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Abstract 
This research describes how security was being implemented in the smartphone 
marketplace, specifically on Android smartphones.  
The initial work concentrated on security and antivirus app permissions and the APIs 
that were called. The gap between permissions and functionality was examined.   
The first stage involved the antivirus apps that were available in 2011. All 22 free and 
commercial apps were compared and investigated to determine if there was any 
relationship between the functions and permissions requested between the two 
variants. A process tool was developed to extract and analys 
e the apps.  
Stage two, in 2015, consisted of an update of the earlier 2011 investigation and was 
performed to determine the maturity of antivirus apps over the 4 years. All 67 apps in 
2015 were compared to the apps from 2011 and the changes between the apps were 
evaluated. There were some tools available that could assist in this investigation and 
the extraction and an automated analysis method was developed called Permission 
Extraction and Method Process (P.E.M.P.).  This reduced the extraction and 
evaluation processing times from 10 hours for 20 apps to less than 30 minutes. 
Subsequent development has reduced the time further. 
In Stage 3, the research moved from analysis of security apps to analyzing 60 free 
Children’s apps. As the market place had evolved to supplying apps with adware or 
in-app purchases rather than offering paid apps, 20 of the top free game apps for each 
age group; 0-5 years, 6-9 years and over 9 years. The research concentrated initially 
on the evaluation of privacy and security of children with the apps installed and if 
there were differences between the permissions requested in the different age groups. 
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Stage 4 of the research developed and created a model of the impact of social and 
psychological contracts through the installation and use of the apps. In addition, this 
thesis makes contribution of a model for the comparison of an app to evaluate the 
user’s expectation of privacy and if the app is fulfilling the social contract between the 
user, developer and marketplace owner.  
 
Keywords:  Security, Android, Smartphone, Privacy, Social Contracts, Antivirus, 
Children, Psychological Contracts. 
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 Introduction 
This thesis investigates security and privacy on mobile devices. From initial 
investigation into device protection the thesis analyses people protection and 
recommends guidelines for Regulators, Marketplaces and developers to ensure 
that user information is not abused. The thesis concludes with framework, 
initially created for measuring the efficacy of antivirus apps and subsequently 
updated to measure and display the privacy status of the app and its impact on 
the privacy of the user as related to Social and Physiological contracts.  
The initial null hypothesis of the research was that antivirus apps for Android 
mobile devices was not effective. This was in response to the hypothesis that 
Security apps protected the user.  
As a security professional, the author was concerned that security products 
were being marketed to mobile users that were not fulfilling the function of 
protecting the user from malware. 
The purpose of the study was to analyse existing security and antivirus 
products to determine their effectiveness in protecting the user. What 
vulnerabilities or gaps exist in the protection and who should be responsible 
for the protection of the user and what the user expects from the product. 
The questions to be answered were; are security and antivirus products 
protecting the user, what are the shortfalls in the protection and how can it be 
improved? With an additional question related to user privacy, does the 
security app introduce vulnerabilities onto the device and make the user or 
their data insecure? 
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The lack of available protection meant that the average user was open to attack, 
vulnerabilities on their device were not being fixed, updates to their phones 
operating system were not occurring on a regular basis to resolve and close 
those vulnerabilities. As the computing power of these devices increased 
owners of these devices started to use them in place of PCs (laptops and 
desktops). The protection of these devices was in a similar state to the PC 
market place in the early 2000’s. 
The aim of the research was to provide users with the knowledge to protect 
themselves, primarily by providing the user with a simple snapshot of their 
security status.  
As vulnerabilities to the user’s data was detected the research scope increased 
to incorporate privacy analysis and therefore provide the user with a snapshot 
of the impact to the user’s privacy whilst using an app. 
The growth of mobile devices and the increase in their capabilities has meant 
that smartphones shipments in 2012 were almost 3 times higher than shipments 
of Notebook PCs, 694.8 million units as compared to 215.7 million. (“Mobile 
device market to reach 2.6 billion units by 2016 | Canalys,” 2013).  
Previous research concentrated on the effects and workings of the apps in 
general, mainly consisting of the API calls made by the apps, geo-tracking of 
the user, identifying and testing malicious apps and the use of permissions to 
identify these malicious apps.  
The geo-tracking research performed by Balakrishnan et al on real-time privacy 
monitoring (Balakrishnan, Nayak, Dhar, & Kaul, 2009), concentrated on 
permissions, whilst Gibler et al reviewed potential privacy leaks (Gibler, 
Crussell, Erickson, & Chen, 2012). 
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Identification of malicious intent focussed on the basic mobile device functions; 
accessing private information, calling or texting premium numbers without the 
user’s knowledge, but did not concentrate on specific types or genres of apps. 
Results of the research was presented by summarising the number of apps that 
could perform these functions but again did not detail this by genre. The 
malicious apps were also immature, the analysis of malware, for example 
Trojans, installed through phishing showed how data was captured and with 
the antivirus market being so immature, there was no adequate protection for 
the user.  
Spyware was also prolific, although it did require physical access to the device 
for installation. The spyware was also able to hide itself on the mobile to avoid 
detection by the user. Existing antivirus products had difficulty in detecting 
these hidden programs. Additional security vulnerabilities were introduced by 
the user through “rooting”1 the device, which facilitated the installation of 
malware. 
Security protection was limited and many of the main security companies had 
not started releasing security products for mobiles. Android devices were 
particularly vulnerable to malware due to the open source nature of the 
operating System. Eventually with the growth of mobile forensics and the 
alignment to digital forensics researchers were able to evaluate the forensic 
data to review security holes in the android operating systems. 
Academic research continued concentrating on the devices and the API calls, 
but privacy research lagged physical and software research. The main privacy 
issues investigated related to wireless security. Brunk (Brunk, 2002) conducted 
                                                 
 
1 Rooting the device permitted the user to install apps from sites other than Google. 
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a detailed examination on 133 privacy tools and services and using analytical 
techniques created a framework which describes a “privacy space”. 
The main source of understanding privacy was the article by Brunk in 2002. He 
switched the perspective of privacy from the viewpoint of threats and 
intrusions to the persons perspective of how their privacy was being invaded. 
He analysed a variety of packages freeware, shareware, and other solutions he 
was investigating this on the PC or desktop arena. 
Tsavli (Tsavli, Efraimidis, Katos, & Mitrou, 2015) used Brunk’s work as a base 
to explore privacy concerns of mobile devices, which apps were storing data 
about the user, and if these could be used to detect trends in the user usage. 
The paper explored dataflow of users’ personal information and a data 
taxonomy was proposed. 
A major hole in research was how security changes due to multiple external 
influences and how corporations should be more responsible was not 
investigated and research concentrated on the detection test and notification of 
the malware for creating virus signatures. However, many of the initial 
antivirus apps tested did not have access to or use a virus signature database, 
which made malware detection very limited. 
The objective was to test all security apps with an antivirus component and 
determine their effectiveness. The approach was to evaluate the antivirus apps 
first by using the android permission model to confirm functionality and then 
to test each app with viruses and virus signatures. The privacy impact of the 
apps was also tested to determine if there was a negative impact to the user 
installing and running the app. (Part of the test process was to compare the 
apps functions with its advertised functions.) And to provide the user with a 
simple snapshot of the efficacy of an antivirus app and the privacy impact to 
the user to apps that the user has downloaded and installed. 
Key terms used in the research are; 
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Security and antivirus apps are software programs that run on mobile devices to protect 
the device from software attack.  
Privacy and its impact on users was described by Brunk on his paper on Understanding 
the Privacy Space (Brunk, 2002). The privacy impact to the user is hard to quantify as 
the monetary value of a users’ information is not defined.  
Social contracts are the voluntary agreements reached between individuals within a 
society. In this research, a social contract is an agreement between a user and the app 
developer. In this case the user purchases an app and expects to be able to use/play the 
app.  
A psychological contract differs from a social contract as it is predominately used to 
define a contract between employer and employee. In this research this type of contract 
is applied to the relationship between a user of the app and the app developer and 
marketplace (app provider). A new definition of the contracts as related to app users 
and providers is proposed. 
There are several contributions to research that have been made, these are: 
1. A robust automated process to extract and analyses android permissions 
2. A unique historical database that contains the source code and package 
code of all antivirus apps on the Google Play Store in 2011 and 2015. In 
the research all security packages which contained an antivirus 
component in 2011 and in 2015 were extracted and their source code 
maintained in a database for future analysis. Testing of all antivirus 
products in 2011 was unique, the major antivirus test organisation, 
AV_test.org only started testing android antivirus apps in 2014. 
3. The research crosses the boundary between technology and psychology, 
mainly by assessing mobile apps as they relate to social and 
psychological contracts and defining Android permissions in 
psychological terms. 
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4. The creation of a framework which is used to illustrate the efficacy of an 
antivirus app. The creation of a privacy impact framework model. This 
display model takes the output from the initial analysis of an antivirus 
app and provides the user with an immediate display of the privacy 
impact of the app on the user. 
There are several limitations of the research; 
· The antivirus testing is performed using snapshots in 2011 and 2015 and 
the antivirus apps in the study are products available on the Google 
marketplace only and not on other app provider sites. 
· Access to testing equipment limited the number of tests that could be 
performed on the antivirus apps, primarily the number of malware 
available for testing and their criticality, specifically zero-day malware. 
· There was a limitation on the number of antivirus apps available at the 
time of testing, although there was a greater number in 2015, the 
marketplace was still immature with many of the specialist security 
companies not providing apps. 
· The research was performed on a part-time basis and would’ve 
benefited by testing all the antivirus apps each year over a five-year time 
span to record the evolution of the antivirus apps every year, rather than 
a before and after snapshot.  
· The research assumed that the apps would be similar across the different 
operating platforms. The research only concentrated on Android 
antivirus apps and could have benefitted with a comparison of iOS 
antivirus apps and Android apps to determine if the apps provided by 
the same company were more effective on the different platforms.  
The format of the research and layout of the thesis follows. The research starts 
with a review of mobile devices, operating systems and how users are being 
protected whilst using the devices. The initial objective was to evaluate security 
apps to determine their efficacy and if they really protected the user. This initial 
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premise evolved into creating a permission extraction method to automate the 
manually download, transfer, extraction and analysis of the apps. The process 
was tested on other app genres to verify the robustness of the method. Analysis 
of other genres necessitated changing the hypothesis to test for privacy issues 
instead of security ones.  
The research progressed from assessing and analysing the physical device to 
the available third-party security software. As the Android operating systems 
is permission based, a modicum of security was built in to prevent apps from 
using unauthorised system resources or accessing data or coding in other apps. 
Analysis of the permissions being requested showed that the requesting of 
permissions was arbitrary and the responsibility of deciding which 
permissions to use were left entirely to the developer. Analysis of the 
permissions requested to perform the antivirus function was tested. None of 
the controls in place were protecting the user and analysis of the interaction 
between the operating system and these apps demonstrated that the user had 
no benefit by using free or commercial security products.  
Further analysis of the app permissions showed that the user’s information was 
being obtained with uninformed consent. The user was unaware of what 
information was being gathered and how it was being used and by whom. This 
prompted the research to progress into the privacy ramifications of the data 
collected and use and if this was beneficial to the user by applying social and 
psychological concepts to the agreements. This led to the analysis of the 
collection of user information related to the protection of user privacy, 
especially with the future GDPR regulations being mandated in the EU in 2018. 
The research also reviewed later versions of the antivirus apps to determine if 
the app had evolved and improved in protecting the user. To test the efficacy a 
framework was developed that provided a snapshot of the antivirus app 
efficacy. As privacy had been reviewed in testing the automation process the 
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efficacy framework was adapted to test the privacy impact that apps had on 
the user. 
The research concludes with a model defining privacy levels of Android 
permissions and how to evaluate their effect on the user of the app. Advice is 
provided on how to evaluate the privacy status of an app using a simple “fuel 
gauge” diagram and how the user can view and request the data held on the 
user.   
To perform the research, security apps available in the Google Store from 2011 
to 2015 were analysed for efficacy and privacy and subsequently Children’s 
apps from each genre were compared to determine if there were changes to the 
privacy controls for different age groups.   
In 2011, free Security apps that contained an Antivirus component were 
investigated for their efficacy. Most of the apps did not perform the Antivirus 
adequately to protect the user’s device. Some of the app developers also 
provided a commercial variant. The research then concentrated on comparing 
the free and commercial variants to determine if the commercial variant 
provided any additional functionality and if it was effective. A comparison of 
the source data was performed to determine if there was any difference 
between the variants. 
In 2015, using the same keyword criteria as in 2011, 67 apps were downloaded 
and analysed for efficacy. This was an increase of 30 from the number of apps 
available in 2011. The apps that were available in 2011 and 2015 were selected 
for comparative testing. An automated testing method had been developed 
between 2011 and 2015, called PEMP. The originally extracted 2011 apps were 
prepared for analysis using this final method.  
To confirm the robustness of the P.E.M.P method Children’s apps were selected 
due to the sensitive nature of children’s protection. The top twenty apps from 
each of the three age groups were analysed. Initially the expectation was that 
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children were unprotected and were being tracked and monitored through 
these apps.  
The results from the analysis prompted a review of apps in relation to the new 
data protection laws, GDPR. The privacy requirements described in the GDPR 
articles raised questions around the ownership and accountability of the 
marketplace owner and the developer. This in turn raised questions on the 
social and psychological contracts between the user and the app 
owner/distributor.  
A solution to address the responsibility of app owners and distributors is 
provided and discussed and is adaptable to any genre of apps. 
The document starts by describing mobile devices, crime related to the devices 
and what is available to protect the device. This leads to the chapter which 
describes the Android operating system and how the various components 
interconnect. 
The next chapter introduces the software available to protect the device and an 
analysis of the software for efficacy. 
Chapter 5 describes the PC test environment, the software requirements and 
how to ready the mobile device to test the apps. 
The following chapter describes the analysis of the apps from 2011 and 2015 
and the comparison of the apps available in 2011 and 2015. 
Chapter 7 describes the P.E.M.P. developed during the research. 
This is followed by an analysis of children’s apps to determine the privacy 
implications of children’s apps. 
Social and psychological contracts are reviewed in Chapter 9 and includes the 
GDPR articles and their required adherence by May 2018. 
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Chapter 10 provides the results of the testing and tools that are available to 
mitigate the issues uncovered in the research. 
Chapter 11 contains proposals to control or eliminate issues and has guidance 
for regulators and a method to evaluate apps in relationship to the user’s 
privacy. 
Chapter 12 and the appendices contain information about additional tools to 
remove permissions from apps, input tables used in the research and 
information on the Android operating system to provide background for the 
reader. 
All figures and tables in the thesis apply to global data and information unless 
otherwise specified. 
1.1 Mobile Devices 
There is a great deal of material available to assist consumers and enterprises 
in choosing security and Antivirus software to secure standard computing 
equipment; laptops, netbooks, desktops, etc. This comparative information is 
not yet widely available in the mobile sector (Smartphones, e-readers, iPads 
etc.) where the increase in acquisition of these devices has far outstripped the 
growth of legacy platforms. Additional issues are also introduced as the users 
of the devices either do not know or do not care about the potential security 
vulnerabilities of the devices, and the increase in criminal activity targeting the 
devices. There are many documents and advice, in the format of blogs and 
white papers, and company promotional material available to aid consumers 
and enterprises in securing standard computing equipment; laptops, netbooks, 
desktops, etc. There are also a variety of tools which are freely available to 
perform vulnerability assessments of these devices and networks that they use 
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for connectivity, e.g. Nessus (http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus/), 
Nmap (http://www.nmap.org) and Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.org), 
to name but a few. However, this availability of tools and knowledge had not 
transferred into the mobile sector (Smartphones, e-readers, tablets etc.). In this 
sector the increase in acquisition of these device types continued to exceed the 
growth of legacy platforms (laptops, netbooks), PCs and shipments increased 
to 92.1 Million in the last quarter of 2010 (“Tablet Computers Hold Back PC 
Sales Growth,” 2011) whilst Smartphones grew by over 100 Million in the same 
period (Canalys, 2011). 
This thesis identifies the Antivirus applications that are available as both free 
and commercial products for Android Smartphones, analyses them to discover 
any differences between the free and commercial apps and the privacy issues 
associated with the apps. These apps are then reviewed 4 years later to 
investigate the maturity of the apps, if they still exist, what new apps are 
available and how the existing apps have matured. Children’s apps are then 
investigated to determine if the privacy issues detected in the antivirus apps 
exist in the children’s games apps across different age ranges. This theme was 
continued in the light of the impending GDPR regulation required by any 
company trading in the EU. The thesis then concludes with the proposal for a 
privacy monitor which can be used by consumers and developers to determine 
if the apps contravene privacy requirements, especially with respect to the new 
GDPR regulations in Europe. 
 
1.2 Online Crime 
There is a great deal of material Online crime took off as a serious crime in 2004 
(Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 2009) after actors had realized the potential 
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opportunities once amateur hackers had shown the ease that websites could be 
defaced and malicious software circulated. Criminals have moved from cloning 
ATM cards and stealing pin numbers, to insider call centre employees 
collecting password data to establish entire networks, where wrongdoers have 
specialized roles and trade skills and resources with each other (Thomas & 
Martin, 2006). A new specialized role has emerged, that of a “botnet herder” (a 
person who manages a large collection of compromised computers and rents 
them out to spammers, phishermen and other actors to enable their criminal 
activities. 
One of the ways to steal data (banking info, passwords, etc.) is to introduce 
malware onto the device.  As most spyware requires physical access to the 
device, the goal of the attacker is to trick or persuade the user to install the 
malware themselves, thereby removing the obstacle of physical access.  
There are a variety of methods in use to place malware on portable devices.  
Android vulnerabilities permit actors to install malware without the user’s 
knowledge. One example was the unsuspecting user downloads an application 
from the manufacturer’s store which is fake but contains malware injected into 
the application and placed on the app store. One example of this was the case 
of the Fake Angry Bird update application, that downloaded additional apps 
which accessed the phones contact list, location and SMS functionality, and 
transmitted it to a remote server (Goodin, 2010).  
Other methods are to infect the device whilst the user is browsing the web, a 
strategy commonly called a Drive by Exploit, (Lu, Yegneswaran, Porras, & Lee, 
2010) whereby the user’s device is infected merely by visiting the website, or 
where the device’s off the shelf OS security has been breached by “Jailbreaking” 
which leaves the device vulnerable to malicious software, as in the case of the 
Dutch phones with default SSH credentials (Lu et al., 2010) and in further 
exploitation of the vulnerability with the iKee.A as described by Porras et al in 
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their analysis of the ikee worm in Australia (Porras, Saïdi, & Yegneswaran, 
2010).   
 
1.3 Malware Growth 
Mobile phones are growing at an unprecedented rate, overall the Smartphone 
sector grew by 64% in the year from 2Q2009 to 2Q2010 (“Google Android 
phone shipments increase by 886%,” 2010). With the sale of Android phones 
growing by 886% and Apple’s iPhone growth was around 61% during the same 
period. Although the Android growth slowed to 148.1% between 4Q 2010 and 
4Q2011 its share of the market grew to over 51%, thus becoming the most 
popular mobile operating system (Canalys, 2011) in Table 1-1. 
 
Table 1-1 Worldwide Smartphone market, in 2010 
Operating 
system  
Q2 2010 
shipments  
% 
share  
Q2 2009 
shipments  
% 
share  
% Growth  
Symbian 27,129,340 43.5 19,178,910  50.3 41.5 
RIM 11,248,830  18.0 7,975,950  20.9 41 
Android 10,689,290  17.1 1,084,240  2.8 885.9 
Apple 8,411,910  13.5 5,211,560  13.7 61.4 
Microsoft 3,083,060  4.9 3,431,380  9.0 -10.2 
Others 1,851,830  3.0 1,244,620  3.3 48.8 
Total 62,414,260  100 38,126,660  100 63.3 
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The table shows the worldwide market share and growth of the share of the 
smartphone operating systems from 2009 to 2010.  Although in 2010 Symbian 
(by Nokia) had the major market share, the introduction of multiple cheap 
Android handsets from a small number of manufacturers has fuelled the 
growth of the Android market to take the biggest market share in 2011. This 
indicates that the sector is probably growing faster than controls can be 
developed to secure the products, this is like the growth of PCs within the 
general population in 1999 and the subsequent development of security 
controls, Firewalls, Antivirus, anti-Spyware applications, etc. 
It was therefore natural to believe that there would be an increase in criminal 
activity in proportion to the growth of the Android operating system market 
share.  
As an operating system becomes more prominent, actors are adapting the 
malware to target it. Initially actors adapted PC viruses and Trojans to the 
mobile market as in the case of the Zeus Trojan, which once installed uses the 
mobile to forward SMS messages, bypassing the 2FA (two factor 
authentication) systems used by a variety of UK banks to confirm identification 
by forwarding the Banks SMS containing a one-time-password (Raywood, 
2010) to the actor. The installation of this sort of malware would normally be 
prevented by the Antivirus software on the device, but this is not a standard 
installation for Smartphones during 2010. Android handsets are very 
susceptible to these types of threats due to the availability of the open source 
of their operating system. Their applications are also available outside of the 
control of the Google Marketplace (https://market.android.com/) on a variety 
of online sites. Research has been conducted in the placement of malware 
masquerading as a legitimate application on the Marketplace.  
However, in 2011 applications already containing malware are were infiltrating 
the Google Operating system faster than the increase in malware attacks 
against personal computers at a similar stage of development (Browning, 2011).  
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Vincent Wafer, senior vice president of McAfee Labs, said the year so far 
(referring to 2011) has seen "record-breaking numbers of malware, especially 
on mobile devices," and directly in proportion to the devices' increase in 
popularity. One of the most favoured techniques is infecting apps so users 
download and spread the malware themselves. Other trends, he said, include 
attacks that are stealthier and more sophisticated, which could mean some 
attacks go unnoticed for a substantial period. Stealth attacks have increased 
more than 38 percent over the last year (Ally Zwahlen, Heather Edekk, 2011). 
Subsequent attacks and the availability of re-packaged applications pre-
infected with malware (Taylor, 2010) forced the release of an application by 
Google for the removal of malware from infected devices (Kellex, 2011). Google 
notified affected users by email and supplied the removal tool, called Android 
Market Security, on the marketplace. Once the application has run and 
removed the malware, the application then removes itself from the device. 
1.3.1 Malware Examples 
Mobile malware has evolved since the initial Symbian viruses that spread via 
Bluetooth in 2007. In 2008, malware stole data and directed text messages to 
premium-rate numbers. 2010 saw the introduction of malware on iOS and the 
first ever trojan on Android. A detailed table of the Android malware evolution 
is included in Appendix D. 
The following table (Table 1-2) provides a summary of the Android Malware 
released over a one-year period between August 2010 and August 2011.  
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Table 1-2 Android Malware release 2010 to 2011 
Date Malware Name 
Aug 9 2010 SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a 
Aug 17 2010 AndroidOS_Droisnake.A 
Sep 14 2010 SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.b 
Oct 13 2010 SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.c 
Dec 29 2010 Android.Geinimi 
Feb 14 2011 Android.Adrd AKA Android.HongTouTou 
Feb 22, 2011  Android.Pjapps 
Mar 1, 2011  Android.DroidDream AKA Android.Rootcager AKA AndroidOS_Lootoor.A 
Mar 9, 2011  Android.BgServ AKA Troj/Bgserv-A AKA AndroidOS_BGSERV.A 
Mar 20, 2011  Android.Zeahache 
Mar 30, 2011  Android.Walkinwat 
May 9, 2011  Android.Adsms AKA AndroidOS_Adsms.A 
May 11, 2011  Android.Zsone AKA Android.Smstibook 
May 22, 2011  Android.Spacem 
May 31, 2011  Android.LightDD 
Jun 6, 2011  Android/DroidKungFu.A AKA Android.Gunfu 
Jun 9, 2011  Android.Basebridge 
Jun 9, 2011  Android.Uxipp AKA Android/YZHCSMS.A  
Jun 10, 2011  Andr/Plankton-A AKA Android.Tonclank   
Jun 15, 2011  Android.Jsmshider 
Jun 20, 2011  Android.GGTracker 
Jul 1, 2011  Android.KungFu Variants 
Jul 3, 2011  AndroidOS_Crusewin.A AKA Android.Crusewind 
Jul 6, 2011  AndroidOS_SpyGold.A AKA Android.GoldDream 
Jul 8, 2011  DroidDream Light Variant 
Jul 11, 2011  Android.Smssniffer AKA Andr/SMSRep-B/C AKA Android.Trojan.SmsSpy.B/C AKA Trojan-
Spy.AndroidOS.Smser.a 
Jul 12, 2011  Android.HippoSMS AKA Android.Hippo 
Jul 15, 2011  Android.Fokonge 
Jul 15, 2011  Android/Sndapps.A AKA Android.Snadapps 
 
Jul 27, 2011  Android.Nickispy 
Jul 28, 2011  Android.Lovetrap 
Aug2 2011  Android.Premiumtext 
Aug 9, 2011  Android.NickiBot 
 
One example of a major infection in 2011 was DroidDream. This malware had 
the capability to root the mobile and install infected applications without direct 
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intervention by the user. The malware operated between 11pm and 8am which 
the developers determined were the quietest time, termed “Dream time” and 
the phone would be rarely used. This resulted in Google supplying an app on 
the Play Store (Kellex, 2011) to scan apps and remove the malware infected app 
on the user’s device, it was not able to repair the app. Since Android V6.0 
(Marshmallow) Google has provided a facility to manage any app’s 
permissions (Hoffman, 2017). Again, there was no guidance to which 
permission to deactivate. 
Currently there are a variety of malware targeting the Android operating 
system, a few of these are; SMS Trojans (examples are RuFraud, Fancy), 
Trojans/bots (examples are DroidDream, Basebridge, PJapps, DroidKungFu), 
SMS/Spyware (examples are NickySpy, Mobi stealth, ZiTMO, SpiTMO) and 
Dataleak. 
1.4 Anti-Malware Protection  
The Antivirus products for legacy PC environment has matured greatly since 
its introduction in the late 1980s to early ‘1990s. At that time malware was 
introduced into the device by sharing files between users, either via email or 
by sharing floppy disks. The introduction of the World Wide Web made file 
sharing easier and also made many devices open to attack from the web, this 
lead to a proliferation of online crime in 2004 (Moore et al., 2009) once hackers 
had demonstrated the ease that websites could be defaced and malicious 
software circulated. 
Antivirus software was first designed to detect and remove computer viruses. 
The software has developed to detect and remove a variety of malware, 
including worms (a self-replicating virus), Trojan Horses (a malicious program 
that appears harmless), rootkits (a collection of program tools that enable an 
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attacker to have administrative access and remain hidden from the user), 
spyware (spies on the user and violates the user’s privacy), keyloggers 
(monitors and records each keystroke that the user types), ransomware (hijacks 
the users data by encryption it and demanding a ransom to provide the user 
with the decryption key), and adware (banners or pop ups that advertise 
products. The malevolent ones point to a website so that malware can be 
installed on the device). 
There are now a variety of free and commercial antivirus  products available 
for the user to choose from that will detect and remove malware. To assist in 
the choice research has been conducted into the effectiveness of these products 
(“AV Test Reports,” 2011) and the comparison results are published regularly 
and even graded by the reviewers (“Top ten reviews,” 2011). 
1.4.1Antivirus Functions 
The objective of any Antivirus product is to prevent a device being infected 
with malware. This is achieved by either preventing the malware installing 
onto the device and removing any existing malware detected on the device. To 
do this the product must be able to detect incoming malware and prevent it 
installing and detect any pre-installed malware and remove it. 
Detection of incoming malware is known as Real Time Monitoring and consists 
of scanning downloads (programs and documents), emails and messages (SMS 
and MMS) and preventing the installation of the malware onto the device by 
either deleting it or quarantining it into a secure non-executable environment. 
Detecting pre-installed malware is performed by scanning the device for 
malware also either removing or quarantining it.    
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Antivirus products use a two-pronged approach to detect malware; basic and 
advanced. Basic detection consists of hashing the suspected file and comparing 
it to a known virus “signature”. The advanced detection uses a heuristic 
approach, which is behaviour based and assigns a score to the suspected file 
depending on a combination of factors, e.g. malicious links, code behaviour, 
etc. The score is then used to indicate if the file is infected or not. If both 
approaches are used, then the product would require a “signature” database 
which would need to be updated as new signatures are created. If only the 
advanced approach is used then although the signature database is not 
required, the product may detect more false positives than by using a combined 
approach.  
1.4.2 Antivirus on Mobile Devices 
Smartphones by their nature are continually connected to a network and are 
ready to receive calls and messages. Wireless networks are less secure, and the 
device communication is open to interception (sniffing) and Man-in-the-
Middle attacks. Being always connected also increases the time available for an 
attacker to monitor and access the device to obtain banking security codes or 
to install malware on the device. Data encryption is not installed and 
configured as standard (unlike iOS smartphones) which means that data is 
readable and useable if physically accessed. Pins and Password technologies 
which are available on most smartphones are predominately not activated, 
therefore facilitating access to the data once the device is physically acquired. 
Malware is also introduced to the device on receipt of an infected message 
(SMS, MMS, email attachment) or downloaded from a website, as was the case 
with the Fake Angry Bird app (Goodin, 2010) or even by accessing a website as 
is the case with Drive-by-exploits (Lu et al., 2010).   
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Attackers have now progressed to offering ranges of free apps, normally with 
advertising, that can track the user’s activity, read their contacts or SMS texts, 
or take control of the phone’s functions. A recent article in The Sunday Times 
described how 70% of users rarely or never read the Terms and Conditions 
when they download an app (Henry & Flyn, 2012), which in most cases 
requested permissions from the user to access their private data and the 
handset’s functions, including well known apps like Facebook and Twitter. The 
article continued with a description of the information that could be gleaned 
from the device and the types of functions that the app could control. The 
number of these intrusive apps are increasing as developers realize the income 
from advertising exceeds the income from selling an app, with one company 
producing one free app a week and expecting to have created more than 1,000 
by the end of 2013 (Henry & Flyn, 2012).  
Antivirus software will not prevent all exploits but will aid in protecting the 
device when accessing an infected site and preventing the downloading and 
installation of infected files and messages. 
In 2012, Gibler et al (Gibler et al., 2012) used a static analysis tool AndroidLeaks 
to  evaluate privacy leaks of Android apps. Of the 24,350 apps tested, 7,414 
showed potential privacy leaks, of which 2,342 were manually verified leaking 
privacy data.    They also concluded that the requested permissions are not 
informing the user of how they are being used. They also had concerns about 
the install adware and what data was being collected on the user. They used a 
program analysis tool WALA to process the Java source and bytecode but had 
to perform the mapping manually. In my research I created an extraction and 
analysis tool in Python to perform this called PEMP (see Chapter 7).  However, 
their research also tested adware libraries, where my research concentrated on 
the apps, the genre types and the privacy issues in the genres rather than the 
apps. 
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 Literature Review 
The previous chapter introduced the mobile devices available at the time of the 
research and how online crime and malware grew to match the popularity and 
growth of these devices. 
This chapter describes the research active at the time of this study and how that 
research scope has grown to match the increase in handset availability and use.  
Initially mobile devices were large, and the battery pack was carried 
separately. The devices contained proprietary software, e.g. Symbian by Nokia 
and RIM by Blackberry. Android was developed by Android Inc. and was 
bought out by Google in 2005.  The Android operating system is based on a 
Linux kernel and has gradually taken over as the most common OS for mobile 
devices.  
As the most common OS and as an open source product research started with 
reviewing the Android operating system concentrating on the API calls of the 
OS and then to security of the device and privacy issues such as Geo Tracking.  
S mobile systems (Vennon & Stroop, 2010) performed a threat analysis of the 
Android market. Here the author describes the openness of the Android 
environment, the flexibility of any-one has access to develop apps and publish 
apps. He identified the market security model, where it is the community’s 
responsibility to identify and test if an app is malicious. He described the Bank 
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phishing malware Droid09. However, there is no process for the detection, test 
and notification of malware. He explained the difficulty of detecting virus 
signatures. 
Developers are required to declare their permissions for the app. The author 
described a method and technology to determine potential malicious apps 
depending on the permissions. 
They performed a market analysis of 48,694 apps (68% of the 2010 apps 
available for download) and noted that 20% requested permissions that could 
access private information and 5% that could call any number without user 
intervention and 3% could send a premium SMS message.  
This analysis was used create a behaviour-based detection model. (patent 
pending). 
Sandminer, a context aware sound Trojan was used as an example of a trojan 
developed to steal user’s credit card data and have access to the microphone 
and dialler (Schlegel, Zhang, & Zhou, 2011). The authors explored the increase 
in data-stealing malware on mobile phones and how antivirus companies are 
moving their products from the PC arena to mobiles. They showed how 
supposedly secure apps could be attacked and sensitive information, like credit 
card data, could be detected. This is achieved by the trojan recording the digits 
from a user’s conservation (either spoken or typed).  The research did not 
provide a solution but suggested a defence to sensory malware.  
Xu et al (Xu et al., 2009) described using the video function to capture data and 
developed a video spyware called Stealthy Video Capture, to record the video. 
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New security services were described by Enck et al (Enck, Ongtang, & 
McDaniel, 2009) and methods for retrofitting security requirements in 
Android, a method for certifying apps at install time. They provide a product 
Kirin as a security add-in to supplement the then existing security framework.   
A set of rules were defined, and security requirements were identified. 
Individual permissions were designated as “dangerous”. Although their 
malware mitigation rules provided rules for single and multiple permissions, 
there was no investigation into how some combination of permissions could 
be identified as potentially dangerous if used concurrently. They tested the top 
20 applications in each of the 16 categories (a total of 311 apps). Only 12 failed 
their 9 security rules. Some of these were false positives where the app required 
the permission described to function. They also discovered flaws in the 
operating system that permitted malicious apps to make API calls without the 
required permissions. 
More recently researchers created or reviewed mobile forensics to analyse 
mobile device security. In Digital forensics, investigators use similar 
techniques to obtain evidence from Mobiles and PCs.  Mobiles have a limited 
amount of storage, so the main function of the forensic tools are to extract 
personal data. Most of the mobile companies have proprietary Sockets to access 
the device, even if they are using open source operating systems and more 
models are increasingly available. Vinit Shah (Shah, 2012) described a model 
that forensic scientists could use as part of their forensic extraction.  
Dehghantanha et al (Dehghantanha, Udzir, & Mahmod, 2011) discussed 
mobile device functions and possible vulnerabilities and proposed a security 
model to protect the data on these devices. Their research described the 
vulnerabilities and how the loss of data affects the user and their company if 
the user has a COU (company owned unit). A financial figure for this loss has 
not been stated. The top ten cyber security risks were described by the SANS 
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group (a leading source for information security and training) in 2009. One 
point raised in the paper was that as these devices were connected to the 
computer at some stages, to perform synchronisation or backups/restores, the 
malware could move to the computer. Additionally, was the discussion on 
how the isolation of apps (sandboxing in the Android environment) made it 
difficult for Antivirus apps to detect malware.  
Thus, was the case in this research, where it showed in 2011 that Antivirus apps 
were not effective. 
The research concluded that mobile devices needed security protection, 
especially as the devices were being used more and more in the commercial 
world. 
Felt et al (A. P. Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song, & Wagner, 2011) provided an in-depth 
analysis of Android permissions. They created and built a tool called 
Stowaway that detected privileges in API calls.  The tool was used on 940 
applications and detected that a third of these apps were over-privileged. Their 
research then moved to analysing the API’s permissions and the tool calculates 
the maximum number of permissions that an app needed. 40 applications were 
used to verify the tool efficacy and compared to the manual calculation. Their 
conclusion was that the extra permissions was caused by developer confusion. 
Stowaway has since been superseded by PScout in 2012. The PScout tool was 
developed by Wain et al (Wain, Au, Zhou, Huang, & Lie, 2012). Again, the 
research was performed across the plethora of Android apps and not at a 
specific genre. 
The main research was into API calls and if the app was obtaining more access 
than was required to perform the function of the app. 
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In my research I decided to concentrate into specific genres and if the 
permissions requested were adequate or excessive to perform their function. 
The initial genre was in the utility genre, specifically Security apps as they were 
the first line of defence to protect the user. 
An earlier paper into wireless security and privacy (Katos & Adams, 2005) 
explored the relationship between wireless security and privacy. They 
introduced the concepts of security and privacy and how the concept of 
security changes over time due to multiple external influences and especially 
in response to the increase in malware. They equated the “focus on privacy 
because of increased awareness of human rights”.   The paper mainly 
concentrated on the responsibilities of corporations to “adopt appropriate 
policies to conform to privacy rules”, here the responsibility was placed on the 
user (corporation) to protect themselves.   
A paper focusing on privacy tools (Brunk, 2002), performed a detailed 
examination of 133 privacy-related tools and services. The examination 
discovered 1,241 features relating to privacy. Their work formulated a 
framework to describe "privacy space" and provided a statistical analysis of the 
raw data. The paper concentrated on the software tools from a user perspective 
and reviewed a sample of web sites. Due to time constraints he was only able 
to evaluate 50 sites. 
The solutions investigated were in many formats, freeware, shareware, 
adware, spyware and demonstration packages (a.k.a. crippleware) etc, but did 
not review a group of specific formats. 
Privacy concerns for mobile devices was explored by Tsavli et al (Tsavli et al., 
2015). Then the number of smartphones and apps had increased enormously. 
There were apps that provided business application access e.g. email, file and 
document management, as well as educational apps and games etc. Many of 
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these apps stored data about the user and were used to detect trends in user 
usage of the device and apps as well as enriching the user experience of the 
app. The paper explored the data flow of the user’s personal information. A 
“data taxonomy” was proposed to determine which data was being requested 
and by whom. The data was defined into one of seven categories and this study 
classified the apps into five different genres.  The results of their research were 
like my research into Antivirus apps showing the lack of control that a user has 
on agreeing to permissions especially related to the fine control of the 
permissions.
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 Evolution of Research 
Design 
The introduction described the available mobile devices, the vulnerability of 
the devices and how they need to be protected. The previous chapter illustrated 
the available research and how this research had concentrated initially on the 
device security and the security of the running software. 
This chapter describes the research design of the study and how it evolved to 
meet the changing environment of the mobile device and Android app market. 
The original research questions were to answer how secure mobile devices 
were, if there was security software available, did it provide more protection 
to the user and was there a difference in protection between free and 
commercial products. 
The Android mobile operating system was selected due to its open source 
nature, which meant that there was more opportunity for coding malware to 
attach the system. All products on the Google Marketplace that contained a 
security keyword were selected. Specifically, security apps that contained an 
Antivirus component. There were a variety of free and commercial apps and 
the research initially concentrated on the differences between the variants of 
these apps. 
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To perform the analysis the app needed to be in a PC readable format. 
In 2011 the process to download and extract the app involved performing the 
upload and installation steps in reverse. 
The app was downloaded to an Android device, in this case a T-mobile G1 
mobile. The app was in Davlik executable format.  
 
Figure 3-1 App Download and Extraction process 
The app is downloaded from the Google Marketplace using the Android 
downloader tool. The software required to perform the transfer and analysis 
are Android Developer tools. 
The time taken to download the app was dependant on the mobile device 
connection and the size of the app, normally took about a couple of minutes. 
The transfer and preparation of the app for analysis was also a manual process 
but took much longer due to the many steps involved. This part of the process 
took approximately 25 minutes. 
This made the preparation of the app for analysis and review a long process 
and limited the selection of the apps to analyse. Details of the process is 
described fully in Chapter 5. 
Download
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.dex file
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•app is 
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A process was also required to obtain the commercial apps at a minimum cost. 
This is described in section 6.2.2 
The design was finalised in 2015. The main aim in 2015 was to be able to obtain 
the app, transfer the app to the PC and perform the analysis automatically. 
The initial refining method involved automating each step and manually 
providing the data for input to each automated process. This involved too 
much manual intervention and an automated process was required to transfer 
the data for input to each step. 
The automation is described fully in the created method, Permission Extraction 
Method and Process (P.E.M.P.) in Chapter 7. 
This method enabled the download, transfer and analysis of each app to under 
5 minutes. The reduction in the download and transfer of the app was greatly 
reduced due to the availability of a new tool in 2012 which provided the ability 
to download the app directly to the PC. The app still needed to be in an input 
format suitable for the disassemble and analysis. The method finalised in 2015 
provided the method to download and process over 60 apps within a 30-
minute window. This was a reduction from 30 minutes to 30 seconds for each 
app. 
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 Antivirus and Anti-Privacy 
(2011-2012)  
The introduction described the available mobile devices, the vulnerability of 
the devices and how they need to be protected.  
This chapter describes the relationship between antivirus and privacy of the 
devices and software. How the device and user should be protected and if the 
software aimed primarily at protecting the user is effective and if there are 
privacy issues with the software. 
Having researched the Android operating system on mobile devices and the 
function of permissions on the apps on the device, the security of the device 
was tested. First the Antivirus functions needed to be defined and understood.  
The Antivirus functions are defined below and linked to the permissions 
needed to perform that function.  
4.1 Antivirus Functions and Permissions 
 To perform Real Time Monitoring, scanning, removal of malware and 
updating of a signature database the app would require access to system 
resources to read incoming messages, downloads and storage and to either 
prevent installation or storage and to delete any pre-existing infections. 
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The table describes the minimum functions that an Antivirus program should 
be able to perform to be effective, the reason that the function is required and 
the threat that the function mitigates. 
Table 4-1 Basic Antivirus Features 
Basic Security Requirements 
Threat mitigation or Reason 
Real time monitoring: 
Scan downloads 
Email scanning 
SMS scanning 
Scanning of apps, files, email, SMS, etc. during download or 
transfer to prevent malware being downloaded and installed on the 
device 
 
Passive Monitoring: 
Device scanning 
 
The ability to perform a scan of the device, either manually or on 
an automatic schedule is needed to detect if malware has been 
introduced to the device via physical access (e.g. SD card, 3rd party 
installing spyware, etc.), or it has slipped though the Real-time 
monitoring. 
Maintenance: 
Virus signature update 
 
Scans should always be performed with the latest virus signatures 
to reduce the incidence of zero-day attacks. 
 
To perform these functions a basic set of permissions are needed, Antivirus 
(AV) Permissions (AV_Perm), for the antivirus app to be effective.  
The following AV_Perms for each of the Antivirus functions are defined and a 
verification method is provided. 
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4.1.1 Real-time monitoring 
Real time monitoring consists of reviewing incoming apps (during downloads) 
and messages (SMS) to detect any malware inside the app code or text message. 
The permissions that would permit this are; 
RECEIVE_MMS - Allows an application to monitor incoming MMS messages, 
to record or perform processing on them. Monitors incoming MMS messages, 
to detect malware and to remove it or to perform other processing on them. 
RECEIVE_SMS - Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them. Monitors incoming SMS messages, to 
detect malware and to remove it or to perform other processing on them. 
 
4.1.2 Malware Removal  
To remove the malware from the device the antivirus product needs to have 
access to the storage areas on the device (RAM, Memory, device storage and 
SD card storage) and to prevent or disable the app if it is running. To access 
these areas the following permissions are needed; 
CLEAR_APP_CACHE - Allows an application to clear the caches of all 
installed applications on the device. Clear the device cache of detected running 
malware. 
DELETE_PACKAGES - Allows an application to delete packages. Deletes 
malware app from the device  
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KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES - Allows the application to call the 
process to force the process to end. Stops process if it is running in the 
background 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE - Allows an application to write to external 
storage. Clears or deletes data on external storage (SD card). 
 
4.1.3 Scanning 
The antivirus app needs access to scan the installed device for malware and to 
remove any infection if it is running. The permissions are;   
GET_TASKS - Allows an application to obtain information about the currently 
or recently running tasks. Obtain information about running tasks or recently 
run tasks. 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE - Allows an app to read from the external 
storage to determine if malware is already installed or if there are infected files 
on the card. 
4.1.4 Update Signature Definitions 
An antivirus app needs to be able to recognise malware and to do this it must 
have access to a database of malware signatures. Signatures are used to detect 
malware that has small variations from the original malware. To do this the 
app must either be able to download the latest signatures or have access to a 
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signature database, or to heuristically predict the malware signature from 
existing available signatures. 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE and CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE - These 
allows applications to access information about networks; used to determine if 
the device is connected to the network and if not to active the network 
connection to either access a cloud signature file or download signature 
updates. 
INTERNET - Allows applications to open network sockets and connect to the 
Internet. 
4.2 Antivirus Verification Method 
This method can be used by a user to verify that their installed antivirus is 
working and detecting malware. To be effective in securing the device an 
Antivirus product should be able to: 
· Scan the device, detect and remove malware 
· Detect malware at download or installation 
· Update a signature file or have access to the latest virus signatures 
Other options which are advantageous but are not necessarily essential are 
automatic or scheduled scanning and automatic updating of the signature file. 
This ensures that the product requires no intervention from the user and is 
protecting the device against the latest attacks.  
Software products containing antivirus should be able to scan and detect 
malware as standard. 
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Figure 4-1 Flowchart illustrating the initial app installation and scan function 
The initial procedure is to download and install the security product that 
contains the Antivirus component.  Once the product is installed, activate the 
app by opening it. In the open app determine if the app needs manual 
intervention to perform a scan? Perform a scan of the handset to provide a base 
for comparison. If the app detects any malware, follow the instructions to 
quarantine or delete the affected file or application. If the mobile has been 
Jailbroken or rooted, then the security app should detect that there is Superuser 
access on the device.  
If this is the case then ignore the message that occurs during scanning that this 
access is suspicious or malware, if the product doesn’t detect the root access 
then the product may not detect rootkits or spyware installed on the device. If 
the app detects Superuser access and you the device has not been Jailbroken or 
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rooted, then follow the instructions to remove the access2. Once the device is 
clean (no malware detected, except for the intended Superuser access), 
deactivate or stop the security product. Once the app is no longer running, 
download a test virus. Test viruses are not malware but contain a malware 
signature and will be detected as malware by the Antivirus software. Two such 
test viruses are P.Defender’s Antivirus TESTVIRUS available from the Google 
marketplace (https://market.android.com/) or the Eicar Test Virus from 
Extorian (http://eicar.org/anti_virus_test_file.htm). Once the test viruses 
have been downloaded, activate the security product and scan the device. The 
app should detect the test virus on the device. 
If you have not done so before, quarantine or remove the test virus as per your 
Antivirus instructions. Then rescan to ensure it has been removed. If the 
product does not detect this test virus, then the product is not performing the 
scanning adequately and is not fully protecting the device.  
Antivirus products should detect malware at time of download to protect the 
device whilst on the Internet or to prevent malware being downloaded over a 
Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connection; this is known as real time monitoring. 
                                                 
 
2 From 2014 the App, SuperSU, available on the Google Play Store removes Root 
access.  
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Figure 4-2  Flowchart illustrating the malware detection. 
The flowchart displays the steps required to perform Real Time Monitoring 
verification. Monitoring is a similar function to scanning but contains 
additional steps due to the proactive nature of the function. The monitor 
analyses the app during download (installation process) for known malware 
or known virus signatures. 
With a clean device (follow previous instructions to scan and remove malware, 
installing the app onto a clean device as in chapter 5.1). Ensure that the security 
product is active and download a test virus onto the device. The product 
should detect this at download and either prevent the download or provide a 
notification that the app contains suspicious content. If the product does not 
detect this test virus and permits installation, perform a scan to verify that it is 
detected by the product, if the malware is not detected then the product is not 
intercepting the download and is therefore not performing real time 
monitoring.   
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Figure 4-3 Flowchart of update of signature file. 
 A signature is an algorithm or hash that identifies a specific virus. A signature 
may be consistent amongst various viruses; in this case an Antivirus scanner 
can use this signature to detect known and new viruses. The signature file 
contains the signatures and is updated when new signatures are detected. To 
maintain effectiveness all Antivirus software should be able to access updates 
to the file or perform heuristic analysis for suspicious content. 
The signature file updates are normally performed automatically but some 
products prefer the user to initiate the file update or only check for updates 
when activated. Check the product settings to verify that updating is 
performed on a schedule or if it is performed manually. If manual update is 
proscribed, then initiate an update request. The expected response is either 
confirmation of the update (and normally the version number of the update) 
or that the database is up-to-date. If the product does not use heuristic analysis 
Antivirus and Anti-privacy  
39 
   
of files, then the lack of updating of the signature file means that the device is 
not protected against newer threats. 
4.3 Anti-privacy Functions and 
Permissions 
There are a variety of permissions that permit an application to access the 
user’s private details on the device. The following permissions requested by 
any of the analysed security app manifest files are deemed to contravene the 
user’s personal privacy. These six permissions are; CALL_PHONE (provides 
the ability to make phone calls without the user’s knowledge), 
GET_ACCOUNTS and MANAGE_ACCOUNTS (obtains a list of the user’s 
service accounts and permits the app to add or delete accounts from this list or 
to read account details, e.g. GMAIL or Facebook or Twitter account ids and 
Pins/passwords), READ_CONTACTS and WRITE_CONTACTS  (read and 
write to the user’s phonebook) and WRITE_CALENDAR (allows an app to 
write but not read the user’s calendar – perversely none of the apps in this 
analysis asked permission to read the calendar). 
4.3.1 Anti-privacy Permissions 
In 2010, Android version 2.2 had a total of 105 permissions that could be 
selected by a developer. Each permission was evaluated to determine if it 
contravened the user’s privacy.  
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The permissions which were considered to cross the concept of privacy were 
recorded in Table 4-2 . The Oxford English Dictionary defines privacy as: 
1. a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other people  
or 
2. the state of being free from public attention:  
Brunk’s research on privacy examined the privacy tools and services on the 
internet and created a framework to describe a privacy space  (Brunk, 2002). 
His research was based from the user perspective, other works had focused on 
technology. He defined Role categories; awareness, detection, prevention, 
response and recovery. This research concentrates on the awareness and 
detection categories and are further divided into four sub categories. Therefore, 
any permission which can be used to monitor activity; track location, overhear 
or spy on the user can be considered as a contra-indication of privacy. 
 
Figure 4-4 Permission types: No privacy issues and two types of Antiprivacy 
concerns 
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There are approximately 25 permissions which either contravene the concept 
of privacy (primary role) or perform secondary roles to enable the devices that 
permit the eavesdropping/monitoring.    
The chart in Figure 4-4 shows the available Android permissions evaluated and 
placed into one of three groups, no privacy concerns, secondary antiprivacy 
concerns and primary antiprivacy infringements.  
However, only the eleven (11) permissions that perform the primary roles are 
marked and described (Table 4-2). To determine the impact on the user’s 
privacy, each of these permissions are given a rating. The ratings are: 
· High – control permits all anti-privacy activities 
· Medium – control permits most but not all anti-privacy activities 
· Low – control permits few but not most anti-privacy activities 
· None – control does not affect user’s privacy 
The permission that is of most concern is the one marked High, which permits 
an app to capture secure video output. This enables the app to track, spy and 
overhear the user. The remaining 80 permissions not affecting Privacy are 
marked None and are not listed here.  
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Table 4-2 Primary anti-privacy permissions and their activity and privacy 
rating 
Permission Description 
Activit
y 
Rating 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
Allows an app to access approximate 
location. 
Track Low 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise location Track Low 
CAMERA 
Required to be able to access the camera 
device 
Spy, 
Overhear 
Mediu
m 
CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT 
Allows an application to capture audio 
output 
Spy, 
Overhear 
Mediu
m 
CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT 
Allows an application to capture secure video 
output 
Spy, 
Overhear, 
track 
High 
CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT 
Allows an application to capture video 
output 
Spy, 
Overhear 
Mediu
m 
READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages Spy Low 
READ_VOICEMAIL 
Allows an application to read voicemails in 
the system 
Spy, 
Overhear 
Mediu
m 
RECEIVE_MMS 
Allows an application to monitor incoming 
MMS messages. 
Spy Low 
RECEIVE_SMS 
Allows an application to receive SMS 
messages 
Spy Low 
RECORD_AUDIO Allows an application to record audio Overhear Low 
 
The majority of designated antiprivacy permissions are classified as low, and 
only CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT is viewed as a major abuse of 
privacy, as this permission permits an app to track the user and to record sound 
and vision of the user’s location/user. 
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4.4 Antivirus Apps Permission Analysis  
The Google Marketplace (https://market.android.com/) contained 37 security 
products that had either security or antivirus in their names or contained them 
as keywords in their descriptions. These products constituted the base for the 
investigation. The permissions requested by these apps were recorded and 
reviewed against the API list to determine the requested access to system 
resources. Of the 130 permissions, available at the time of the study (in 2011 
the most common version of Android was Froyo) 103 were requested by the 
security apps analysed. 
Firstly, the permissions that were determined to provide the Antivirus 
functions and those which were detrimental to the user’s privacy were noted 
for each security product.  
The flowchart, Figure 4-5,  illustrates the method used during the investigation. 
The initial step is to define the parameters for the product type for the 
investigation. Apply the sample criteria and select the samples. A method was 
not available to examine the permissions and one was written to fulfil this 
function. The method was applied and updated to create a robust method. 
Comparisons were performed, and the results documented. Analysis of the 
results indicated the next steps of the research. 
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Figure 4-5 Investigation method flowchart 
4.5 Selection Criteria and Sample 
Selection 
A search was performed in the Google Marketplace 
(https://market.android.com/) and the keywords used for the selection 
criteria was; antivirus and/or security. The security apps were required to have 
an Antivirus component, or they were dropped from the study. The objective 
was to test all the available apps, and these were selected. 
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4.6 Antivirus Functions 
The next step was to provide a common base for the comparison, the author 
considered the following features to be the basic functions that should be in 
any security product containing an anti-virus component (Table 4-1), the 
selected products were then compared to the basic features (Table 4-3) for each 
of the selected products. 
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Table 4-3 Products and stated Antivirus Features 
Product Real time monitoring Device 
scan 
Virus 
signature 
update 
At 
Download 
Emails SMS 
Lookout mobile security (free) √   √ √ 
Lookout mobile security (premium) √   √ √ 
AVG Antivirus Free √ √  √ √ 
AVG Antivirus Pro √ √ √ √ √ 
Dr. Web Anti-Virus √  √ √ √ 
Dr. Web Anti-virus lite √   √ √ 
Aegislab Antivirus Free √   √ √ 
Aegislab Elite √   √ √ 
Bluepoint Antivirus Free √ √ √ √ √ 
Bluepoint Antivirus Pro √ √ √ √ √ 
Android Defender Virus Protect (free) √   √  
Defender Pro Virus √   √  
 
Antivirus and Anti-privacy  
47 
   
Each product describes it’s features and functions that it performs. The 
functions that relate to antivirus processing are marked in the table. 
4.7 Anti-privacy Permissions Requested 
Using the defined grouping described in Figure 4-4 each app was analysed, 
and the number of permissions requested in each group was recorded. The 
number of permissions requested by each app in each group is shown in Figure 
4-6. 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Permissions by security type for each app (2012) 
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The apps did not request the full set of permissions to perform antivirus 
monitoring and removal. There were 11 permissions that were required to fulfil 
the antivirus function and 6 permissions that contravened the user’s privacy.  
The permissions for antivirus processing were determined to be the following; 
· ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
· CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 
· CLEAR_APP_CACHE 
· DELETE_PACKAGES 
· GET_TASKS 
· INTERNET 
· KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 
· READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
· RECEIVE_MMS 
· RECEIVE_SMS 
· WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
The highest number of antivirus  designated permissions that was requested 
by an app was 6. Figure 4-7 displays the apps and the number of antivirus  
permissions requested. 
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Figure 4-7 Number of Antivirus designated permissions requested by each 
App 
 
The figure shows that none of the Antivirus apps requested all the antivirus  
permissions required to be effective. The maximum number requested was 6 
which indicated that Antivirus functions were not being performed 
adequately.   
This chapter has described the Antivirus functions and their related 
permissions and defined the categories of anti-privacy permissions and graded 
them for severity of privacy infringement. The next chapter defines the test 
environment and how to prepare the device and software for testing the 
Antivirus apps. This test environment is used during the analysis of the 
Antivirus apps.  
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 Preparing the Test 
Environment 
Part of research is the ability to perform a repeatable and robust process to 
obtain and analyse data. This research obtains data from apps freely available 
on the Google Marketplace (https://market.android.com/) and uses 
commonly available tools to process the data. In that aspect this chapter is 
devoted to the creation of a test environment.  
A tool to download the App, in this case a T-Mobile G1 and another to perform 
the analysis, in this case a Windows PC. The software used in the analysis is 
also discussed. 
5.1  Preparing the Test PC 
A PC is required to perform the analysis of the packages downloaded from the 
Google Marketplace. The software on the PC enables the package to be 
transferred to the PC and de-compiled and dis-assembled into its source code 
for analysis. 
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5.1.1 Software Environment 
The software is freely available and can be installed on either a Windows or 
Linux PC. This environment used a PC running Windows XP. 
Tools were required to de-crypt and dis-assemble the compiled code into a 
readable format, so that the source code was in a readable format and the 
Manifest (permission request description file) could be accessed.  
Tools are required for performing the transfer of the app and to extract the 
permissions from the binary files.  
The software used was:   
· Android Development Kit (ADK) –  
· Android Virtual Devices (AVB),  
· Android Debug (ADB),  
· Java Development Kit (JDK) and a Java graphical interface – JDGUI 
(JDGUI Download, 2011),  
· Eclipse (Eclipse Download , 2011),  
· Software Development Kit (SDK), 
· a .dex decomplier – DEX2JAR (Dex2jar Download page),  
· a reverse engineering tool – APKTOOL (Apktool downloads , 2011) 
· a script programming - PYTHON (Python Downloads, 2015) 
Linux only tools  
· SANTUKO performs package analysis 
· DROZER –analyses the interaction between apps. 
Install the tools from above.  (use the recommended links). ADK creates a 
virtual machine with the same characteristics as the device (AVD). The package 
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is downloaded onto the PC via the debug function (ADB). The package has a 
suffix of .apk. The preparation of the package for analysis is performed. The 
downloaded package apk file is decompiled using dex2jar, which creates a java 
compiled file. This .JAR file is dis-assembled using the JDK into Java code (or 
the eclipse product can be used to perform the dis-assembly and provide the 
code in Java source available for editing). Once de-compiled and dis-assembly 
the package is available for analysis. 
APKTOOL is used to extract and decode the Manifest file and placed in a 
readable format. The file is now ready for analysis. A python script is used to 
extract the permissions from the manifest file for the comparison analysis.  
 
 
5.1.2 Installing the app onto a Clean Device 
Ensure that you have a clean operating system; reset the mobile to the factory 
defaults and clear the storage by re-formatting the storage card. The 
instructions to perform this are available in the user manual. To factory reset a 
T-mobile G1 perform the following steps; 
1. Power off the G1 
2. Hold the Home key and the End key simultaneously for at least 20 seconds 
or until the G1 displays a triangle, an exclamation point and a picture of the 
G1. 
3. Open the QWERTY keyboard and press ALT and W 
The device is now restored 
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To perform a soft reboot (general reset) replace step 3 by pressing the HOME 
and Back buttons simultaneously. 
 (This can be done on a PC or Laptop if there is no option on the mobile).  
 
5.2  Rooting an Android Smartphone 
Some Android users that wanted more control of their device and the ability 
to obtain apps from locations other than the Play Store, “rooted” their devices. 
Some of these locations were uncontrolled and some apps contained malware 
masquerading as a genuine App. Gordon Kelly extracted from a report by F-
Secure in 2013 the results tested the Google Play store and found that only 0.1% 
of apps were infected with malware. This contrasts with other 3rd party sites 
tested; Mumayi – 6%, AnZhi – 5%, Baidu – 8%, oeoMarket – 7%, liqucn – 8% 
and in Android159 33%of apps were infected (Kelly, 2014).  
Rooting an Android smartphone consists of removing the original Android OS 
and “skin” provided by either the smartphone manufacturer or the mobile 
network provider and replacing it with an “open” OS provided by a 3rd party, 
for example CyanogenMod. The open OS removes the sandboxing security 
feature of the OS by permitting the user to have “superuser” access to the 
device. This enables the user to upgrade the OS to a newer version, install or 
customise skins and to install apps from multiple providers. 
To perform the rooting the user must uplift their access to be a privilege user 
(“Superuser”) of the device as the smartphone ROM must be accessed. During 
the process the original OS on the ROM is removed and replaced with the open 
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OS. The following example of upgrading to a higher version OS and rooting an 
Android smartphone is using the CyanogenMod ROM, although other 
developers’ ROMs are available. 
5.2.1Root the Device 
The rooting and upgrading the device requires the device to have a specific 
firmware. The European firmware is RC7. The firmware file is DREAIMG.nbh 
and is stored in the root of the device’s SD card. To load this firmware the 
device is powered off and then rebooted by pressing the Power and Camera 
button simultaneously until the device enters bootloader mode. The on-screen 
instructions guide you through the process to flash the new firmware image. 
When this is complete you are requested to press the “trackball” on the 
keyboard. You then need to reboot the device with the new image, this is done 
by pressing the Call, Menu and Power buttons simultaneously. 
Rooting the device is performed via a Telnet session and there are two methods 
available to install and start telnet.  
5.2.2 Method 1 – Using the Setup Utility 
1. Finish booting up the G1 & sign-in to a Google account.  
2. Once at the Home screen, open the keyboard and press the Enter key twice.  
3. Type telnetd & press Enter. The Contacts screen will come up, just ignore 
it. There will be no indication that you did it right.  
4. Open the Android Market and install Telnet by ClockworkMod.  
Alternatively, you can install Telnet from the device's browser. First, go to 
Settings » Applications » and check Unknown Sources. Then, from the 
device's browser, go to http://koushikdutta.blurryfox.com/G1/Telnet.apk. 
Wait for the file to download, then tap on icon to install it.  
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5. Open Android Telnet Client; type localhost in the large text box and 23 in 
the smaller text box on the right. Press Enter.  
5.2.3 Method 2 – Using a PC 
This method is used if there are any connectivity issues signing into the Google 
account. 
1. Enable a WiFi connection and connect to your local home network  
2. On the Android screen, type <enter>telnetd<enter>  
3. On the PC, open a new Command Line   
4. On the device, press on your connection to know your local IP  
5. Back on PC, type this to the fresh command line: telnet [your_local_ip]. This 
should connect you to the device, and you should see this: # #  
6. If it's right, copy these lines and press enter on the end of them:  
mount -o rw,remount -t yaffs2 /dev/block/mtdblock3 /system  
dd if=/system/bin/sh of=/system/bin/su  
chmod 4755 /system/bin/su  
7. Type su in the console. The correct response is a new line (# #). If the 
response is "permission denied", repeat step 6. 
 
5.2.4 Custom Recovery Image 
To install the recovery image, the image must be flashed, and this is done via 
the Android Telnet client (see earlier step) and entering the flash command. 
flash_image recovery /sdcard/recovery.img  
 
Once the recovery file has finished installing, # # is displayed on the screen 
below the command and Amon_Ra's Recovery image is now installed.  
Test environment  
56 
   
The recovery image needs to be installed and this is performed by activating 
the Radio update. 
Boot the device into recovery mode (press Home and Power buttons) The 
device prompts you for the boot type, scroll down and select Flash zip from SD 
card. Select “radio update.zip”. The G1 will reboot to install the update. Once 
the update is finished, select “Reboot system”. 
The device is now “rooted” and has recovery image and radio update installed 
in preparation of the OS version upgrade. 
5.3  Upgrading to Android Version 2.2 
(Froyo)  
The T-Mobile G1 released in the UK in the 2008 was a re-badged HTC Dream 
G1 and was sold to consumers with the HTC skin with the original Android 
version 1.0. This example will describe the process of upgrading the OS from 
version 1.5 (Cupcake) to version 2.2 (Froyo) onto the G1. This upgrade was 
unsupported and was not available from the mobile suppliers or 
manufacturers of this device. 
To perform the upgrade (install the Froyo ROM) the device will need to be at 
a specific firmware level and have custom recovery images installed to recover 
the original OS version. 
The files are downloaded to a PC. The G1 is connected to a USB port on the PC 
in debug mode and the SD card is mounted. The SD card must be in FAT32 
format. The files are then copied to the SD card’s root directory. The files to 
download are: 
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· CyanogenMod 6 Stable for the G1 (which contains the Google apps 
file for the version of Android) 
· DREAIMG.nbh (firmware file) 
· recovery-RA-dream-v1.7.0-cyan.img (recovery image from 
Amon_Ra) renamed to recovery.img before copying to the G1. 
· Recovery Radio file 2.22.19.26i (used with the recovery image to boot 
the device) 
 
Once the files have been copied the G1 can be disconnected. 
5.3.1 Upgrading the Operating System 
Now that the user has root access and there is a recovery image, the OS can 
now be upgraded to a more recent or previous OS version.  
· Reboot the phone in recovery mode and on the Backup/Recovery 
screen follow the instructions to do a Nandroid backup. 
· The device’s existing OS is deleted to enable the installation of the 
new OS, to do this; 
· From recovery, scroll down using trackball to Wipe or press ALT 
+ W on the keyboard. 
· Select Wipe Data/Factory Reset and press home to confirm the 
WIPE. 
· Once all data and cache has been wiped, return to the main recovery 
menu and navigate to Flash Zip from Sdcard option. Press trackball 
and the installation will commence. (Note: switching off the phone 
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at this stage of the installation will cause the phone to be “bricked”3 
and therefore be unusable).  
· After the installation is complete, install Google apps by repeating 
the above procedure. 
· Once the Google apps have been installed, navigate to Reboot Your 
System Now and press the trackball. 
· This first reboot will take some time. The device will then start the 
normal setup for the Google instructions to complete your account 
setup (This step can be skipped for later). 
To verify that the OS has been upgraded to Froyo, select Menu > Settings > 
About Phone and the Android version should display as 2.2 Froyo with the 
build number FRF91. 
5.3.2 Security Implications 
Research by Luyi, X. et al (Xing, Pan, Wang, Yuan, & Wang, 2014) described 
the new challenges in updating the mobile’s OS. The length of time between 
updates being available and being installed provides the actor with a large 
window of opportunity to develop an exploit of the update installation 
process. Their study focussed initially on the Android package manager but 
can be applied to other internal updaters. The study highlighted a how 
unprivileged malicious apps can acquire system capabilities after the OS has 
been upgraded and to be unnoticed by the user. These vulnerabilities, which 
                                                 
 
3 Bricked is a term used to denote that the device is permanently unusable. The device 
is unable to boot and it has the same value and usability as a brick. 
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they called Pileup (privilege escalation through updating) exploits the OS 
updating system not an app and can therefore create new permissions for 
malware to exploit. Manually updating the OS as described in section 5.3 
makes the OS more vulnerable to attack as the time that the update is available 
is far greater than for normal updates. 
The limitation of this test environment is the manual steps to move the apps 
from the download device to the PC and the steps required on the PC to 
prepare the app in a format for analysis. The manual interaction is time 
consuming and an automated process is required. 
The tools available in 2011 to perform this download and preparedness were 
very limited and the process used was like performing a reverse engineering 
of the App.  
Although this process was used in the initial extraction and analysis an 
automated method was developed and used in future analysis (see PEMP in 
Chapter 7). The results from the manual process was used as a comparable base 
when the automated method was tested on the original set of apps. 
This section described the test environment and the following section details 
the steps to obtain and analyse Antivirus apps. 
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 Analysis of Antivirus Apps 
The previous section detailed the test environment required to test the 
Antivirus apps and this section concentrates on the test process of the apps. 
The process is described for obtaining and testing the apps available in 2011 
and 2015 and their selection criteria. The results obtained in each year’s group 
and makes a comparison between the two sets to show the evolution of 
Antivirus apps from 2011 to 2015.  
6.1 app Status in 2011 
Articles and white papers are available to assist consumers and enterprises in 
choosing Antivirus software to secure standard computing equipment; 
laptops, netbooks, desktops, etc. This comparative information was not 
available in the mobile sector (Smartphones, e-readers, iPads etc.) The increase 
in acquisition of these devices has far outstripped the growth of legacy 
platforms. Additional issues were introduced as the users of the devices either 
do not know or do not care about the potential security vulnerabilities of the 
devices and the increase in criminal activity targeting these devices. 
This chapter explores the variety of security and anti-virus tools that were 
available for installation on Android mobile devices. There were many 
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products which were available as either Free or Commercial applications, but 
this research focuses on the products available for Android devices available 
as both Free and Subscription (commercial) variants.  
These variants were then compared to find the differences that could have been 
used as the criteria to determine the difference that were used to determine the 
product availability as free or require a charge.  
6.2 Android Antivirus Apps in 2011 
There are a variety of antivirus and security protection products for Android 
mobiles. The difficulty occurs in deciding which product to use and whether it 
is effective in protecting the device and owner data. There are a variety of sites 
where Android applications can be obtained. The best known is the Google 
Play Store (https://play.google.com/store/), some other known app 
providers are; Amazon (http://www.amazon.co.uk/appstore), Phandroid 
(https://www.phandroid.com/), the Android Freeware store  
(http://www.androidfreeware.net/) Android Software Download store 
(http://androidsoftwaredownload.com), Androlib marketplace  
(http://www.androlib.com) or Best Android downloads (Best Android 
Downloads, 2011) which uses the iliVid Download Manager. 
Tripwire magazine also compiled a list of the top 15 best websites for Android 
app downloads (Angus, 2011).  
A thorough analysis of the Android marketplace antivirus and security 
protection applications was performed. The criteria for the included security 
applications were that it had to have an Antivirus component. The Google 
Marketplace (https://market.android.com/) contained 37 security products 
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that had either security or antivirus in their names or contained them as 
keywords in their descriptions. 
The initial analysis was to determine the number of free applications available, 
how popular the apps were by their download count and the rating submitted 
by users of the tools’ performance or ease of use and to compare free and 
commercial Antivirus apps to determine if there were differences in their 
efficacy.  
The highest downloaded free security apps, according to the Androlib Market 
site (http://www.androlib.com) on February 28th, 2011, that contain an 
Antivirus component and the developer are contained in Table A-1. Details of 
the user rating and the number of reviews and downloads are recorded. The 
number of reviews as a percentage of the download were calculated to 
determine if the rating value was a true representative of the users 
downloading the product. The lower the figure indicated that more users that 
download the product provided a rating. This was then used to rank the apps. 
The list of applications was used to determine if the supplier also provided a 
similar commercial version, for which the user either paid a one-off or a regular 
subscription charge like Antivirus products in the PC/Laptop world. This 
incorporated small changes to the product list. Some suppliers only 
concentrated in providing free applications and there were also additional 
suppliers who did not provide a free version of their application but did offer 
trial periods or paid versions only. Six of the suppliers provided free and 
commercial versions. 
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6.2.1 Investigation Method in 2011 
Initially the permissions and features were compared between the original free 
apps and their commercial variants. The null hypothesis was there were no 
major differences between the free Security products that contain an Antivirus 
component and their commercial versions. 
The materials used in the study were the free and commercial versions of the 
Antivirus programs available for download to Android mobile devices, 
primarily Smartphones, from the Google Marketplace 
(https://market.android.com/)4. The data about features and permissions 
have been obtained from either the supplier web site or from various online 
Marketplace libraries and search engines such as; Androlib 
(http://www.androlib.com) Android Market (https://market.android.com/), 
Cyrket (http://www.cyrket.com/m/android/)  or Android Zoom 
(http://www.androidzoom.com). 
6.2.1.1  Procedure 
The initial task was to remove the applications that are presumed to be unique, 
these were the applications which were only available as a single version, 
either free or fee paying. For the investigation a trial version is a fee-paying 
version if once the trial period has expired users are required to pay for a 
monthly or yearly subscription to continue using the product and users do not 
have to perform any additional downloads to the trial product. 
                                                 
 
4 Applications are also available from other locations, but were not used in this case 
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The applications that are included in the comparison study are those security 
programs that are available as both free and paid versions.  
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 Table 6-1 The list of companies that provide the security apps, grouped by 
version type. 
 
Both Free and Commercial 
 
Free Only 
 
Commercial only 
Lookout Inc 
Creative Apps 
McAfee 
AVG Mobilation 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 
MyMobile Security 
Doctor Web Ltd 
SuperDroid.net 
UMU Ltd 
AegisLab 
Hauri Inc. 
DMA 
BluePoint Security Inc. 
TrustMobi 
Livezen 
MoonBeam Development 
CPU Media Sarl 
P Defender 
 
ShipWreckTech 
 
 
Qianjun 
 
The table shows that there were 6 suppliers that provided free variants of their 
commercial applications, either as basic or Lite versions and it was these 
products that formed the base of the comparison testing. 
6.2.2 Obtaining a Commercial app for Testing 
Without Incurring a Cost. 
To compare the free and commercial variants of the app to determine if the 
paid version provided additional facilities, required the purchase of the paid 
version of the App, which ranged from £0.85 to £19.95. As the app was needed 
as input to a comparison and not for use as an Antivirus product, therefore an 
alternative method was needed to acquire the app for no cost. 
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After downloading the app and transferring it to the PC, the author 
inadvertently selected the option to reject the payment on the mobile device. 
The app was then removed from the device but was still available on the test 
PC for analysis. Further investigation revealed that Google provided a 15-
minute window in which a user could refuse/reject the App. The app was then 
removed from the device as part of the reject process. This did not affect the 
app stored on the secondary device. 
The author then used this process to obtain commercial apps for the 
investigation. The method to obtain the app is as follows.  
1. Download the app to the mobile device (I used a T-Mobile G1 device), 
Agree to the payment as part of the download process.  
Using the debug function in eclipse transfer the Davlik module to the PC. Save 
this module for input to the dis-assembly and comparisons. 
On the device reject the app after download. The rejection kicks off the 
automatic process to remove the app from the phone and the user’s account 
is not charged.  
Note: The user only has 15 minutes to transfer the app to the PC and reject the app on 
the phone, otherwise they will be charged. 
6.2.3 Selected Security and Antivirus Developers 
Security product suppliers are dependent on their Google Store ranking to 
encourage users to download and install their product. The companies use a 
variety of ways to do this. Some provide free apps and then offer in app 
purchases, a method where the user is required to make an additional payment 
for increased functionality, or the free app contains ads to entice the user to 
buy other apps or other products or services, the developer then receives a 
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recommendation fee if the user selects the ad. Other companies use a list of 
functions/features that their app contains hoping that this will differentiate 
them from other providers. 
 An overview of each of the six suppliers from the study and a brief description 
of the two security products, the free and the commercial app, as provided by 
the suppliers are described below. 
 
 Lookout Inc https://www.mylookout.com/  
has two products that are included in the comparison, both are called Lookout 
Mobile Security, but the premium or commercial application is only available 
as an upgrade. The premium application includes a Privacy Advisor, 
additional backup/restore capabilities and the ability to remotely wipe and 
lock the device.  
 
  Lookout Free 
Security 
· Block malware, spyware, and phishing apps 
· Scan every app you download to ensure it's safe 
· Schedule daily or weekly security scans 
· Automatic protection against the latest threats 
· Prevent a virus from transferring from your phone to your PC 
· Doesn’t drain your battery 
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Find My Phone 
· Phone Locator: Locate your lost or stolen phone on a Google map 
· Activate a loud alarm, even if it is on silent 
· When possible, Lookout will remotely enable GPS to help you find 
your phone even if GPS is turned off 
· Log in to myLookout.com from any web browser to locate your 
phone  
Backup and Restore 
· Securely backup your contacts 
· Restore your backup data to an existing phone 
· Access all backed up data securely at myLookout.com 
· Lookout is certified by TRUSTe (privacy and data are protected) 
  Lookout Premium contains all the features in Lookout free and the 
following additional features: 
· Remote Lock, a security lock for your phone to lock others out. Set a 
secret passcode to unlock your phone. 
· Remote Wipe to delete your data from logged-in accounts like 
Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, and YouTube. Delete contacts, SMS text 
messages, photos, call log, web browser history, calendar, sync 
settings, and full SD card data. With enhanced protection, you can 
do a full factory reset. 
· Privacy Advisor to identify which apps can access your personal 
data such as contacts, location, SMS text messages & identity 
information 
· Additional Backup of photos & call history; restore your backup data 
to a new phone 
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· Premium Support for priority response 
 
AVG Mobilation http://www.droidsecurity.com/ is a joint 
venture between AVG and Droid Security and has three products on the 
market, Antivirus Free, Antivirus Pro and Security Pro. All products are 
available from the Marketplace, and all have the same file size.  
 
 
Security 
· Scan whole device and identify and remove viruses with a simple 
click 
· Automatic scans can be run weekly, daily, or on demand 
· Check apps for malware before downloading from app stores 
· Check website content, emails, and SMS for malware before 
downloading to device 
Theft protection  
· Locate lost or stolen device using GPS 
· Create and display message on screen remotely 
· Lock device and wipe content 
· Manage applications remotely 
· SMS Spam Protection provides basic protection from SMS 
Spammers 
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 Anti-Virus PRO has all the features of Antivirus FREE, plus: 
Premium SMS security, whose feature set includes 
· All SMS checked in real time for malicious content and spam 
· SMS spam blocked at source 
Anti-Virus PRO customers receive premium level support whenever they need 
it 
Anti-Virus PRO is free of advertising and other disruptions 
 
 Doctor Web 
http://products.drweb.com/mobile/?lng=en has two Antivirus products for 
Android devices. The light version has a smaller file size than the commercial 
version and does not contain SMS filtering. 
Dr. Web Anti-virus Light scans the file system of your Android 
device, including the "hidden" area and user applications. Detected 
malicious objects are moved to quarantine. A real-time file monitor 
automatically scans applications being installed and all files written to the SD 
card.  
The feature set consists of: 
· Non-stop anti-virus protection. Non-stop, real-time file system 
scanning. 
· On-demand scanning. Scan options are either fast or full file-system 
scans as well as scan individual files and folders. 
· Filtering mode selection. 
· Black list editing. Block incoming calls and messages from certain 
numbers.  
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· Filter creation. Dr. Web Anti-virus lets you configure custom 
filtering modes for calls and messages. 
· Viewing of blocked calls and messages.  
 
DR Web Antivirus has all the features of Anti-virus light with an 
additional anti- SPAM feature to filter and block SMS messages.  
 
 
 Aegislab http://www.aegislab.com/ have two 
products, Aegislab Antivirus Elite and Aegislab Antivirus Free, which were 
previously known as Appscan beta. The commercial variant has a larger file 
size than the free version and requests more permissions. The cost of the 
commercial variant is the yearly subscription for the application. 
 Aegislab Antivirus Free identifies Spyware/Malware. Supports 
advertisement detection (especially from Admob). Provides network/traffic 
statistics for both mobile and WiFi interfaces to assist finding suspicious 
background usage. 
 
 
 
Aegislab Antivirus Elite has the following feature set; 
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· Real Time and Manual cans 
· Remote lock 
· Remote Data wipe 
· Search/Query signature database prior to downloading 
· SMS check for Phishing  
 
 
BluePoint Security Inc. 
http://www.bluepointsecurity.com/presentationlayer/pages/home.aspx 
has two products Antivirus Free and Antivirus Pro. The commercial version 
has a much larger file size and incorporates additional settings and scheduled 
scanning. The company utilises a cloud-based Antivirus database to detect all 
viruses not just phone viruses.  
Bluepoint Antivirus Free Features 
· Realtime protection 
· Battery efficient 
· Automatic scans of email, SMS and other downloads 
· Scan memory cards 
· Uses a cloud-based Antivirus engine 
Bluepoint Antivirus Pro contains the same features of Antivirus Free with 
additional settings and the ability to schedule scans. 
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MoonBeam Development http://moonbeamdevelopment.com/ has 
two products Android Defender Virus Protect (free) and Defender 
Pro Virus (commercial). The commercial version has a larger file size than the 
free version.  
Key features are: 
· Block viruses, spyware and malware 
· Scan all apps installed on device 
· Scan new apps when first installed 
 
6.2.4 Comparative Analysis Results 
Comparative analysis was performed of the twelve security products from the 
six companies to determine if there were any differences between the 
commercial and free versions. Each product was investigated for the following; 
feature set, Android permissions, other permissions, ratings (popularity) and 
file sizes. The results of the comparisons are summarized in Figure 6-4, which 
displays the features of the tested Antivirus products, their requested Android 
permissions, other permissions and user ratings.  
Each product (free and fee paying) was investigated for the following: 
· Android File permissions requested 
· Other Permissions requested 
· Features 
· User rating 
· Antivirus function efficacy 
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The detailed results of the comparisons are provided in the tables and figures 
in the appendix. These are comparisons of the product features (Table A-3), the 
Android permissions requested (Table A-4), additional permissions (Table 
A-5)  and user rating of the product (Table 6-2). 
Additionally, a comparison of the package sizes was performed to determine 
any variations between the free and commercial versions of the apps (Table 
6-5). 
Finally, the apps were tested to verify that they performed the Antivirus 
function through detection and removal of malware.  
 
Figure 6-1Android permissions requested by each app. 
 
Figure 6-2 The figure shows the total permissions requested by each Antivirus 
app. 
A summarization of the total permissions and the number of features is shown 
in. Figure 6-3 shows the Android permissions requested and the user rating.    
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Figure 6-3 Application Features and Android Permissions 
The figure indicated that there was no correlation between the permissions 
requested and the number of features, which needed to be researched. 
 
 
Figure 6-4 Features, permissions and ratings for each product 
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Figure 6-4 shows the total features and permissions for each of the products 
with any additional non-Android permissions and the user rating. The 
expectation was that the more features that an app has, then this should be 
reflected in the increased number of permissions requested and that the more 
features defined then the higher the user rating. 
Of the six suppliers in the analysis, three (Lookout Inc, AVG Mobilation and 
BluePoint Security Inc) used the same Android permissions on both the 
commercial and free applications. Two suppliers (Lookout Inc. and AVG) 
requested non-Android permissions, whilst the other suppliers only requested 
Android permissions. Of the non-Android permissions, Lookout Inc. used the 
same permissions on both products, whilst AVG performed License checking 
and used different C2D_MESSAGE permissions between its PRO and Free 
versions. The user’s rating of the product was obtained from the Androlib 
market site. Bluepoint used only Android permissions.  
Two of the developers requested additional permissions, Lookout Mobile and 
AVG. The permissions requested by each of these developer’s apps are 
recorded. 
The analysis of the ratings was similar irrespective of the number of features 
of the app. The reviews as a percentage of the downloads was calculated to 
determine if there was any correlation between the number of reviewers rating 
the app and the number of downloads (Table 6-2). The range of the result 
demonstrated that there was no correlation.  
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Table 6-2 User ratings for the six suppliers 
Company 
Application Rating 
(out of 5) 
# of 
reviews 
# of 
downloads 
Reviews 
as a % of 
downloads 
Lookout Inc 
Lookout Mobile Security 4.59 169987 20,587,202 0.83 
Lookout Inc * 
Lookout Mobile Security 
Premium 
- - - - 
AVG Mobilation 
AntiVirus Free AVG 4.36 98907 13,082,544 0.76 
AVG Mobilation 
AntiVirus Pro 4.44 2221 50,000 4.44 
AVG Mobilation 
Security Pro 4.31 356 7,739 4.60 
Doctor Web Ltd 
Dr Web Anti-virus 4.43 69 515 13.40 
Doctor Web Ltd 
Dr Web Antivirus light 4.57 19267 1,177,978 1.64 
Aegislab 
Aegislab Antivirus free 4.43 126 10,000 1.26 
Aegislab 
AntiVirus Elite 4.09 11 157 7.01 
Bluepoint security 
Inc 
BluePoint Antivirus 4.12 321 14,793 2.17 
Bluepoint security 
Inc 
BluePoint Antivirus 3.56 36 720 5.00 
MoonBeam 
Development 
Android defender virus protect 3.89 66 10,312 0.64 
Moonbeam 
Development 
Defender Pro virus^ 0 0 49 0.00 
 
 
The user rating for each product (Table 6-2) was obtained from the Androlib 
market site. Data was not available for the Lookout mobile premium App; 
however, it was possible to obtain the premium version by upgrading from the 
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free version. Defender Pro virus was removed from the Marketplace 
23/01/2012. 
A statistical analysis was performed to determine if the rating was related to 
purchase price of the product. The resultant means, and standard deviation is 
shown in Table 6-3 and a box graph showing the overlap is in Figure 6-5. 
Table 6-3 Rating of app by app type (free or commercial) 
Status 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Free 
4.33 0.27 
Commercial 
3.51 1.78 
 
The analysis showed that overall the free products received a slightly higher 
mean user rating than the commercial products and the standard deviation 
shows that the user ratings of the commercial products had a greater range 
than the ratings for the free products.  
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Figure 6-5 The rating of the app by type. 
The figure displays the user rating of the app by type, commercial or free. Free 
apps tended to have a slightly higher rating than the commercial apps.  
Next analysis was to determine if there was any relationship between the 
number of features and the number of requested permissions. A simple 
bivariate plot of the two variables by version is in Figure 6-6. The cluster 
analysis produced an unexpected visual analysis. The plot shows a positive 
relationship between the number of features and number of permissions 
although grouped into clusters and there appeared to be no relationship to the 
version of the app (free or commercial). 
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Figure 6-6 Cluster analysis of relationship between Features and Total 
Requested Permissions 
 
The correlation value for the relationship was calculated. The result for the 12 
cases was 0.61, which is a strong relationship. A significance test was then 
performed to determine the probability that this relationship had occurred by 
chance. Using an alpha level of 0.05, the critical value for df=10 is 0.576, 
therefore as the correlation coefficient is 0.61 the relationship is not a chance 
occurrence and is statistically significant. 
 
The final analysis was to determine if there was any relationship between the 
number of features and the user rating (Figure 6-7). 
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Figure 6-7 Relationship between features and user ratings. 
The graph did not display any relationship between the features and user 
ratings, so a Spearman’s rho correlation was performed to determine if there is 
any relationship between them (Table 6-4).  
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Table 6-4 Correlations of features and user rating 
Spearman’s Rho 
 Feature Permissions 
Feature 
Correlation Coefficient 1 .376 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .228 
N 12 12 
Rating 
Correlation Coefficient .376 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .228  
N 12 12 
 
The resulting coefficient was 0.376 which is lower than the critical value of 
0.576 for the requisite degrees of freedom and therefore there is no correlation 
between the rating and features as shown in Figure 6-7. 
6.2.5 Review Program Source 
The next step was to review the program source of the Antivirus App. This 
involved downloading the app to a smartphone, in this case a T-mobile G1, 
and then transferring this package in Davlik format to a PC for analysis.  
The transfer of the package required the smartphone to be connected via USB 
to the PC and Android app developer tools installed on the PC. 
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The tools required for the transfer of the app from the mobile device to the PC 
and the software required for the dis-assembly to the source code are described 
in section  5.1.1 
Initially the package was converted from Davlik into compiled Java and then 
de-compiled to Java source code. Table 6-5 provides a comparison table of the 
program sizes of the decompiled packages. Packages that are signed and are 
therefore protected from disassembly were supplied in a non Davlik format 
(zipped XML files), their file sizes are shown for information only. 
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Table 6-5 Comparison of program sizes of the packages as downloaded 
27/05/2011 
Application Cost 
(GBP) 
Package name Davlik 
Size 
(KB) 
Java 
Size 
(KB) 
Zip 
Size 
(KB) 
Lookout Mobile 
Security 
0.00 Com.lookout-1.apk 1335 862  
Lookout Mobile 
Security Premium 
18.51 Com.lookout-1.apk 1335 862  
AntiVirus Free AVG 0.00 Com.antivirus-1.apk 1349 677  
AntiVirus Pro 6.09 La.droid.gr-1.apk 1169 622  
Dr Web Anti-virus 3.68 Server error prevented purchase    
Dr Web Antivirus 
light 
0.00 Com.drweb-1.zip   677 
Aegislab Antivirus 
free 
0.00 Com.aegislab.sd3prj.antivirus.free-
1.apk 
670 233  
AntiVirus Elite 4.88 Com.aegislab.sd3prj.eigismobile-1.zip   966 
BluePoint Antivirus 
Free 
0.00 bluepointfree.ad-2.apk 3476 211  
BluePoint Antivirus  3.09 Bluepoint.ad-1.zip 2813   
Android defender 
virus protect 
0.00 Com.moonbeamdevelopment.riskdetec
tor.android-1.apk 
261 296  
Defender Pro virus 4.99 Com.moonbeamdevelopment.riskdetec
torPRO.android-1.zip 
56   
The table displays the sizes for each package (executable app name) as the 
Davlik executable component and then the size of the decoded Java source. 
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Both Lookout Inc. products had the same file sizes and the resultant md5 Hash 
showed that there was no difference between the files. This is possibly due to 
the free version acting as a trial version of the premium product and those 
features are in an inactive state.  
Once the free version of Lookout Mobile Security was downloaded and 
activated the company offered the option of a 14-day trial of the premium 
version. There was no additional downloads or updates once the 14-day trial 
was opted for. An MD5 hash was performed to detect any differences between 
the free and commercial source codes. 
·  Free variant MD5hash 
· 41593367DF5FDBC8005F71048FC61E95 
· Commercial variant MD5 hash 
· 41593367DF5FDBC8005F71048FC61E95 
The two hashes were identical, and this indicated that the premium functions 
are not included in the package but were instead available as host (web) based 
functionality and are available as part of the user registration. 
Note: I was unable to purchase the Dr. Web Anti-virus due to a server error on the 
27th May 2011 during the purchase of the product. This also occurred on multiple 
occasions during that week. This prevented the comparison of the free and commercial 
versions. 
6.2.6 Efficacy of Free Antivirus Apps  
The free apps were tested to determine their efficacy and if the user would 
obtain more benefit (security) from buying the app rather than use the free 
version. 
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Each product defined in its feature list which Antivirus functions it could 
perform (Table 6-6).  
Table 6-6 Antivirus apps and their described features 
Product Real time monitoring Device 
scan 
Virus 
signature 
update At 
Download 
Email
s 
SMS 
Lookout mobile security (free) √   √ √ 
Lookout mobile security (premium) √   √ √ 
AVG Antivirus Free √ √  √ √ 
AVG Antivirus Pro √ √ √ √ √ 
Dr Web Anti-Virus √  √ √ √ 
Dr Web Anti-virus lite √   √ √ 
Aegislab Antivirus Free √   √ √ 
Aegislab Elite √   √ √ 
Bluepoint Antivirus Free √ √ √ √ √ 
Bluepoint Antivirus Pro √ √ √ √ √ 
Android Defender Virus Protect (free) √   √  
Defender Pro Virus √   √  
 
All stated that they would detect malware at download of an app and during 
a device scan.  
Android defender virus protect, and Defender Pro virus did not use a virus 
signature database. This meant that they relied on using a heuristic method to 
detect malware which indicates that they need frequent updates to ensure that 
their detection method could detect the newer types of attack. 
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Four products monitored emails for malware, with two of them also 
monitoring SMS texts. Non-monitoring of SMS texts exposes the user to Man 
in The Middle (MITM) attacks. MITM attacks are used to intercept SMS 
messages before passing them on, thus obtaining one-time-passcodes (used by 
Financial institutes for mobile authentication) to access a user’s account or 
email password change links. This vulnerability exposes the user to identity 
theft and theft of assets and money. 
The testing of the app was performed on the T-Mobile G1 device running 
Froyo. The testing was performed using the Antivirus verification method as 
described in section 4.2. 
The results of the Antivirus function testing are summarised in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-7 Antivirus funtion testing summary 
Task Lookout 
Mobile  
AVG  Dr Web Aegislab Bluepoint 
 
Moonbeam 
Update Virus database No Yes, 
optional 
Yes, 
optional 
Yes, 
optional 
No, 
database 
in cloud 
No 
Scan options On 
demand 
On 
demand 
3 options On 
demand 
On 
demand 
Automatically 
Scan scheduling manual manual manual manual manual manual 
Virus detected (number out of 2) 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Adware detected No No No Yes No No 
Root/Superuser app detected No Yes No No No No 
Malware detected during 
download 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Malware detected during install Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Malware removal or quarantine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Full details of the testing results are in the Appendices. 
 
6.2.7 Results 
The products Antivirus functions were very similar, but there was a difference 
in the quality of the applications in comparison to classical Antivirus products 
available on PCs and Laptops. There were differences in the permission 
requests and file sizes of the selected products and most suppliers provided 
additional functions or features to their suite of security products to 
differentiate them from competitors. These functions were mainly 
backup/restore utilities, location and data removal utilities and these were 
primarily included in the commercial variant of the product. These functions 
required user registration.  
Testing the Antivirus function of the 6 free Antivirus apps that were analysed 
with their commercial version resulted in none of the free versions fulfilling 
the full requirements of an Antivirus product.  
Three products detected both viruses and the majority detected malware 
during download. Only 1 detected adware and another detected that the 
device had been rooted. Quantifying the results against the required function 
showed at best a 75% match to the required functions, with one app detecting 
an installed virus and nothing else. 
Essentially an Antivirus app should detect and remove malware, but sadly this 
was not the case. As the free and commercial versions had no variation for the 
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on-device Antivirus functions, there is no benefit to the user to purchase the 
product unless they desire the remote or cloud facilities.  
6.3 Android Apps in 2015 
Since 2011 the Android operating systems has increased its share of the 
smartphone market, so by 2014 it had over 80% of the market-share. 2011 data 
is provided by Canalys (Canalys, 2011). IDC investigated the growth of the 
smartphone market (“IDC,” 2011). By 2015 the three main operating systems 
were Android, iOS and Windows phone (Table 6-8). The market share of the 
Android operating system has grown by 160% from 2011 (51.6%) to 2015 
(82.8%). 
Table 6-8 Smartphone OS market share growth 
Operating system 2011Q4(1) 2012Q2 2013Q2 2014Q2 2015Q2 
Android 51.6% 69.3% 79.8% 84.8% 82.8% 
iOS 23.4% 16.6% 12.9% 11.6% 13.9% 
Windows Phone 1.6% 3.1% 3.4% 2.5% 2.6% 
Blackberry OS 8.3% 4.9% 2.8% 0.5% 0.3% 
Others 15.1% 6.1% 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 
 
The table shows the market-share of each of the main smartphone operating 
systems from 2011 to 2015. Between 2011 to 2014, the Android OS grew in 
market-share at the expense of iOS, Blackberry OS and other proprietary 
operating systems like Symbian. The only operating system to recover was iOS 
and between them Android and iOS had over 96% of the market.  
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As the most ubiquitous Smartphone OS (operating system), Android had 
become the main target for attacks (Table 6-8). As an open source OS, the 
availability of the source code was one of the drivers of the take up of the OS. 
Most smartphone manufacturers installed Android on their hardware and 
installed their own front end, called a skin, on top of the OS. This gave a 
different “feel” to each manufacturer’s device. This feel also created hardware 
manufacture loyalty and the Android smartphone market become delineated 
by the manufacturer of the device rather than by the level of the operating 
system. The only “native” Android device was manufactured by Google (the 
owner of the operating system) and was the Nexus series of smartphones, 
phablets and tablets.  
One of the problems with the diversity of hardware manufacturers and the 
range of devices was the delay in updating the software. Software updates 
became dependent upon the manufacturer’s schedule rather than on the new 
releases of the operating system. This left the operating system increasingly 
vulnerable to more malware as actors had more time to create and or adapt 
malware. 
Some manufacturers “pushed” the updates out to the smart phones within a 
short time of the new release or version, whilst some either did not publish an 
update or if they did, they left it to the carrier to “push” the update out. This 
meant that the marketplace had a great variety of levels in circulation as can be 
seen in Figure 6-8. Smartphone Android version distribution figures and 
release dates were provided by IDC (“IDC,” 2011). 
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Version Codename Release 
date 
dd/mm
/yy 
API Distribution 
2.2 Froyo 20/05/1
0 
8 0.1% 
2.3.3 - 2.3.7 Gingerbread 06/12/1
0 
10 1.5% 
4.03 - 4.04 Ice Cream 
Sandwich 
18/10/1
1 
15 1.4% 
4.1  Jelly Bean 09/07/1
2 
16 5.6% 
4.2 17 7.7% 
4.3.1 18 2.3% 
4.4 Kit Kat 31/10/1
3 
19 27.7% 
5.0 Lollipop 12/11/1
4 
21 13.1% 
5.1 22 21.9% 
6.0 Marshmallow 05/10/1
5 
23 18.7% 
Figure 6-8 Distribution of Android versions as at 5th September 2016 
The most common version (Kit Kat) is two levels behind the latest release 
(Marshmallow). The exception to this was Google’s Nexus devices which were 
updated when (or shortly after) the new release was published. The figures for 
Honeycomb (version3.0 – 3.2.6) are not included as this was a tablet only 
operating system, released 22nd February 2011. The figures for Nougat (version 
7.0) which was released 23rd August 2016 are not yet available. 
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At each new release permissions were added or deleted and updates to apps 
running on the devices were also subject to performing updates to incorporate 
the changes to permissions. Apps also required updates to resolve bugs or to 
make the app more attractive, for example; more levels in gaming apps, 
additional functions in business or lifestyle apps. 
As app updates became more prolific and the reticence of Android users to 
purchase apps the app developers turned to adware to earn an income for the 
apps. Initially the user was offered a one-off charge to remove the adware but 
as the income from adware grew many developers moved away from this 
option. The exception to this were the major app developers who continue to 
provide their apps free. The Top Ten Mobile apps in 2017 as provided by 
comStore (Dan Frommer, 2017). Show that the most popular app was 
Facebook, closely followed by YouTube, two major social media sites. 
  
Figure 6-9 Top Ten Mobile Apps in the U.S. for 2017 
The major use of social media sites is reflected in the Essential Apps that 
Millennials “said they couldn’t do without” according to comScore 
Whitepaper report on mobile apps  (Lella & Lipsman, 2017). 
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Figure 6-10 Most essential apps according to millenials. 
Although Facebook and YouTube were the top two apps being used, they were 
only the third and fifth essential apps according to the 18-34-year olds.  
The main interests and usage of millennials in social media sites and sharing 
data is in contrary to securing data and privacy concerns. 
6.4 Android Antivirus Apps in 2015 
As the Android OS grew in popularity so did the malware aimed at it. By 2013 
when the Android OS held a market-share of 87%, it also accounted for 97% of 
all mobile malware (Kelly, 2014).  The Antivirus and security apps developed 
for the Android OS to protect the user and remove malware from the device 
had also matured. The apps were available in two variants, free and 
commercial (which included both one-off or monthly payments). The 
commercial apps offered additional functionality (in some cases) see initial 
research into the comparison of free and commercial antivirus apps features 
and permissions in 2011/2012 (Chapter 5). 
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As the popularity of the Android OS grew many antivirus and security 
developers were bought by the mainstream Security software companies. The 
Antivirus arena on mobiles which was in its infancy in 2011 matured over the 
four years. The major providers of Antivirus programs from the PC/Laptop 
arena consolidated their position by purchasing or by merging with other 
companies, as in the case with AVG entering the mobile Antivirus market by 
purchasing DroidSecurity (Horn, 2010). This meant that multiple Antivirus 
products were available from one company, whilst the products were 
consolidated, incorporated into an existing product or dropped from the 
marketplace altogether. 
The growth of apps with Antivirus components from 2011 to 2015 is shown in 
Table A-6. 
In 2011 there were 22 apps with Antivirus components. In 2015 the number of 
apps with Security or Antivirus functions was 240, of which 67 were Antivirus 
apps. Developers use multiple tags or keywords to provide greater visibility of 
their apps during searches. The 240 apps contained the keywords “security” or 
“antivirus” or both. These apps were reviewed to confirm that they did possess 
an Antivirus component. In total 67 of the 240 apps performed Antivirus 
functions. (Table A-7) 
This research added to the initial 2011 research and concentrated on analysing 
the permissions of the 67 Antivirus apps in 2015. The permissions and features 
from the initial 2011 Antivirus apps were available to perform comparison 
testing between the apps that were available in both 2011 and 2015, albeit at a 
newer release. 
Of the 67 Antivirus apps the 64 free apps were downloaded and prepared for 
analysis. The app name, package name, developer, rating, number of 
downloads and size were recorded (Table A-8). 
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A summary of the number of permissions requested by each of the apps 
included in this study are shown in Figure 6-11 and the detailed tables of 
permissions requested are provided in the Appendix section A.4 Detailed 
Permissions of Antivirus apps in the study 
 
6.4.1 Investigation Method - 2015 
The materials used in the study were all security apps that contained an 
Antivirus component. There were 67 Security apps that contained an Antivirus 
component of which there were three commercial variants. Only the free apps 
were used in this study.  
In 2011 there were 82 permissions specified for the Froyo version of Android. 
In Kitkat the number of specified permissions had grown to 154. At the time of 
testing six permissions flagged as no longer available were requested by eleven 
of the apps. The permission “android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_UPDATES” was the 
most requested old permission (six times) and had not been superseded by 
another permission in the newer versions of Android. 
6.4.2 2015 Security and Antivirus Apps 
The permissions for the sixty-four free apps were extracted for analysis (Figure 
6-11). The permission figures were then analysed. Four of the apps did not 
request any permissions and were ignored for the analysis as outliers. The 
maximum number of permissions requested was forty-nine and the least 
requested was four. Eighty-six percent of the apps requested between four and 
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forty permissions. Only five apps requested more than forty-one permissions 
and four apps didn’t request any permissions.  
The permissions requested were reviewed to determine if any old permissions 
were being requested. Old permissions were those designated as no longer 
valid in this version of Android. There were six old permissions that were 
being requested (Table A-9). 
The requesting of these non-valid permissions could be due to a variety of 
causes, these include (but are not limited to); backward compatibility, 
incomplete code review or no code review or updates. The lack of code review 
indicates that the Antivirus is not being updated and is not protecting the 
device against new malware.   
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As previously the apps were checked to see that they were requesting 
Antivirus permissions and if any Anti Privacy permissions were also being 
requested. 
Antivirus permissions; 
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE 
android.permission.DELETE_PACKAGES 
android.permission.GET_TASKS 
android.permission.INTERNET 
android.permission.KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS 
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
 
Anti-Privacy permissions; 
android.permission.CALL_PHONE 
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS 
android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS 
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS 
android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR 
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS 
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The apps were then analysed to determine if there was any correlation between 
the number of Antivirus and Anti Privacy permissions requested. 
The apps that requested the most Antivirus permissions requested 
approximately half the Anti Privacy permissions. Except for “Line Antivirus” 
that requested 9 of the eleven Antivirus permissions and none of the Anti-
Privacy permissions.  
Table 6-9 Antivirus apps that requested the most Antivirus permissions 
app Name Anti-Privacy Antivirus 
ALYac Android 3 10 
AMC Security - Clean & Booster 4 9 
Antivirus Booster & Cleaner 5 9 
LINE Antivirus 0 9 
Security & Antivirus - FREE 4 9 
  
Seven of the apps requested all six permissions that were designated as anti-
privacy (Figure 6-14). These apps also requested a high number of Antivirus 
permissions. 
Table 6-10 Antivirus apps that requested the most Anti Privacy permissions 
app Name Anti-Privacy Antivirus 
antivirus & mobile security 6 7 
antivirus Security - FREE 6 7 
Dr.Web v.9 Anti-virus 6 7 
Kaspersky internet security 6 7 
Mobile Security & Antivirus 6 8 
Security - Free 6 7 
tablet antivirus security FREE 6 7 
 
 
 
The correlation between Antivirus and Anti-Privacy was tested. The result was 
0.71 which indicates that there is a strong positive correlation between the 
requested number of Antivirus permissions and Anti-Privacy permissions. 
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Meaning that many of the permissions requested to perform Antivirus 
functions were contrary to a user’s privacy. Therefore, Antivirus apps require 
more controls to protect the user’s information from abuse. 
6.4.3 Results 
In 2011 there were 15 developers with 22 apps on the Google Store, of which 5 
developers in their original state were still in existence in 2015. The 22 apps 
available in 2011 had reduced to 7 which had been updated during the 4 years 
to 2015. 
In 2015 the number of developers had increased to 57 and the number of 
products available to 67.  
The number of permissions had also changed but had not increased across the 
board as expected with the increase in permissions available. In 2011 the 
median number of permissions requested was 15, the maximum requested was 
82 and the minimum requested was 3. In 2015 the median had increased to 21, 
but the maximum requested had dropped to 49. Three of the apps did not 
request any permissions at all, which does question the efficacy of the App. 
Removing these outliers showed the minimum that was requested was 4. 
During the 4 years of the study the number of developers had increased four-
fold, but the number of apps had only increased by a factor of three. This 
showed that the market was maturing, and developers were concentrating on 
a main app rather than providing multiple variations and names. The main 
commercial Antivirus providers were now providing Antivirus and security 
products to the mobile environment in addition to their PC portfolio. 
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6.5 Commercial Testers Results. 
The main antivirus testing organisation (AV-test.org) had started testing and 
publishing these results in 2010. They tested four apps. The feature sets of the 
four apps were proscribed for the following OS; Windows Mobile, Symbian, 
Android, Android 7 and iPhone. All 4 apps were available on Windows Mobile 
and Symbian, 2 apps were available on Android and only 1 for the iPhone. In 
2010 there were 35 security apps available on the Android platform, but these 
were not tested. The test results in the report showed that the apps were tested 
on the HTC Touch Pro 2, which is a Windows Mobile device. Details of the 
device type; Android, Symbian or iPhone used were not available. The 
Antivirus testing consisted of loading two viruses onto the phone and then 
testing the detection and quarantine functions of the apps. Browser detection 
and Firewall protection of the Security function of the app was also tested and 
their results published online (“Product Review: Mobile Security - August 
2010,” 2010). 
Their subsequent testing occurred in 2011 and in this and future tests the 
company concentrated on the Android OS, with the first report available in 
August 2011 containing the results of the testing of six (6) security products on 
an LG P500 running Android 2.2. This testing was of the feature set of the 
products. Their first test of the products to the Android Permission set was 
performed in 2014 with the report published in September 2014. 
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6.6 Comparison of 2011 and 2015 
Antivirus Apps  
As the popularity of the Android OS grew many antivirus and security 
developers were bought by the mainstream Security software companies. In 
2011 there were 22 apps with Antivirus components, this had grown to 63 apps 
in 2015.  
Of the 22 security apps in the marketplace in 2011, 7 had been updated and 
were available in 2015. Five of the developers from 2011 were still active as 
developers in 2015, the rest had either gone out of business or had been 
subsumed by other companies. Table A-10 shows the apps available in 2011 to 
2015, the developer name and the number of permissions requested in that 
year’s variant. Some of the app’s names changed between 2011 and 2015, but 
their package name (installable component) remained consistent with version 
variations.  
The 2015 analysis consisted of comparing the differences between features and 
permissions of the 2011 apps that were still in existence in 2015. The extraction 
and comparison of the apps permissions and feature used the latest 
methodology as described in the PEMP chapter (Chapter 7). 
The comparison of the permission changes during the 4 years of the antivirus 
apps are shown in Figure 6-16. 
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Figure 6-16 Comparison of permissions of 2011 apps still available in 2015 
A comparison of the defined features was also made. 
 
Figure 6-17 The features and requested permissions of Free and Commercial 
apps in 2011 
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6.7 Conclusion 
Five Antivirus developers from 2011 were still in existence in 2015. The 22 apps 
available in 2011 had been reduced to 7 which had been updated during the 
intervening 4 years to 2015. 
In 2015 the number of developers had increased to 57 with the number of 
products available to 67.  
The number of permissions had also changed but had not increased across the 
board as expected with the increase in permissions available. In 2011 the 
median number of permissions requested was 15, the maximum requested was 
82 and the minimum requested was 3. In 2015 the median had increased to 21, 
but the maximum requested had dropped to 49. This indicated that developers 
were either being more selective about the permissions to perform the function 
or were using the higher-level permission, which would cover multiple 
permissions, rather than select individual permissions (see the section in 9.1.3 
which describes “Protection Normal”). Three of the apps did not request any 
permissions at all, which does question the efficacy of the app. Removing these 
outliers showed the minimum that was requested was 4. 
Testing the correlation between Antivirus and Anti Privacy permissions 
showed that there was a strong positive correlation. 
During the 4 years of the study the number of developers had increased four-
fold, but the number of apps had only increased by a factor of three. This 
showed that the market was maturing, and developers were concentrating on 
a main app rather than providing multiple variations and names. To be able to 
provide the security for the user, the user’s privacy was severely impacted. 
This was not communicated to the user as many of the apps used the high-level 
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permissions provided by Google, which did not ask for user approval. The 
main commercial Antivirus providers were now providing antivirus and 
security products to the mobile environment in addition to their PC portfolio. 
The next section improves on the testing process by introducing an automated 
method created to reduce the preparation of the app for analysis. The method 
is tested on various genres to ensure that it is repeatable and robust. 
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 Permission Extraction 
Method and Process (P.E.M.P.) 
The previous chapter described the analysis of apps using a manual process. 
This was time consuming and an automated method was required to extract 
the app and perform some initial processing before the final analysis. This 
chapter describes the improved automated extraction process and it’s use. 
Mobile app permissions are increasingly attracting interest from the mobile 
industry, researchers, standards bodies and protection agencies. Previous 
studies have concentrated on the technical aspect of the permissions and 
related API calls (Wain et al., 2012) introducing methods for the static (Bartel, 
Klein, Monperrus, & Le Traon, 2014) and dynamic (Barrera, Kayacik, van 
Oorschot, & Somayaji, 2010) analysis of the extracted permissions.  
The extraction of the permissions is a laborious process and repeatable 
methods are needed to automate the extraction itself. 
This chapter provides a repeatable and robust method, which is subsequently 
referred to as the Permission Extraction Method and Process (P.E.M.P). The 
method extracts the permissions from the app and provides the permissions in 
a suitable format for processing.  
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The development of the PEMP method described has been tested and refined 
over four years of research. The method has been used primarily to evaluate 
Android apps’ permissions, although the method is easily adapted to other 
permission-based systems. 
The initial method and use and the evolution to the current version is 
described. A discussion on the observations on the success of the method and 
additional functionality which could be incorporated to fully automate the 
process are explored. 
 
The initial method that is described first was used to extract antivirus and 
security apps in the Google play store5. The purpose of the extraction was to 
compare the coded permissions and features with those described on the Play 
Store. Previous research had reviewed the efficacy of free antivirus scanners 
but had not analysed the permissions requested by the scanner apps 
(Ramachandran, Oh, Stackpole, & Smartphone, 2012). Before the app could be 
processed it had to be downloaded to a device capable of running the app and 
then transferred to a PC for the evaluation.  
However, the initial method was very labour intensive, initially taking 1 hour 
to extract and process each app, but with repetition the author managed to 
reduce it to 30 minutes per app. The thirty minutes processing for each app 
consisted of; the download took 5 minutes and to transfer, decrypt and extract 
the permissions took an additional twenty-five minutes. Therefore, preparing 
the 20 apps for comparison analysis took 10 hours. The final product contains 
                                                 
 
5 Google play store is also known as the Play store and Google Market place 
(https://play.google.com/store). 
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automation and has reduced the time taken to prepare the app for processing 
to slightly more than the download time of approximately 3 minutes. The 
disassembling, decryption and preparation of the app for further processing is 
then done in bulk and takes less than 5 minutes for 20 apps. The updating of 
the permission database is still manual, but the format of the extraction output 
has reduced the time taken to populate the database. This is an area for future 
automation (Chapter 10).  
The chapter provides guidance on PEMP for Android, the initial overall model 
and extraction, code segments and guidance on selection of apps for a robust 
and repeatable evaluation. And provides insights into how app permissions 
have changed over the last four years. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on observations on the success of the 
method and the additional functionality which is required to fully automate 
the process, and then indicates additional areas for further research. The 
research will concentrate on analysis rather than the extraction and data 
collection as in this research. 
Previous researchers concentrated on the permissions specified API calls (Wain 
et al., 2012) and permission mapping analysis (Bartel et al., 2014). In these cases, 
research concentrated on the permission framework and analysis of the 
Android framework and those permissions requested by categories of apps 
rather than the permissions of individual apps in one category. 
 
A survey by (Mylonas, Kastania, & Gritzalis, 2013) has found that there is a 
suggestion of complacency by users to security on personal devices, initial 
research investigated the efficacy of security products, especially Antivirus, 
available in the market place in 2010  (Pilz  S, 2012). At that time, the Android 
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operating system was selected due to its rapid growth on devices and the 
abundance of free apps  (Enck et al., 2010). Whilst investigating the selection of 
the apps, the analysis detected a distinct variation between the numbers of 
permissions requested, the lowest being 3 and the highest was 31. Using 
security knowledge and experience the permissions which would be required 
by an app to be able to perform basic antivirus functions was defined. The apps 
were then tested to evaluate their ability to perform the antivirus functions6 
and then the results compared across the apps. One section of the research 
reviewed the permissions of the apps to determine if the previously defined 
required minimum had been requested and if the permissions requested had 
any impact on the efficacy of the app’s functioning as an Antivirus app. Further 
comparisons were made between the free app and its commercial version (if 
available) including the source code. 
It was during the extraction of the source code in 2011, that a generic process 
was required to enable mass extraction of the apps, irrespective of the genre or 
category of the app, or the OS version that it was written and compiled for. 
This would enable the research to be concentrated on the analysis rather than 
the extraction tasks. The generic Permissions, Extraction Method and Process 
(PEMP) evolved from this need and verified using the earlier tested process 
models. The method has also been tested by another researcher to extract and 
analyse First Person Shooter (FPS) games. 
                                                 
 
6 Full research results are available on request. 
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7.1 Generic PEMP 
This section describes the generic permission extraction process for apps. It also 
captures a discussion of a fuller extraction process, PEMP, towards a repeatable 
and mass extraction capability. It also provides guidance to implement PEMPs 
through the extraction process of Android apps. 
 
The overall research method was first developed in 2011 to download 
Antivirus apps from the Google Store (now called the Play Store), verify that 
the app performed Antivirus functions; scanning, detection and removal of 
malware from the device. The app was then transferred and decompiled into 
readable format to check the permissions coded into the app were as described 
on the Play Store. 
 
The Google Play Store in 2011 (https://market.android.com/) contained 37 
security products and these constituted the base for the investigation. The 
permissions requested by these apps were recorded and reviewed against the 
API list to determine the access to system resources. 
 
The permissions that were determined to provide the Antivirus functions and 
those which were detrimental to the user’s privacy were described and 
documented for each security product.  
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Other methods have been described to perform analysis of the apps, API calls, 
Permissions etc. Two examples are static analysis to map API calls and 
Permissions (Bartel et al., 2014) and empirical analysis (Barrera et al., 2010) 
using Self-Organising Maps. The methods describe the analysis of the 
permissions but have assumed that the author already uses an undisclosed 
method for the extraction of the app, it’s source and database repository. The 
method described in this paper is one example to fill this gap and provides an 
extraction method to enable researchers with little or no Android development 
skills, Java or Eclipse knowledge to prepare the Android framework and code 
for analysis. 
 
7.2 Generic PEMP Process and Guidance 
A generic model of the process is shown (Figure 7-1). The model has been 
extended with further contribution to existing models. A detailed description 
of the phases, with examples of the implementation of the phase and the results 
are discussed in the Initial 2011 Method section (Section 7.3) and the 
subsequent evolved method in the 2015 Method chapter (7.4 ).  
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Figure 7-1: Flowchart illustrating the overall method for extraction of 
permissions 
 
The generic PEMP process model consists of 6 phases. A summary of each 
phase is described and more detailed description of the phase in action is in  
Phase 1: 
The identification of the product type is important as it will indicate which 
types of permissions will be in the selection. Antivirus apps will be 
concentrating on permissions related to scanning either the device itself or 
during downloads, so the ability to read and write to storage is necessary. If an 
app is performing photographic tweaks, then access to the camera and the 
photo album is required. 
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Phase 2: 
Sample criteria needs to be robust and repeatable. One option is to select apps 
that have a minimum number of downloads or a certain rating. Google also 
displays apps from a search by popularity, but this is hard to repeat by 
researchers performing subsequent searches. 
One method that the author used was to create a co-efficient related to the 
rating and number of downloads. apps that had too few downloads were 
discarded to prevent the data being skewed. Subsequent selection was to create 
a co-efficient on the rating and number of people rating the app. 
Phase 3: 
Downloading the app can be performed in a variety of ways. The main options 
are to download to a valid device and transfer to the processing PC or to 
download either directly to the PC or via a download server.   
Phase 4: 
Extraction of permissions can be performed manually for each app, or 
automation can be used to simulate the manual extraction. The output from 
the extraction entered into a database to facilitate later analysis. 
Phase5: 
Comparison of the permissions requested will depend on the product selection 
and the researcher’s area of interest. 
Phase 6: 
Document the results. As the selection criteria is repeatable, evolution of the 
app permissions can be compared over time, as well as changes to the rating 
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co-efficient. As bulk extraction is relatively simple, other analysis can be 
initiated by the category of app extracted. 
7.3 Initial 2011 Method 
In 2010, mobile phones were growing at an incredible rate, overall the 
smartphone sector grew by 64% in the year 2Q2009 to 2Q2010 (“Google 
Android phone shipments increase by 886%,” 2010). The author’s research 
concentrated on the analysis of security and privacy of Antivirus apps.  
The question that the research intended to answer was, “Is there a correlation 
between the permissions requested and the features specified, and do they 
effect the efficacy of the Antivirus function?”. 
7.3.1 Tools 
Prior to 2012, the download of the app from the Google Play Store 
(https://market.android.com/) was performed using the Google Installer and 
installed directly onto the device that it would be run on. See Chapter 4 
Additional tools are then required to transfer the app and its code to the 
processing device (a laptop or PC). Tools were also needed to de-crypt and dis-
assemble the compiled code into a readable format, so that the permission file 
could be accessed.  
7.3.1.1 Tool Installation. 
The base tools had to be installed prior to the testing. 
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7.3.2The Phases of PEMP 
The description of each phase of the initial method and the results follow.  
7.3.2.1 Phase 1: Identify and select product type 
At the time of selection in 2010 and 2011, there were a variety of documents 
and advice, in the form of blogs and white papers, and company promotional 
material available to aid consumers and enterprises in securing standard 
computing equipment; laptops, netbooks, desktops, etc. There was also a 
variety of free/shareware tools available to perform vulnerability assessments 
of these devices and the networks that they use for connectivity, e.g. Nessus 
(http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus/nessus-product-overview), 
Nmap (http://www.nmap.org/) and Wireshark 
(http://www.wireshark.org). However, this availability of tools and 
knowledge had not been transferred into the mobile sector (Smartphones, e-
readers, tablets etc). In this sector the increase in acquisition of these device 
types exceeded the growth of legacy platforms (laptops, netbooks), PC 
shipments increased to 92.1 Million in the last quarter of 2010 (“Tablet 
Computers Hold Back PC Sales Growth,” 2011) whilst Smartphones grew by 
over 100 Million in the same period (Canalys, 2011). 
A study by Nielsen shows that the choice of Smartphone software is also age 
related with Android being the main choice in the 18-34 age group (Study: 
Ages of social network users., 2010). Therefore, there was an increase in 
criminal activity in proportion to the growth of the Android operating system 
market share. Android phones growing by 886% between Q2 2009 and Q2 2010 
whilst Apple’s Smartphone growth was around 61% during the same period 
(Mobile Snapshot: Smartphones Now 28% of U.S. Cellphone Market. , 2010). 
Although the Android growth slowed to 148.1% between 4Q 2010 and 4Q2011 
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the market share grew to over 51%, thus becoming the most popular mobile 
operating system as per research by Canalsys (“Smart phones overtake client 
PCs in 2011.,” 2012). The mobile operating systems and their market share from 
Q4 2010 to 4Q 2011 are in Table 7-1. 
 
OS  Q4 2011 Shipments 
(millions) 
% share % Growth 
Q4’11-Q4’10 
Symbian 18.3 11.6 -40.9 
RIM 13.2 8.3 -9.7 
Android 81.9 51.6 148.7 
Apple 37 23.4 128.1 
Windows 2.5 1.6 -14.0 
bada 3.8 2.4 39.1 
Others 1.8 1.1 117.91 
Total 158.5 100  
Table 7-1: Worldwide Smartphone market 
 
As occurred on the Windows OS for PCs as an operating system becomes more 
prominent, actors are adapting existing malware, PC viruses and Trojans, to 
target it. 
Therefore, this research concentrated on the most popular mobile OS, which 
was Android smartphones and how they were being protected from not only 
malware but the security products themselves. 
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7.3.2.2 Phase2: Determine sample criteria 
A search of the google store produced a result of 37 apps that had keywords or 
tags of security or antivirus, 23 contained tags for Antivirus, and were selected 
for the research. The selection method was to sort the free apps by number of 
downloads and select the top 10. These apps were sorted by user satisfaction 
co-efficient. This was calculated using the user rating and number of 
downloads.  
If a company provided a commercial version of the app, this was also selected 
for download so that comparisons could be performed. 
 
7.3.2.3 Phase 3: Download 
At the time of the testing the apps had to be downloaded to an Android 
smartphone and then transferred to a PC to perform any extraction of the 
source code. 
The app downloads were performed on a T-Mobile G1 smartphone. The device 
was running the original installed Cupcake version of Android (V1.6). This 
proved to be inadequate to run the Antivirus apps and was not supported by 
some of them. Therefore, the decision was made to update the software to the 
latest operating system, which at the time was Froyo (V2.2). Once the device 
had been rooted and updated to the latest version of the OS, the apps installed 
with no problems and each app was tested to determine that it performed the 
basic Antivirus functions; that is detecting and removing malware. Once the 
app passed the verification checks it was a suitable candidate for further 
processing.  
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The author did not test against all the malware available but used a small 
subset of test malware to verify functionality. Antivirus test companies, AV-
Test.Org had started testing mobile security apps and had large databases of 
malware to use as part of their test process (Pilz  S, 2012). 
 
7.3.2.4 Phase 4: Extract permissions and populate database 
The Android operating system (OS) is a privilege-separated OS and by default 
applications (apps) or packages are not permitted to perform any operation 
that would impact another app, the operating system or the user, this is known 
as Sandboxing. The sandbox creates an area for applications to run in and the 
access that the installed app must a system resource is controlled. Android uses 
a system of permissions. These permissions form part of the application 
sandbox and provide a modicum of basic security to the operating system.  
These permissions are declared in an application’s manifest file.  
By default, an application does not have any associated permissions and must 
declare in the manifest file which permissions it needs. At installation time the 
user is notified by the installer the permissions that the app is requesting, and 
the user then has the option to deny (don’t install) or accept (continue install) 
the request. 
The user is not able to select which permissions the app can receive during the 
installation process. 
 
To extract the permissions, the app code had to be transferred to the PC.  To do 
this several software tools was required. The software required was; Android 
Development Kit (ADT), Java Development kit (JDK), Android Virtual Devices 
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(AVB), Android Debug (ADB), a Java graphical interface (e.g. JDGUI), Eclipse, 
Android Software Development Kit (SDK), a .dex decomplier (dex2jar), and an 
app package extraction tool. 
 
The smartphone was connected using a USB cable. The app was located on the 
phone main storage and had a .dex suffix. This suffix describes the package as 
a Davlik EXecutable. Only apps in this compiled format can run in the Android 
operating system environment. 
The transfer and conversion commands are run using the command line on the 
PC. To transfer the executable to the PC the ADB Pull command was used.  
To be able to read the Android manifest file (Manifest.xml) the transferred 
executable must be converted from dex to a readable format. This was 
performed in two steps; first de-compiling from dex to a compiled Java code 
(jar) using the dex2jar tool and then from the compiled Java (jar) to Java source 
code. This was done via the JDGUI interface which displays the Java classes of 
the app in a GUI format. The Manifest file was selected, and the permissions 
were manually extracted from the source code and saved in a database for later 
analysis.  
 
7.3.2.5 Phase 5: Perform comparisons and further analysis 
Excel was used as the database platform, due to its ease of use, inbuilt 
programmability and the various file formats that the data can be converted to 
and saved. A spreadsheet was created which contained the following fields; 
app name, developer name, package name, rating, number of downloads, co-
efficient, package size, and the permissions selected. 
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7.3.2.6 Phase 6: Documented results 
Comparisons between the Free and Commercial (paid for) Antivirus apps were 
documented. The results7 of the comparison of product features, permissions 
and user ratings are in Figure 7-2 and a cluster analysis of features and 
permissions illustrated that there was no relationship between the number of 
features of the app and the permissions (Figure 7-3).  
 
Figure 7-2: Permissions requested by Free and Commercial Antivirus apps in 
2011 
 
                                                 
 
7 These results are available on request. 
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Figure 7-3: Cluster analysis of the relationship between features and total 
permissions requested 
 
The analysis demonstrated that there was no correlation between features and 
permissions. Therefore, any additional features in the commercial versions, 
either did not require any additional permissions or were external to app. 
External features consisted of remote lock/wipe, find my phone, and other 
online/cloud-based functions. 
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7.4 Generic Method (2015) 
7.5 Tools 
One of the objectives in the evolution of the method was to automate the 
various functions of the method.  There are tools available that perform many 
of the previous manual steps and these are incorporated into the generic 
method. The download of the app was performed by using a PC browser tool, 
APK Downloader (“APK Downloader V2,” 2014). The extraction was 
performed with APLtool (“APKtool,” 2015) and the processing was performed 
by running a Python script. 
7.6 APK Downloader 
Google Chrome (“Chrome Browser Download,” 2012) was selected as the 
browser for the Play Store access and for downloading the apps, the APK 
Downloader was used. APK Downloader, which became available in 2012 and 
is obtained directly from the developer (“APK Downloader V2,” 2014).  
Apk downloader is a browser extension which downloads the app directly to 
your PC. The extension version used in this method was version V2 and was 
available for both Chrome and Firefox.    
Other, non-official versions of this Chrome extension are available (“APK 
Downloader,” 2014).  In that instance of the extension, the app is downloaded 
to a server and a link is made available for the user to then download to the 
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PC. Commonly accessed apps are stored on this server to reduce download 
times. This method provides the ability to bypass the normal device 
constraints. (The browser plugin requires that you define the device that the 
downloader is emulating. The downloader then downloads the related code 
for that device. This way you can download apps for tablets or mobiles.) Users 
are also able to download apps from a variety of app stores and transfer them 
to their smart device. When using this extension, the user needs to be aware 
that there is an extra step in the download process where malware could be 
introduced to the app. It is also possible to obtain apps from non-legitimate 
sites, which could also contain malware. Using this option means that any app 
can be downloaded, irrespective of the device requirements. 
APK Downloader is also available as a Windows executable. This program 
downloads the app but requires the package name or full URL as input to the 
program to download the app, whereas the browser extension can download 
the app directly from the Play Store. 
The method used in this stage of the study was to use the Chrome extension to 
download the app directly to the PC. This method requires that the Chrome 
extension has access to the user’s email and password, (as this access is a 
security risk, I recommend creating a dummy Userid to perform the 
downloading) and the Device Id that the app needs to work on as described in 
the installation notes (Figure 7-4).  
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Figure 7-4: Chrome APKdownloader plugin installation notes 
 
7.7 Extraction and Processing Tools 
To extract the manifest file from the packages the Android reverse engineering 
tool APLtool (“APKtool,” 2015) is used. This tool is a smali debugger and can 
decode Android apps from binary to their nearly original form. This is required 
to extract the Manifest.xml file which contains the app permissions. The Java 
v1.7 or higher development kit (“Java Download,” 2015) is needed to run the 
tool. A knowledge of the Android SDK is useful but not essential.  
To perform the processing, automation code was written in Python and needs 
Python version 2.7.9 or higher (“Python Downloads,” 2015). 
To be able to get the Android Market cookie, it needs a valid email and password to 
login. Once the initial login has occurred, download(s) can commence. The password 
is not stored after this initial login, the email, Device Id and Cookie are stored for later 
requests.   
1. Enter email and device ID on Options page. There are two ways to get 
Email and Device ID 
a. With the Device ID app which is obtained from the 
[https://market.android.com/details?id=com.redphx.deviceid] , 
it will show you your emails and Device ID 
b. On the smart device: Open dial pad, call *#*#8255#*#* ( 8255 
= TALK ). If it opens “GTalk Service Monitor”, find lines that begin 
with JID and Device ID. Your email is JID, and your device id is a 
string that after android- prefix 
For example: if it shows android-1234567890abcdef , then your 
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7.7.1 Process 
In 2015 the method was simplified (Figure 7-5) to incorporate the APK-
Downloader plugin on Chrome. Once installed and enabled it permits the user 
to download the app package directly to the PC. This removes the laborious 
steps of downloading the app to a smartphone, transferring the executable to 
the PC and de-compiling to a readable format. The file is saved with a suffix of 
.apk. 
 
Figure 7-5 Analysis process flow - simplified. 
 
The Extract code (Figure 7-6) provided, requires that the app descriptions are 
inputted into to a flat file for pre-processing. The pre-processing prepares the 
app’s information for the decode. The decode is performed in a batch file 
(cmdlist2.bat). This extracts the app’s code and decrypts and dis-assembles it 
into a source readable file so that the AndroidManifes.xml file, containing the 
permissions can be accessed. 
This automation requires that basic details are in an input file, which is used to 
create the output folders for each app. A comma separated values file that 
contains the app name, package name and company has been used in this case. 
These values are also used to create the pre-processing list for the tools. 
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7.7.1.1 Phase 1: Identify and select product type 
In 2015 the selection criteria from 2011 was replicated; Android apps on the 
Play store with keyword tags of Security and/or Antivirus. Primarily of 
interest were apps that had been in existence in 2011 and had evolved with 
Android and smartphones.  
 
7.7.1.2 Phase 2: Determine sample criteria 
The search of the Play store produced a result of 65 apps that had keywords or 
tags of security or antivirus. Seventeen of the apps were updated versions of 
2011 apps. These apps, in both versions were used to test the validity of the 
process.  
 
7.7.1.3 Phase 3: Download 
Two additional options are available to download apps. Both provide the 
functionality to download directly to a PC thereby by-passing the requirement 
to download and install the app to a suitable device and then transfer the 
executable to the PC for decompiling. 
This reduces the time to prepare the app for extraction. Although the download 
time, from Play Store to device is constant, irrespective of the device, 
Smartphone or PC, the transfer process has been eliminated. 
The APK Downloader that downloads directly to a PC was used. This requires 
that the device type and its operating System is configured in the tool at first 
use. 
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During the download process the tool verifies that the app is suitable for the 
device type and OS configured prior to the download. The tool downloads 
both the .apk file and the .obb file, which contains additional data that is used 
when the app runs.  
To verify that the tool was not injecting any additional code into the app, a 
sample app was downloaded using the traditional method to a device and the 
executable transferred to the PC, where the extraction was performed to obtain 
the package and the two MD5 hashes compared. Subsequent downloads were 
performed only using the APK-downloader. 
The Play store was accessed from the PC using Chrome with the APK-
Downloader plugin and the search keywords used were security and/or 
antivirus. Snapshots of the app pages were taken so that the app presentation 
order was recorded. 
Each app was downloaded, and the package stored in an input folder (apkin). 
The name of the developer, app, package name, rating and number of 
downloads and package size was recorded in an excel spreadsheet. Once the 
spreadsheet has been populated with the selected apps it is saved in .csv format 
so that it will be readable by the batch extraction process.  
7.7.1.4  Phase 4: Extract permissions and populate database 
 
The format of the input file is app names, the company/developer name, the 
package name, rating, number of downloads and package size. To differentiate 
between duplicate app names, the name is updated to include the company 
name in parenthesis and any names that contain an and symbol (&) will have 
it replaced with a ‘n’. All spaces in the app name are replaced with an 
underscore ‘_’ which prevents processing errors. 
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Prior to executing the script, the following tasks are required. Create an output 
folder (apkout) 
· Create a folder to contain the python output and the call command batch 
file. 
· Create a batch file to contain the APKTool commands to decode the pkg 
and output the code and androidmanifest.xml file 
· Create an output folder, apkout 
 
The sample python script (Figure 7-6) reads the .csv input file and for each 
entry creates a corresponding entry in an output file, containing the APKTool 
command. The code is provided as guidance, as complementary code to help 
guide other researchers to provide a robust and repeatable extraction.  
The format of the command is  
“call apktool d –f –s /apin/package_name.apk –o /apkout/app_name/ \n” 
This creates a folder in apkout for each app_name. Each of these folders contain 
the decrypted and dis-assembled package including the AndroidManifest.xml 
file in readable format. 
The script is run in a python shell (from the IDLE editor GUI).  
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''' APKextract 
This code reads the downloaded apk file. 
For each line open the package and run APKtool to decode the xml file 
and output to the app name folder. 
 
list of packages is in c:/apkin/apklist/ 
 
cmd string is c:apktool d -f -s /indir/app_name -o /outdir/app_name 
 
''' 
import csv 
 
fi = file('/apkin/apklistn.csv','r') 
#fo = file('/apkout/appout.csv', 'wb') 
fo = file('/apkout/cmdlist2.csv', 'wb') 
 
ci = csv.reader(fi) 
co = csv.writer(fo) 
 
#for each input row 
 
for master_row in ci: 
    app_name = master_row[0] 
    pkg_name = master_row[1] 
    company = master_row[2]  
    print pkg_name 
    cmd1 = "call apktool d -f -s /apkin/" 
    cmd2 = " -o /apkout/" 
    cmd3 = "/ \n"  
    cmd = cmd1 + pkg_name + cmd2 + app_name + cmd3 
    fo.write(cmd) 
    #fo.write('\n') 
 
fi.close() 
fo.close() 
 
Figure 7-6: Example python script to create the batch file entries 
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The output file cmdlist2.csv is renamed to a batch file (cmdlist2.bat) 
A cmd GUI is opened and the batch file is run.   
Example log of one batch call which corresponds to the APKTOOL cmd; 
call apktool d -f -s /apkin/org.sample.av-53.apk -o /apkout/Sample_Antivirus/ 
  
and the output log is:  
I: Using Apktool 2.0.0-RC3 on org.samplem.av-53.apk 
I: Loading resource table... 
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources... 
I: Loading resource table from file: C:\Users\KC\apktool\framework\1.apk 
I: Regular manifest package... 
I: Decoding file-resources... 
I: Decoding values */* XMLs... 
I: Copying raw classes.dex file... 
I: Copying assets and libs... 
I: Copying unknown files... 
I: Copying original files... 
Figure 7-7 Sample Log from the APKTool call 
This creates a folder in APKout called Sample_Antivirus 
The folder contains the AndroidManifest.xml which has been decoded so that 
it can be viewed by any text editor (e.g., Notepad or Wordpad). 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?> 
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
android:installLocation="internalOnly" package="org.whitegate.av"> 
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.telephony" android:required="false"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="GET_TASKS"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="RESTART_PACKAGES"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="INTERNET"/> 
    <uses-permission …………….. 
     ………………………… 
    </application> 
</manifest> 
 Figure 7-8: Sample Manifest file extract 
 
7.7.1.5 Phase 5: Perform comparisons and further analysis. 
This is still a manual process and will be automated in future work. 
Excel is used to open the AndroidManifest.xml. When Excel opens the file, it 
asks for the format. Select the XML Table format. Once open, search for (use 
the find all option) the permissions will all be in one group. Permissions that 
have been created by the developer may show up but are not part of this 
comparison of Save the permissions in a file called manifest.csv (Figure 7-9) in 
the packages folder. This will be used as input to the permission checker 
(Figure 7-10). 
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Figure 7-9 Sample contents from a manifest.csv file 
A file containing all the Android permissions for the OS version is used as the 
master permissions file (f1) to compare the app permissions with. The script 
has 2 input files, the master permission list and the app’s package list. The 
output file from apklist contains a list of all the app names and this used by the 
permission checker to open each app folder and open the manifest.csv file (this 
contains the android.permissions specified in AndroidManifest.xml). The 
app’s permissions are compared to the master permission list and the result is 
the full list of permissions with the requested permissions marked with a ‘y’, 
which is stored in pkg_perm in the apps folder. 
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#! c:\python27\scripts 
# f1 is the file containing the full list of permissions for Android Lollypop 
# f2 is the manifest file of the package 
# f3 is the resultant file with the permissions confirmed (y) or not (n) 
import csv 
fp = file('/apkout/uni_pkgn.csv','r') 
cp = csv.reader(fp) 
pkglist = [row for row in cp] 
for unip in pkglist: 
    uname = unip[0] 
    print 'unique name is ', uname 
    #uname = 'testfold' 
    f1 = file('/apkout/masterperm.csv', 'r') 
    f2  = file('/apkout/' + uname + '/manifest.csv', 'r') 
    f3 = file('/apkout/' + uname + '/pkgperm.csv', 'wb') 
      
    c1 = csv.reader(f1) 
    c2 = csv.reader(f2) 
    c3 = csv.writer(f3) 
    permlist = [row for row in c1] 
    manflist = [row for row in c2] 
    row = 0 
    man = 0 
    for perm in permlist: 
        result = perm 
        for manf in manflist: 
            if manf[0] == perm[0]: 
                result.append('y') 
                break 
        c3.writerow(result) 
    f2.close() 
    f3.close() 
    f1.close() 
fp.close() 
Figure 7-10: Python code to compare app permissions to a master permission 
file 
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7.7.1.6 Phase 6: Document results and initiate actions 
 
The pkg_perm file for each app is stored in the excel database. A snapshot of 
the database (Figure 7-11) is shown. 
 
 
Figure 7-11: Snapshot of Permission Database entries 
7.7.2 Additional Actions 
Permissions can be checked for any version of the OS and even across the 
versions using a simple script. A sample script (permver_chk.py) to compare 
permissions for different Android versions is provided (Figure 7-12). 
In this case each version has a master file created and the sample code will 
compare each file and output a file containing all the permissions in both input 
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files marked with either ‘new’ (only in this release), ‘both’ (present in both 
versions) and ‘old’ (only in older version and now discontinued. 
#! c:\python27\scripts 
''' 
Permission Version Checker 
This script compares two Android versions permissions file and creates an output file with the permissions marked 
as valid in both versions, only in previous version or new for this version. 
 ''' 
# f1 is the file containing the full list of permissions for Android Lollypop 
# f2 is the manifest file of the package 
# f3 is the resultant file with the permissions confirmed (y) or not (n) 
import csv 
 
f1 = file('/apkout2011/masterperm.csv', 'r') 
f2  = file('/apkout2011/permv2.2.csv', 'r') 
f3 = file('/apkout2011/permdiff.csv', 'wb') 
c1 = csv.reader(f1) 
c2 = csv.reader(f2) 
c3 = csv.writer(f3) 
permlist = [row for row in c1] 
manflist = [row for row in c2] 
row = 0 
man = 0 
for perm in permlist: 
    result = perm 
    for manf in manflist: 
       if manf[0] == perm[0]: 
          result.append('y') 
          break 
    c3.writerow(result) 
 
f2.close() 
f3.close() 
f1.close() 
Figure 7-12: Python code to compare permissions of different versions of 
Android OS and mark the origin. 
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The final output is an Excel Spreadsheet with the permissions selected by each 
app. This data can them be used as input for analysis of trends, most commonly 
selected permissions by genre/category etc. When used as the base for 
checking apps requested permissions, it is useful to review if discontinued 
permissions are still being requested.  
7.8 Conclusion  
The method arose to fill a need to extract and process Android apps to perform 
permission analysis in another stage of the research. The time taken to extract 
and prepare the permission list for analysis was too time consuming. It meant 
that the research was concentrated on the extraction and decoding of the 
manifest file instead of the analysis of the file between different categories of 
apps and within the categories. Removal of the manual intervention at each 
stage of the extraction and decoding through the automation of the basic tasks 
has enabled the research to process 20 apps within a few hours rather days. 
The method has been tested against different categories of apps and in each 
case the mass extraction of a minimum of 60 apps at a time. This proved 
successful, especially when comparing apps across multiple genres and 
updated versions of the apps. 
Although the method8 has been tested and refined to be as automated as 
possible, it still requires further automation. Work will be concentrated on the 
                                                 
 
8 The python code used in the method is provided by CC licence ©AT&T and University of Portsmouth. The author would appreciate 
feedback on the code as well as any suggested improvements.   
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next two labour intensive areas. The first area for automation will be with the 
app download and the next area will be concentrated on the permission 
extraction and population of a database for each app’s permissions. This would 
facilitate access to the data for processing and analysis.  
The process uses open source software and the code is easily updated to 
incorporate changes to the permission databases or for the author to 
concentrate on another part of the app code. Use by other researchers has 
shown that the process is robust and is easily used to extract and analyse 
multiple apps/genres. 
The next chapter utilises this method to review children’s apps.  
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 Analysis of 2015 Children’s 
Apps  
8.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the Antivirus apps concluded with the development of a 
method to automate the analysis process of the apps, resulting in the PEMP 
method. The method had been tested in the utility genre apps with apps across 
a four-year time span but needed to be tested in another genre to show 
robustness. Children’s apps were selected for the next stage of testing.  
In 4Q15 Android had over 80% of the Worldwide Smartphone Market share 
(Puneet Sikka, 2016). Research in the US in 2013 by Vicky Rideout (Rideout, 
2013) on the usage of mobile media of children under 8 revealed that 38% of 
children under 2 years of age had used a smartphone or a tablet, this is up from 
10% two years ago. By the age of 8, 72% have used one of the devices. This has 
increased from 52% of 8-year olds using these devices in 2011.  
The increase in usage of these age groups increased the concern that had been 
raised by other researchers and business groups, Mumsnet etc, that children 
are vulnerable to being tracked (geo-location) or monitored (camera, voice 
recording) inadvertently by the apps that they were using (either games or 
educational apps). 
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The increased usage of these devices by young children has exposed them to 
being tracked though location sharing technologies (de Souza e Silva, 2013) as 
well as affecting their privacy (Duncan, 2011).  
This part of the research concentrated on the privacy aspect of apps aimed at 
children. The objective was to determine if the privacy of children was being 
abused either by monitoring or spying on children without the parents or 
guardian’s permission.   
8.2 Motivation 
Earlier this research into security apps showed that the apps that were 
supposed to protect the user, also abused the user’s privacy. Where adults have 
a reasonable awareness of privacy and are concerned at the erosion of their 
privacy online, the research of Palfrey, Gasser and Boyd (Palfrey, Gasser, & 
Boyd, 2010) showed that youngsters are also concerned by this erosion but 
have a different perspective to what can or should be disclosed. Often the skills 
and knowledge to protect themselves are missing. Children are especially 
vulnerable and through peer pressure will disclose private information. 
Therefore, it is important to provide some modicum of protection until the 
requisite skills are learnt.  This part of the study was to determine if there were 
differences or similarities between the permissions requested for the different 
age groups or whether similar apps used the same permission requests across 
all the age groups. The apps were also reviewed to determine how many of the 
apps requested permissions perceived to be “privacy” related permissions. 
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8.3 Method 
Google uses multiple categories to group apps. Children apps are in the Family 
category and are also divided into 10 sub-categories. The twenty most popular 
free children’s apps were selected from the following sub-categories; Ages 5 & 
Under, Ages 6-8 and Ages 9 & Over.  
The Google Play Store (and other app stores) contain thousands of apps and 
increasing daily. When a new app is released it has a temporary visibility as a 
new app and then drops to become part of the general apps unless positively 
promoted. All app stores use a ranking system which is kept confidential. 
Google’s ranking was used when selecting the apps and the top 20 were 
downloaded from the Popular apps & Games group in each age range. The 
rankings are not constant and to ensure consistency in the selection of the apps 
over time the initial ranking of the app was recorded. 
Recent research into app ranking performed by Stuart McIlroy et al (McIlroy, 
Ali, & Hassan, 2016), used Distimo, an app analytical tool. These tools are 
commonly used by developers including crashing and bug tracking analytical 
tools to obtain a higher ranking of their app. 
These 60 free apps were analysed as follows: 
· Define the permissions considered as conflicting with the user’s 
privacy 
· Number of permissions requested for each app 
· Redundant permissions 
· Similar apps across the different age ranges 
· The variety of developers 
· The similarity or not between the app’s functions 
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· The similarity or not of the permissions requested. 
· The permissions were analysed and marked for privacy or not 
markers. The number of anti-privacy permissions for each app. 
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8.4 Permissions that Affect User Privacy. 
Permissions are requested to permit the app to access core or system facilities 
in accordance with the sandbox design of the Android operating system. There 
are apps available on the Google Play store that will list the number of 
permissions of each installed app and will list the permissions for that version 
of Android, but will leave the decision to block the permission (if possible) or 
to uninstall the app to the user, three examples are; PrivacyBlocker, the free 
version is Privacy Inspector (“Privacy Blocker,” 2017), Permissions – Privacy 
(“Senior Lab DE Apps,” 2017) and Snoopwall (“Snoopwall App,” 2017).  
8.4.1 Apps for Children aged 0-5 years 
The apps were selected using the default Google Ranking system, this is the 
order that the app is displayed to the user on the Play Store. The top 20 free 
apps were selected. The ranking order of the app and the number of 
downloads, user rating and permissions are described in Table A-11. 
The 20 apps in this category were supplied by 7 app providers. The most 
popular apps were the ones supplied by the Lego Group with 4 apps. The 
Disney group was second with 3 apps. 
The permission frequency of the apps in this age group of the study is shown 
in Figure 8-1. The median permissions requested was 5 and the median rating 
for these apps was 3.8 (out of 5). 
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Figure 8-1 Frequency of the requested permissions in the 0-5 age group apps 
In this age group the most frequently requested permissions were for the 
Internet, Access Network State and Write to external Storage. These 
permissions allowed an app to determine the network access and to connect to 
the Internet. The requesting apps were also able to write to an SD card if 
installed or to mobile device memory that has been configured as external 
storage. The request for WRITE automatically assumes READ access.  
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Figure 8-2 Permissions requested by each of the studied apps in the 0-5 years 
age group 
The privacy marked permissions for each app were analysed and 4 of the apps 
requested permissions that were marked as anti-privacy (Table 8-1). Of these 
two apps requested multiple anti-privacy permissions. These apps were 
Cbeebies Playtime and Disney color and play, who both requested access to 
the camera and to audio. 
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Table 8-1 Age group 0-5 apps requesting anti-privacy permissions. 
app Name CAMERA record_AUDIO 
Barbie magical fashion Y  
BBC Cbeebies story time  Y 
Cbeebies Playtime Y Y 
Peppa's activity maker 
 
Y  
disney_color_and_play Y Y 
 
8.4.2 Apps for Children aged 6-8 years 
The 20 apps in the study for the 6 to 8 age group is shown in Table A-12. The 
table shows the package name, developer, user rating, number of downloads 
and number of permissions requested. 
The 20 apps in this category were supplied by 11 app providers. The most 
popular apps were the ones supplied by the Disney, Lego and Budge, who 
supplied 4 each. 
The permission frequency of the apps in this age group of the study is shown 
in Figure 8-4. The median permissions requested was 6 and the median rating 
for these apps was 3.8 (out of 5). With the King of Math Junior – Free not 
requesting any permissions. 
The median permissions requested was higher than the younger age group 
although the median rating was the same. 
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Figure 8-3 Frequency of the requested permissions for the 20 apps in the 6-8 
age group. 
In this age group 5 permissions were requested most frequently. Again, Access 
Network State, Write External Storage and Internet were requested, with the 
addition of Wake lock and Access WiFi state. These last two permissions 
permitted apps to activate the phone without the user’s knowledge, for 
example at night, and to be able to determine the WiFi access and to activate it 
to logon to a WiFi network also without the user’s knowledge. 
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Figure 8-4 Permissions requested in apps for children in the 6-8 years age 
group 
The privacy marked permissions for each app were analysed and only one of 
these permissions was requested and this was requested by three of the apps. 
Table 8-2 Apps requesting anti-privacy permissions for 6-8 year group. 
app Name record_AUDIO 
Disney color and play Y 
Go CBBC Y 
The_Smurfs_baker Y 
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8.4.3 Apps for Children aged over 9 years 
The 20 apps in the study for the over 9’s age group is shown in Table A-13. The 
table shows the package name, developer, user rating, number of downloads 
and number of permissions requested. 
The 20 apps in this category were supplied by 10 app providers. The most 
popular apps being the ones supplied by Disney (5) and Gameloft (4). 
The permission frequency of the apps in this age group of the study is shown 
in Figure 8-6. The median permissions requested was 7.5 and the median rating 
for these apps was 4.2 (out of 5). The median permissions and rating were the 
highest in this age group. 
 
Figure 8-5 Ages 9+ app permission frequency 
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In this age group, the same five permissions were requested, Wake lock, Access 
WiFi state, Write external storage, Internet and Access network state. All the 
apps in the study requested the Internet and Access network state permissions. 
 
 
Figure 8-6 Permissions requested in apps for children in the 9+ age group. 
The privacy marked permissions for each app were analysed. 10 of the apps 
requested permissions marked as anti-privacy. Two of the apps requested 
more than one anti-privacy permission (Table 8-3).  
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Table 8-3 Apps that have requested anti privacy permissions 
app Name ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATIO
N 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATIO
N 
camer
a 
record_AUDI
O 
Cookies maker salon   y  
Crayola jewellery party   y  
Despicable me y    
Littlest pet shop   y  
Mini pets y y   
My little pony y    
Star chart  y  Y 
Littlest_pet_shop   y  
Angry_birds_transform
er 
    
Bad_piggies y    
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8.5 Results 
Comparing the three age category’s permissions illustrated that the mean 
number of permissions had increased in relation to the age of the user (Figure 
8-7).  
  
 
Figure 8-7 Number of permissions by age category 
The frequency of the permissions requested across the age groups was then 
evaluated and Figure 8-8 shows the frequency that a permission was requested 
of the apps in that age group. 
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Figure 8-8 Frequency of permissions requested in each age group. 
These frequencies illustrate that predominately the number of permissions 
requested increased in the older age bracket, the main exception to this was the 
requests for DISABLE_KEYGUARD and SET_DEBUG_APP, which were only 
requested in the 6-8 age bracket and RECORD_AUDIO that was only requested 
in one app in the ages 9+ bracket.  
Reviewing the frequencies of the apps across all three age groups showed that 
the apps use a standard set of permissions. These permissions are; 
Access_Network_State, Access_WiFi_State, Wake_Lock, 
Write_External_storage and Internet. 
The main concern is that the apps were requesting permissions deemed 
contrary to the user’s privacy also had Internet access. Over the 3 age brackets 
97% of the apps had requested Internet access. 
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Although these apps are not necessarily collecting camera, location data, 
account data etc, the Internet access could be used by colluding with data 
collection apps and using Covert Channels to provide this data to a third party 
(Marforio, Francillon, & Capkun, 2011). Marforio et al, describe how 
applications can collude on smartphones by bypassing the restrictions of their 
own permissions and using covert channels.    This technique is useful to a data 
collector as once installed an app’s permissions in the Manifest file are 
normally immutable.  
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8.6 Conclusion 
Reviewing the range of permissions requested by the apps in each age group, 
the maximum number of permissions increased by age. 
 
Figure 8-9 Number of permission requested by age group 
A variation to the increase in the number of permissions by age group was in 
the 6-8 age group where one app did not request any permissions. This 
prompted the question “Are there any permissions that are added as default 
and therefore not proffered to the user to accept or reject?” The app requesting 
no permissions was the “King of Math Junior – Free”. This app is aimed at 
parent schooling of mathematics in this age group. The interaction is only on 
the device and therefore does not need any permissions. 
Reviewing the privacy permissions requested by age (Figure 8-10) indicated 
that more anti privacy permissions were requested of the older age group.  
Analysis of Children’s Apps  
159 
   
 
Figure 8-10 Requested antiprivacy pemissions by app 
The permissions in this age group related to location, camera and audio access. 
This permitted the child to be location tracked and overheard as well as visual 
surroundings being recorded. 
In summary, the initial hypothesis that children were not fully protected was 
incorrect. However, Anti-privacy permissions requested increased in the older 
age groups. The main concern was that the privacy permissions requested in 
this age group was for tracking these were the locations, both coarse and fine 
and the camera and audio.  Fortunately, the apps did not request these at the 
same time, but it indicates that it is not single permissions which could be a 
problem but how multiple permissions are being used in conjunction with each 
other.   
The next chapters build on this initial research by describing the expected 
privacy needs of a user in relation to social and psychological contracts and 
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what the app marketplace owners have incorporated into their sites to “protect” 
the user.  
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 Privacy and Social and 
Psychological Contracts 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of apps privacy and how the 
marketplace owners are “protecting” the user. This chapter builds on this by 
associating the privacy of the apps with the presumed privacy requirements of 
the user and the user’s perception of their privacy protection. 
Previous research into privacy reviewed it from the perspective of the user 
(Brunk, 2002), the technical view (Enck et al., 2014) and from a forensic 
perspective (Tsavli et al., 2015), this research reviews privacy from a social and 
psychological perspective. 
Social contracts were first coined and described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 
1762 in his work The Social Contract. Where Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan 
(1651), proposed that individuals relinquish their individuality to obtain 
security through a holder of absolute power, Rousseau advocated that 
individuals surrender their rights under a social contract to form one moral 
will.  Both theorists are advocating an individual’s right to use free will. A 
social contract is defined in the 2017 Oxford English Dictionary as: 
An implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits, 
for example by sacrificing some individual freedom for state protection.  
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Therefore, the concept of Social contracts which apply to users of mobile apps 
can be described as; 
Users are permitted to utilise an app and to do so agree to relinquish personal 
information to the app developer or provider as defined in the requested permissions.  
Users are unable to use the app, even in free mode or as a trial, unless they click 
the “I agree” button. Interviews of Android users (Kelley et al., 2012)(Kelley et 
al., 2012) found that users paid little or no attention to the permission request 
screens and that they did not understand the implications of the permissions 
requested. This study was corroborated (A. Felt, Ha, Egelman, & Haney, 2012)  
by similar research based on Internet surveys and lab studies. 
 Users are inadvertently, unknowingly or unconcernedly relinquishing 
ownership of their privacy, so they can install and run an app. This brings into 
question the social contracts between users and the app providers, permissions 
vs data protection and who benefits from this partnership. In GDPR, the main 
principle is the protection and control of the user’s privacy data. It is not known 
yet what the impending implementation of GDPR will have on these 
agreement forms.  What can the developer/marketplace keep and in what 
format. How is this big data summarized by the likes of Google? 
Users do not normally think that their private information is a commodity that 
can be sold or shared. Information sold or shared to external groups is 
summarized, but the level of granularity is not shared, and the initial collectors 
do not state the level of detail that is being kept and for how long and who has 
access at this level of detail. 
Big Data has become an industry and many companies use this data to target 
users. Telecoms mobile companies collect data of customer usage as part of 
their vision to enable it to build a better customer experience. This ranges from 
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making more bandwidth available for customers during the times of heavy 
usage, e.g. downloads of videos, live streaming of TV programs, sports events 
and movies. Adhoc data usage, e.g. the upload/download of personal files, 
facetime or skype or Whatsapp calls are more difficult to predict but many of 
these calls will be performed during time ranges that the provider can plan for 
by viewing historical data. If the provider detects that more usage of a specific 
type of traffic, SMS, voice calls, data usage occurs in specific areas then it can 
install more cell towers or even convert the existing towers to a newer 
technology (LTE/5G). 
All this data is being kept about the user, totally unknown to the user.  
Some mobile network providers sell their mobiles with a skin (as do mobile 
manufacturers) the data collected by these widgets is not disclosed. For 
example, if a user has a weather app that is active on their device and they use 
it to track more than one location’s weather the provider can extrapolate that 
the user (based in a location acquired from geo tagging) is monitoring their 
own weather and that of another location that they are interested in. Once the 
user goes to that other location it is detected (geo tagging or cell tower tracking) 
the provider can then extrapolate that this user will in future travel or connect 
with somebody in that location or future locations that the user will go to, 
based on the usage of the weather app and the locations checked and visited. 
The same is true of social media sites that track the user’s location and their 
friends using geo tagging. The benefit to each party is slightly skewed to the 
provider as the provider can target ads for the additional location (hotels, 
restaurants, travel options) whilst the user has access to a single piece of 
information (weather in that location). 
Therefore, the user has given up their personal information, location, expected 
travel plans, an area of interest or where contacts are located to be able to view 
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the weather at that location. The permission request is not made as the app is 
pre-installed on the device. The user is unaware that additional data of the 
other locations could be obtained and used by the provider as a saleable 
product. 
Marketplace app marketplaces provide terms of contract for users to agree to. 
These contracts are long and complex and are available online.  The main areas 
relating to Privacy in Apple’s and Google’s Terms and Conditions are 
summarized below. 
9.1.1Apple’s Privacy Terms and Conditions 
Apple’s Media Service Terms and Conditions contains a section that refers to a 
separate privacy terms.  
“PRIVACY 
Your use of our Services is subject to Apple’s Privacy Policy, which is available at 
http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/. 
Apple has country specific privacy policies. In the UK version Apple states 
that it “may collect a variety of information, including your name, mailing address, 
phone number, email address, contact preferences, and credit card information” it 
may also “collect the information you provide about those people such as name, 
mailing address, email address, and phone number. Apple will use such information 
to fulfil your requests, provide the relevant product or service, or for anti-fraud 
purposes.” 
 
Apple will use it for contacting for promoting services as well as auditing, data 
analysis and other research.” 
Fundamentally Apple will collect the data, perform data analytics and then 
either use it to promote its own services and/or provide this data to strategic 
partners, law enforcement and other service partners. 
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Apple has a separate clause re Children and Education. 
“We understand the importance of taking extra precautions to protect the 
privacy and safety of children using Apple products and services. Children 
under the age of 13, or equivalent minimum age in the relevant jurisdiction, 
are not permitted to create their own Apple IDs, unless their parent provided 
verifiable consent or as part of the child account creation process in Family 
Sharing or they have obtained a Managed Apple ID account (where available) 
through their school. For example, a parent must review the Apple ID and 
Family Sharing Disclosure and agree to the Consent to Apple’s Collection, Use 
and Disclosure of Your Child’s Information; and the iTunes Store Terms and 
Conditions, before they can begin the Apple ID account creation process for 
their child. In addition, schools that participate in Apple School Manager and 
have reviewed and consented to the Managed Apple IDs for Students 
Disclosure may create Managed Apple IDs for students. The Managed Apple 
IDs for Students Disclosure describes how Apple handles student information 
and supplements Apple’s Privacy Policy. Learn more about Family Sharing, 
the Managed Apple IDs and Restrictions for children’s accounts. 
If we learn that we have collected the personal information of a child under 13, 
or equivalent minimum age depending on jurisdiction, outside the above 
circumstances we will take steps to delete the information as soon as possible.” 
If at any time a parent needs to access, correct, or delete data associated with 
their Family Sharing account or child’s Apple ID, they may contact us through 
our Privacy Contact Form. 
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9.1.2 Google’s Privacy Terms and Conditions 
The Google T&Cs also refer to a specific Privacy Policy. 
As with Apple Media, Google states the type of information that it collects. 
These include but are not limited to:  
When Google services or view content is used, Google automatically collects 
and stores certain types of information. These include; 
· Details of how the service is used, for example search queries 
· Telephony log information, such as telephone number, calling 
number, time and date of calls, SMS routing 
· IP address 
· Event informant, such as crashes 
· Cookies, that identify your browser or Google account 
As well as location information, local storage (web storage) and cookies 
 Google also performs data analytics of this data and profiles the Google 
Account to target services and products. 
Google also has the right to use the name specified in your Google Profile 
across all its services that require a Google Account, including replacing all 
past names associated with the account across all services. Other users that 
your email or other identifying information may be shown your publicly 
visible Google Profile information, such as your name and photo. 
Fundamentally you have loosened any control over who has access to your 
profile. Your data is shared across all the google services irrespective if the 
service is used or not. 
Privacy, Social and Psychological Contracts  
167 
   
Personal information is also provided to Google affiliates, law enforcement and 
partners (like publishers, advertisers or connected sites). 
Google Age Restrictions 
“Age Restrictions. In order to use Google Play you must have a valid Google account, 
subject to the following age restrictions. In order to serve as the family manager of a 
family group on Google Play, you must be at least 18 years old. You must not access 
Google Play if you are a person who is either barred or otherwise legally prohibited 
from receiving or using the Service or any Content under the laws of the country in 
which you are resident or from which you access or use Google Play. You must 
comply 
with any additional age restrictions that might apply for the use of specific Content or 
features on Google Play.” 
The passage on the rights/protection of Children places the responsibility of 
the download/installation of the app with an adult. However, there are no 
controls in place to verify that the consenter is an adult. 
Fundamentally, Google will track the user and their online behaviours, 
irrespective of age as by selecting “I agree” you have confirmed that you are 
over 18.  
9.1.3 Protection Normal 
apps on Google Play must also follow Google Play's policies. Google removes 
apps that are found to violate these policies. Google also has systems that 
analyze new and existing apps, along with developer accounts to help protect 
users against potentially harmful software 
Google has designated a base set of permissions as protection normal, to indicate 
that there's no great risk to the user's privacy or security in letting apps have 
those permissions. For example, users would reasonably want to know 
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whether an app can read their contact information, so users must grant this 
permission explicitly. By contrast, there's no great risk in allowing an app to 
vibrate the device, so that permission is designated as normal.  
If an app declares in its manifest that it needs a normal permission, the system 
automatically grants the app that permission at install time. The system does 
not prompt the user to grant normal permissions, and users cannot revoke 
these permissions. 
To minimise the number of permissions that the user consents to at app 
download and install, Google introduced the designation “protection_normal” 
(“Protection Normal,” 2017). This designation applies to permissions which 
Google has determined that there's “no great risk to the user's privacy or 
security in letting apps have those permissions”. If the app declares in the 
manifest file that it needs a normal permission, then the system automatically 
provides the app with that permission at install time. The user is not prompted 
at install time to agree to these permissions and is not able to revoke any of 
them. These designated permissions are listed in in the appendices in Table 
A-14.  
Unlike the explicit permissions request made by apps, these permissions are 
implicitly accepted as part of using an Android handset, the app permissions 
are requested for acceptance as normal. 
This acceptance permits the provider to track the user, change how the mobile 
is connected (Bluetooth, network and/or WiFi), change the look and feel of the 
device (manufacturers or providers skin). Reboot the device and override 
physical security (fingerprint). Therefore, the user’s privacy and security are 
already compromised. 
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Individually the permissions are not greatly impinging on the user’s privacy, 
however when used in conjunction with other permissions the privacy 
infringement increases. 
 
9.2 Social Contract Obligations 
In social contracts the user expects the device manufacturers and app 
developers to treat them fairly. Access to a device for them to control their 
environment or provide other services, for example voice activated or visual 
commands. And not to spy on them in the confines of their own home. 
Although the user is prepared to pay for the app or in-app purchases, the user 
is unaware of who the contract is with. Currently the purchase of the app is 
made via the Marketplace provider so that the actual contract is with the app 
provider and not developer. Therefore, it should be the provider’s 
responsibility to protect the user during the purchase and use of the app. 
However, the providers limit their accountability by requesting that the user 
agrees to their Terms and Conditions which are complicated and long. Copies 
of the T&C’s are provided in the appendices. 
Rarely do the providers admonish the app developer, as occurred between 
Apple and Über, which was poorly reported at the time. There was no mention 
of a similar occurrence between Google and Über, even though the apps 
performed the same on both operating systems (iOS and Android). 
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9.3 Psychological and Implied Contracts 
Two other unwritten agreements are psychological and implied contracts. The 
terms psychological and implied contracts was originally developed by Denise 
Rousseau. She described the subjectivity and nature of the contracts and how 
it is applied to organisations (Rousseau, 1989). Her definition is 
“The term psychological contract refers to an individual’s beliefs regarding the terms 
and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal person and 
another party” 
In a psychological contract the individual expects the company to reciprocate 
or be obligated to the individual due to the contribution that the individual 
makes. This belief is held only by that individual that a contract exists. 
Denise Rousseau used a biblical parable about the vineyard owner employing 
workers to work for him as an example, their expectations and the owner’s 
contract with them. His contract with the workers was that he would pay a fair 
day’s wage. At payment time the workers that had worked the full day 
expected a higher payment than those employed later during the day. These 
workers were aggrieved as they felt that they had been unfairly treated.  Whilst 
the owner felt he was keeping to the agreed contract to pay a fair day’s wage. 
The workers psychological contract was with the term “fair”, where they felt 
that the wage would be in proportion to the hours worked, an implied contract. 
Implied contracts are a mutual obligation between the two parties and the 
relationship evolves over time. The evolvement binds the two parties together 
and makes exit a possible expensive option.  
There are also differences in the level and point of view of these contracts. 
Employees that work for a company for many years and in their view, go above 
Privacy, Social and Psychological Contracts  
171 
   
and beyond (working late and over weekends) expect the employer to 
recognise and reward this loyalty. However, the employer only acknowledges 
the content of the contract that an employee works for a fixed number of hours 
and is paid for those hours. The employee’s psychological contract is that “the 
more I work and perform, the better my standing is with the company and my 
employment is more secure”.  The employee’s extra hours are not expected and 
are not part of the agreed contract and thus do not have any bearing with the 
employer.  
Applying the concept of psychological contracts to app purchase and use, the 
user’s expectation is to be able to play the app with no hindrance. Most of the 
apps that are free on the Store contain adware or in app purchases. This 
disrupts the continuous flow of the app and contravenes the psychological 
contract that the user perceives to have with the developer. From the 
developer’s perspective, the app is developed to provide income. Managing 
this perception is key to encourage the user to continue using the app and 
continue to update the app if available and to purchase powerups or another 
add-ins. This “loyalty” to the app ensures that there is more opportunity for 
the user to click on the adware or the in-app purchases, thereby providing 
more income to the developer. 
Breaches of the perceived contract can severely damage the relationship 
between the user and the developer. These range from deleting the app and 
possibly providing a negative review on the Store, thereby putting other users 
off and reducing income.  
An implied contract is often considered to be legally binding. In this case the 
contract is that the user may download and play the app, but may not 
plagiarise the app. This would be to copy the coding of the app, making 
minimal changes and selling it on the store as a unique app, thereby reducing 
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the real developer’s income. Currently this does not seem to be policed pro-
actively and there are many apps on the store with very app similar names. 
The onus is on the developer or user to report this to the Store monitors. 
Rousseau (Rousseau, 1989), illustrates the differences between these two types 
of contracts, and I have used her diagrams as a foundation to reflect the usage 
of these contracts in the mobile app environment. 
  
Figure 9-1 Development of a psychological contract 
The psychological contract is the individual’s (user’s) perception of the 
contract. In this contract there is an expectation of trust between the user and 
the developer. This can include confidentiality of the user’s details (name, age, 
etc.) and their privacy expectation, e.g. location. The developer trusts that the 
user will not cheat him and will pay for using the app in one form or another.  
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Figure 9-2 Development of an implied contract 
The implied contract is the relationship between the user and the developer, 
and both perspectives are displayed in Figure 9-2. For the contract to be 
reciprocal, both parties have similar goals. The developer wants their app to be 
popular (and provide income) and the user wants the app to fulfil their 
requirements, for which they will pay an amount, either for the app itself or for 
in-app purchases. 
The comparison of the different types of contracts as applied to app purchase 
and use are summarised in Table 9-1. 
The user plays the app, only by agreeing to a permission list at download. The 
app may contain adware or in-app purchases. The app may or may not be 
maintained or updated with new levels. The play is interrupted to offer in-app 
purchases or be delayed whilst a timer runs down. User privacy is impacted, 
and the user has no control over their data and no recourse to control its use. 
The user may incur more costs to continue to play the app, even after initial 
payment to purchase the app has occurred. 
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Table 9-1 Summary of contract types 
Contract type Activity In actuality 
Social Developer protects user data and 
ensures that the app is maintained.  
Developer may update app or fix coding issues. Developer 
may also use the user’s data to provide a target group for 
new apps or provide additional functionality. 
Psychological The user expects the developer to 
maintain the app without 
interference 
Developer often uses adware and in-app purchase to 
increase income. Usage is interrupted and may affect the 
user’s enjoyment of the app. 
Implied The developer sells the use of the 
app and the user agrees to pay and 
not steal the app code. 
If either party breaks the agreement there could be legal 
consequences 
 
The user is at a disadvantage as none of the three contract types are active. 
Equity Theory (J. S. Adams, 1965) deals with exchange and fairness. The 
psychological belief of the employee is expecting an exchange of fairness. 
Adams suggests that the employee comparing him/herself to a neighbour and 
believing that they should earn more is an expectation not a psychological 
contract. Reciprocal expectations in a contract believe their action s are bound 
to another, employee and employer. An employee expects more income but 
understands that there is no obligation for the employer to give them a raise. 
However, the experience of inequity differs from an actual or implicit contract 
as it is not enforceable by law. As discussed above, the employee who is loyal 
and works hard, expects to be rewarded. When the reward is not forthcoming 
the employee becomes dissatisfied and their performance will be affected, with 
withdrawal of the employee being the last resort. This relationship is far easier 
to repair than contracts.  
Violating a psychological contract has similar results. The employee begins to 
distrust the company and the relationship is badly damaged and is difficult to 
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repair. Sometimes the trust must be rebuilt as happened at the beginning of the 
relationship of the employee and employer part company. 
In the app development arena, the user has paid or accepted free use of an app 
and agrees to some in-app purchases. Some developers force the user into 
paying large sums of money to un-lock game levels or remove ads. This creates 
an atmosphere of inequity, “I’ve paid for the app, why should I pay more to play it?  
attitude. This resentment can spill over into the reviews for the app, advising 
other users not to buy it. A similar resentment occurs when a developer does 
not repair errors in the app. This creates a deep psychological distress, leading 
to frustration and disappointment. 
Once a user experiences one problem it will heighten the psychological distress 
of any subsequent problems. This could lead to negativity in the user’s life 
experience. This is a concern where minors or teenagers are concerned as their 
life perception could be tainted. 
9.4 GDPR – EU Privacy Regulation 
The EU has decreed that by May 2018 all companies that process data about 
individuals in the context of selling goods or services inside the EU must 
comply to their General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  
The GDPR not only applies to organisations located within the EU but it will also 
apply to organisations located outside of the EU if they offer goods or services to, or 
monitor the behaviour of, EU data subjects. It applies to all companies processing and 
holding the personal data of data subjects residing in the European Union, regardless 
of the company’s location. (“GDPR FAQs,” 2017). 
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Any company breaching the regulation can be fined up to 4% of annual global 
turnover or €20 Million.  
The main article that will affect app providers is article 7, which deals with 
consent. 
The conditions for consent have been strengthened, and companies will no longer 
be able to use long illegible terms and conditions full of legalese, as the request for 
consent must be given in an intelligible and easily accessible form, with the purpose 
for data processing attached to that consent. Consent must be clear and 
distinguishable from other matters and provided in an intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language. It must be as easy to withdraw 
consent as it is to give it (“GDPR Summaries of Articles,” 2017). 
 
The introduction of this regulation will provide some measure of protection to 
the users, but only if they understand how their data is being harvested and 
processed.  
The introduction of the GDPR requires that a provider must obtain consent 
from the customer to collect personal data. Marketing consent is required, and 
the user must be informed of how their data is to be used. This is one of the 
ways that the regulation empowers the individuals to control their own 
personal data.  
Comparison to the DPA (Data Protection Act) indicates that many of the user’s 
rights are strengthened; article 22 (decision making), articles 12/13/14 
(transparent information) and article 15 (right of access to the data). Articles 
20/18/17 (processing, portability and right to be forgiven) are all new. The 
data must be provided to the individual upon request and must provide an 
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overview of how it is to be used and the information must be clearly legible (in 
a child friendly manner in the case of minors). 
Article 5 relates to the processing of the data specifies that the individual must 
be treated with lawfulness, fairness and transparency, like the concept of a 
“social contract”.   
Compliance to the regulation is yet undefined. The controls for guidance to 
obtain compliance certification is not in existence and are only expected to be 
available after the implementation deadline in May 2018. 
Obtaining personal data from the use of mobile apps has yet to be defined by 
the app stores and the GDPR regulators. Android apps usage and data 
collection of the individual’s data is not specified. Is the data collected for the 
developer’s benefit or for the Store, for example, Google Store or Apple’s app 
store? If the developer is the recipient, then the developer must provide the 
consent form and describe how the user’s data will be used. If Google or Apple 
are the recipient, then the responsibility for the consent form and description 
lies with Store owner. 
There are multiple problems with either acting as the data collector.  
If the developer collects and stores the data for their use to market their 
products or products that they will receive a fee for, then it means that for every 
app, the developer must provide a consent form. The developer will also be 
required to provide a revoke form so that the user can revoke their consent to 
collect or use the data. At this point, will the user be able continue to use the 
app and what happens to the historical data that has been collected and 
possibly sold prior to the revocation request. The administration becomes very 
costly for a developer to provide and maintain the consent/revokes of users. It 
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also means that a consent agreement is required for every app and will be more 
complicated than a permission agreement. 
If the Store acts as the collector, then they provide the consent and revoke forms 
and maintain them. This very advantageous for many Store owners as they 
already collect and process customer data.  The companies already have 
“privacy” sections to their terms and conditions, and it would be easy for them 
to add a consent to collect and consent to market from the user as part of the 
user’s agreement to use the Store rather than at the app download stage. 
Again, there is no benefit to the user, especially if the usage of the app is 
revoked the same time that the user’s revoke request is processed. This then 
contravenes the concept of fairness, one of the principles of the GDPR. Or would 
the revoke request be treated the same as the right to erasure? 
There is no definition of what level of granularity the anonymised data is 
maintained in either storage, transference or sale of the data.   
9.5 Privacy Impact of Location Trackers 
Research into geo tracking of mobiles using Cell towers, WiFi, RFID and GPS 
is very popular and there are a variety of papers describing the tracking and 
how to simplify and improve it from a basic paper in 2009 describing current 
geo tracking and how to improve the tracking of mobiles (Balakrishnan et al., 
2009) to using third party services, such as apps, social media as well as the 
normal physical tracking (WiFi, Networks, etc) (Razaghpanah et al., 2018). The 
trend towards inbuilt location awareness was described by Adams and Katos 
(C. Adams & Katos, 2005). Geo tracking is a useful source of data to companies 
that collect and use user data. Google publishes the estimated location of 
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millions of iPhones, laptops, and other devices with Wi-Fi connections. 
Without the knowledge of the user. Android phones with location services 
enabled regularly beam the unique hardware IDs of nearby Wi-Fi devices back 
to Google.  
Google make their location databases linking hardware IDs to street addresses 
publicly available on the Internet. If the hardware ID is known it is possible to 
determine the physical address of the device, a major privacy concern.  
This is how it works: Wi-Fi-enabled devices, including PCs, iPhones, iPads, and 
Android phones, transmit a unique hardware identifier, called a MAC address, 
to anyone within a radius of approximately 100 to 200 feet. If someone captures 
or already knows that unique address, Google services can reveal a previous 
location where that device was located, a practice that can reveal personal 
information including home or work addresses or even the addresses of 
restaurants frequented. 
This tracking was highlighted in the case between Über and Apple, where Über 
defended the tracking by saying “that the tracking is a common industry 
practice used to prevent fraud and account compromise.” (Conger, 2017). Über 
used this method for fraud prevention (especially in China) where drivers 
would register multiple accounts (and thereby rides) to receive additional 
bonuses. 
Über continued to track iPhones even when the app had been deleted on the 
device. In 2015 they were forced to comply with Apple policy and the 
fingerprinting was removed.9 However, in 2016 an app update re-introduced 
                                                 
 
9 There is no data that Google held a similar intervention with Über. 
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the fingerprinting and Über defended the tracking by saying that they only 
track users five minutes before and after a ride to obtain accurate pick-up 
points and safe exit afterwards.  
0
Requested 
Permissions
Always 
tracking
No tracking
Tracking for 5 
mins before 
and after
A B
Uber App permissions request
 
Figure 9-3 Graphical representation of Über permission requests. 
This statement needs to be validated as Über needs to know the location of the 
user to provide them with a graphic showing the nearest Über drivers. Who 
may be more than 5 minutes away.  
A graphical representation of the privacy infringement can be shown in the 
Privacy Impact Framework Model in Figure 9-3.  
The number of permissions required by the app to start and validate user are 
represented by 0 to A permissions. Once the user requests a ride then the app 
needs the additional permissions A to B, so total number of permissions 
required to operate are 0 to B. Additional permissions, B onwards are 
superfluous and should not be requested. This is where the main privacy 
infringement occurs. An additional infringement is that the app still records 
the user location even when not active and in use by the user. 
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With the ease to track users, advertisers plus parents that want to be able to 
track their kids, asks the question about how protected is that data from prying 
eyes. And at what granularity. 
What about the expectations of privacy, in 1888 when the first portable Kodak 
camera was introduced there were many privacy panics and the camera was 
banned in a variety of places, e.g. businesses, beaches, monuments, etc. 
However, twenty-two years later this panic had ended with the increasing 
adoption of the camera. This showed that as technology is accepted and 
utilised, previous concerns about its misuse diminishes.  As more data is 
collected, is this data copyrighted? Can the owner of the data have it removed 
from the collector’s databases? This is one of the principles of the EU GDPR 
regulation as described in Section 9.4. 
Facebook terms and conditions state that any image uploaded to their servers 
becomes their property. This ownership has not yet been tested in the courts. 
With education apps the data collection has another aspect, where parents or 
educators view the education app with an implied trust which is not 
contractual. Certain companies are viewed as trustworthy especially as 
relating to children, for example, the Disney Corporation, although there is no 
legal contractual obligation of the company to protect a child using their app. 
This negates the assumption that the app provider is acting in “loco parentis” 
of the child as would normally happen with children in schools or colleges. 
Some parents use the apps as digital nannies so is the trust implicit or explicit?   
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9.6 Spyware 
Another method to detect usage and location is by installing spyware on the 
physical device.  
9.6.1 Mobistealth 
Mobistealth (“Mobistealth,” 2017) is an Android tracking app 
There are a million reasons why parents would want to monitor their 
children’s mobiles as well as companies wanting to monitor company owned 
devices. Mobistealth is marketed as an All-In-One Android monitoring 
Software solution. Once installed, the app remains hidden from the mobile user 
and begins instantly sending information directly to your online user account. 
The information that is collected and sent are; Real-Time Location of User Even 
When GPS is not Working (in buildings, etc.), Monitor Skype, Whatsapp and 
Viber Chat communications, Call Details and Complete SMS Data, Browsing 
History and Pictures or Videos Available on the Target Phone 
As the app remains hidden the device user is unable to access the app to either 
remove or disable it. Physical access to the device is required for the download 
and configure.   
9.6.2 FlexiSPY’s Android Spy App 
FlexiSPY’s app (“FlexiSPYTM Unique Android Spy app — Reveals Secrets 
Others Cannot,” 2017) monitors messaging, application usage, GPS location 
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and can perform live listening and recording of phone calls and device 
surroundings. The app is also able to spy on instant messaging services. Again, 
physical access to the device is required to install the app. The full functionality 
of the app is only achieved if the mobile has been rooted. 
9.6.3 Android Monitoring App 
The Mobile Spy app, (“MobileSpy,” 2017) also requires physical access to the 
device to install the app. Once installed the app monitors and records SMS, 
Social networking usage (Facebook, Whatsapp etc), YouTube videos that have 
been watched, what apps have been installed, URLs accessed, GPS locations 
visited, phone calls (incoming and outgoing) numbers, messages, emails from 
the primary account, contacts, calendar date and time logged. apps can be 
blocked, all photos taken are saved and viewable. The update interval is 
customisable.  
All the logged data is available and accessed remotely. There is an optional 
LIVE Screen Viewer feature, which permits the user to see what is on the 
mobile phone in real time. 
9.7 Big Data 
Now that the mobile interacts with so many other devices (IOT) what about 
the permissions for these apps? A future tool is needed to analyse IOT controls 
and accesses 
Privacy, Social and Psychological Contracts  
184 
   
Originally smart home devices were controlled in the home using short range 
devices, these were either using a form of WiFi or Bluetooth. This evolved to 
each device having a mobile app which could access the device through the 
consumer’s network. Initially within the user’s network and then via the router 
into the network. 
Access via the router opens the user network to the outside.  
Eventually users will require a single app to be able to control all the smart 
devices in the home. The devices need to be interconnected and using a 
common protocol to communicate. This increases the possibility of an external 
actor accessing the range of devices to “spy” on the user. 
Currently there are many smart devices available to watch users, for example, 
smart TV’s, internal CCTVs, web cams, etc. Devices can overhear user’s, for 
example, Alexa, Google Home, Siri, or Cortana, etc.  
Once the actor is inside the network the app will have full control of these 
devices and can monitor the user and their environment.  
There is currently no constraint on what the smart devices can do, and most 
users are unaware of the access or control that they have. 
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 Research Review 
10.1  Overview and discussion 
The research initially concentrated on user security, the available tools and 
how they protected the user. The questions asked were;  
· Do anti-virus products work as intended? 
· Do anti-virus products protect the user? 
· How have anti-virus apps matured? 
· Is there additional security for minors? 
The Antivirus products were tested for efficacy and the results demonstrated 
the limitations of the free products. The maturity of the Antivirus apps was 
inconclusive. Some of the apps had matured and were providing a basic 
security service to the user. Other apps had disappeared altogether, and other 
apps had not been updated or improved since their initial addition to the 
Marketplace. 
The security for minor’s investigation showed that minors were being 
protected if the apps were aimed at their age group, but there was no protection 
if the minor accessed an app aimed at a higher age group and there was no real 
protection to stop the minor accessing these apps. Most companies 
circumvented this requirement by adding into their Terms and Conditions that 
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it was the responsibility of the parent to stop the child. This can be interpreted 
as “we are in Loco Parentis, but we’re not!” 
The app download and installation permission request require an all or 
nothing approach, i.e. accept the app permissions so that you can download 
the app and install it or refuse the permissions and therefore are unable to 
install the app. At the time of the initial research there were few apps available 
that could review the permissions of the app and there was no basic guidance 
for the general user to be able to decide which app permissions to turn off, even 
if it was possible at the time.  
How does this relate to the social peer pressure to run apps and play multi-
user apps? Both Millennials and Generation Z have grown up with mobile 
technology and social media and use it as just another tool in daily use. 
Generation Z have not known anything different and are used to sharing every 
moment of their life online. This always on-line approach to the minutia of their 
lives makes them vulnerable to peer pressure to install the current popular app 
with little or no regard to the permissions being requested or if there is any 
impact on their privacy. When multi player apps are being used in these online 
social groups how much data does the developer collect that not only is from 
each user but their interaction and their relationship to each other. It also means 
that the developer can consolidate usage/privacy of the player not only from 
this app but any other apps that the users uses from that developer. The 
developer has a viewpoint of the user’s activities, apps that they like (from 
usage stats) as well as do they play them with their friends (multi-play) if 
available or alone (either multi-play or not) do they only play multi play with 
their group of friends or do they interact with other groups. Is there even a 
group dynamic which can be obtained from the usage data of the multi-play 
groups? Then there is the issue of the ads being targeted to these users. Are 
they different when the user is playing alone or in a multi group? Are the ads 
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targeted at specific ages and is this representative across single player apps and 
multiplayer apps? All these questions need to be investigated and answered in 
future research. 
What about apps that permit you to change the permissions of the app. Does 
the app work properly after you have switched some of the permissions off? 
What is the number of permissions that the app requires to work? What about 
adding permissions, is that feasible? 
At the time of the 2015 research, there were apps available to aid the user in the 
review of the permissions and permit the user to switch permissions off, but 
again how does the user know which permissions should be deactivated. First 
the user had to determine what permissions that should be revoked and had 
to install apps that could review the permissions for each app and then permit 
the user to revoke the permission or to switch a permission on. Invariably these 
apps required “root” access, which then made the device vulnerable to external 
attack. The decision to which permission to switch off or on was left to the user 
with no guidance of permissions, only a brief tag, e.g. camera or read contacts. 
Some of these apps had the disclaimer that switching off permissions could 
prevent the app from working. There was not any indication of whether the 
app would work without this permission. Some of these apps at least provided 
an indicator of last used to aid the user.   
In October of 2015, Google provided the ability in Android 6.0 (Marshmallow) 
to control the permissions. See section 12.1.1 on Permission control. 
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10.2 Differences between 2011 and 
2015 Research 
10.2.1 Initial Research in 2011 
The security app database shows the maturing of an app or its removal and 
any new apps and developers that are now available in the marketplace. 
Comparisons have been made of apps that were in existence in 2011 and 2015 
albeit with or without updates or improvements and show how the 
permissions changed over time, good and bad. Thereby, providing a reflection 
of the maturation of the market and how the market has moved to free apps 
with in-app payments and how some developers moved to providing online 
services rather than incorporate them into the app. This enabled the developer 
to reduce the number of updates to the app as the services were being 
controlled in the cloud. This introduced additional problems with data security 
as the cloud services were more detached from the user and the user did not 
have the control as was the case with requesting permission updates. Often the 
developer did not have control of the Cloud as this was a purchased service. 
Many of these suppliers than used rolling payments rather than requesting if 
the user wanted to renew, an opt-out rather than an opt-in. 
Research moved away from practicalities of the extraction to the analysis of the 
permission use and practice. The extraction and preparation for analysis was 
automated and documented as the P.E.M.P process. The initial requirement for 
the automation was the download of the app. In 2011 this was a laborious 
process as it required the author to download the app onto a mobile device and 
then transfer the app to a PC for analysis. Once on a PC the app had to be 
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decoded and dis-assembled so that it was in a readable format. At the time, the 
process from executable app to readable format had to be performed serially 
one app at a time. The longest part of the process was the download and 
transfer. Download speeds were slow as the cellular network was immature, 
and the network was 2G (2nd Generation also known as Edge). The mobile 
device had to be disconnected from the PC to perform the download and then 
re-connected to the PC for the transfer process. This involved connecting the 
device in debug mode to perform the transfer. Decoding and disassembly were 
quicker but still had to be performed one at a time. Initially this manual process 
took 1 hour per app, but by repetition the process (still manual) was performed 
in 30 minutes. The permission list was then manually added to an Excel 
database. This also involved manual intervention to sort the permission list 
ready for analysis. 
The research initially was to investigate the security apps available to protect 
users and their devices and the efficacy of these apps. All security apps that 
had an antivirus component or keyword tag in 2011 were downloaded. At the 
time there were no freely available tools to perform this download and de-
compile, so the initial apps were downloaded to a T-mobile G1 smartphone, 
transferred to a PC for the analysis. The download, transference and extraction 
of the app’s manifest file and the multiple de-compiles (Dex [package on 
mobile] to Jar [compiled java code] to source code [java]) and the extraction of 
the manifest file was taking approximately 30 minutes for each app. The length 
of time taken to perform this meant that it was prohibitive to download and 
analyse large numbers of apps. An automated process was required to extract 
the manifest file from multiple apps and the download and extraction was 
reduced to less than 5 minutes per app. This method has been further 
augmented and comparison steps have been added and automated. 
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The antivirus component of the app was tested on the smartphone using 
available test viruses. The results of the free and commercial versions were 
compared, and the efficacy of the apps recorded. The conclusion being that 
there was no difference between the free and commercial versions in detecting 
and quarantining the virus.  
There was a large difference between the apps functioning, with some apps 
able to detect both viruses, during scanning and downloading, whilst one app 
didn’t detect either virus during download, installation or scanning. 
Once the app was extracted and decompiled, a rudimentary analysis was made 
of the Android. Manifest file that contained the actual permissions defined by 
the app. These permissions required acceptance by the user before download 
and installation was permissible. In some cases, the permissions requested 
were not the same as those that were described on the marketplace site.  
The free security apps were compared to their commercial variants to 
determine if there was any benefit to the user to purchase the product. The 
differences in their permission requests and features were recorded and 
analysed to determine if the commercial versions provided the user with more 
features or better protection. Part of the analysis was to record the sizes of each 
of the packages to determine if additional code was used in the commercial 
version to differentiate it from the free version. Hashes were performed on the 
app source codes versions that had the same size to determine if there were 
any actual differences between the free and commercial versions. The hashes 
were identical, indicating that there were no source code differences, therefore, 
the main differences were probably related to online services.  
Reviewing the feature sets of the apps, indicated that the additional features of 
the app (used as a differentiator on the marketplace) were in fact online and 
not included in the app itself. One of the apps had the same size and hash of 
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the free and commercial variants. Of the six suppliers in the analysis, three 
(Lookout Inc, AVG Mobilation and BluePoint Security Inc) used the same 
Android permissions on both the commercial and free applications. Two 
suppliers (Lookout Inc. and AVG) requested non-Android permissions, whilst 
the other suppliers only requested Android permissions. Of the non-Android 
permissions, Lookout Inc. used the same permissions on both products, whilst 
AVG performed License checking and used different C2D_MESSAGE 
permissions between its PRO and Free versions.  
10.2.2 Subsequent Research in 2015 
In 2015 the same analysis was performed using the method from 2011. New 
tools were available to perform the download directly to a PC, namely the APK 
Downloader tool (“APK Downloader,” 2014). The author developed analysis 
code using Python software (“Python Downloads,” 2015). This script extracted, 
dis-assembled and decoded the app and recorded the permission list into the 
database in the correct format without any user intervention. Once all the 
requisite apps had been downloaded to the PC, they could be processed in one 
batch rather than serially. The automation reduced the download, extraction 
and decode process by over 80% (from 30 minutes to 5 minutes). The 
permission list database was then available for analysis. The refining and 
automation of the method was named P.E.M.P. (see Chapter 7). 
The PEMP process was tested against the initial (2011) set of apps as well as 
the 2015 set. The results from the manual and the PEMP process was identical, 
confirming the robustness of the process. The process was also used to extract 
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and analyse children apps10. The code has been used to prepare various set 
sizes with very little increase in processing time. 
The process was also used by another researcher for preparing First Person 
Shooter (FPS) games for analysis. This showed that the process could be used 
across genres. 
As in 2011 the available Antivirus products were tested. During the 
intervening 4 years the antivirus apps had matured and many of the industry 
security market leaders had entered the mobile marketplace. Some of the 
original developers and/or their products had been bought and integrated into 
the market leader’s portfolio of products, this meant that these companies had 
a security presence across all platforms. 
As in 2011 the apps were available in two variants, free and commercial. With 
the commercial variants either charging a one-off or monthly payment. In some 
cases, the commercial apps offered additional functionality.  
In 2011 there were 22 apps with Antivirus components, this had grown to 67 
apps available in 2015. The main PC Antivirus testing company (AV-Test.org) 
had also matured its testing of antivirus  products on mobiles. Testing had 
increased from 4 apps in 2010 to 16 in 2015. By which time this research had 
already tested all 67 antivirus  apps. Of the 15 developers (22 apps) on the 
Google Store in 2011, 5 developers were still in existence in 2015.  The 22 apps 
that they had available in 2011 had reduced to 7 which had been updated 
during the 4 years to 2015. In 2015 the number of developers had increased to 
                                                 
 
10 The process has also been used by another researcher for preparing First Person Shooter (FPS) games for analysis. 
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57 and the number of products available to 67. The market was maturing as the 
number of developers had increased fourfold, but the number of apps had only 
increased by a factor of three. The author’s conclusion was that developers 
were concentrating on a main app rather than providing multiple variations 
and names. 
The same tests and analysis were performed as in 2011. First the antivirus 
component and then the permissions and features.  
An additional analysis was to compare the permissions and features of 
antivirus apps in 2015 with their predecessors in 2011. There were 7 apps from 
2011 that were still in existence in 2015.  
The number of permissions had also changed but had not increased across the 
board as expected with the increase in permissions available. In 2011 the 
median number of permissions requested was 15, the maximum requested was 
82 and the minimum requested was 3. In 2015 the median had increased to 21, 
but the maximum requested had dropped to 49. This indicated that developers 
were either being more selective about the permissions to perform the function 
or were using the higher-level permission, which would cover multiple 
permissions, rather than select individual permissions. Three of the apps did 
not request any permissions at all, which does question the efficacy of the app. 
Removing these outliers showed the minimum that was requested was 4. 
To test future large numbers of apps the generic method PEMP in Chapter 7 
was created to minimize download and extraction times via automation so that 
research time was spent on analysis of the results rather than obtaining data. 
Testing of the generic method was performed by another researcher to 
download, extract and test First person shooter games (FPS). 
This generic method was then used to extract and test 60 children’s apps. The 
apps were chosen for their popularity and the top 20 were selected from the 3 
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age groups (Ages 5 & Under, Ages 6-8 and Ages 9 & Over). The permission 
frequency for these apps and the requested permissions in each age category 
was recorded. The privacy quotient was then created for each app. The privacy 
quotient is determined by recording how many anti-privacy permissions are 
requested as compared to the number that are available and whether these are 
rated as high, medium or low. These quotients are graded as High (too many 
requested and not required by the app to perform its function), Medium (too 
many requested but required for the app to function), Low (acceptable number 
requested for the app to perform its function). apps with a rating of {High, 
High} are to be avoided as they totally contravene the child’s privacy. 
One observation was that the large number of requested permissions that apps 
were requesting, that contravened the user’s privacy, but did not add to the 
app’s functionality, is not being controlled or regulated. 
10.3 Guidance for Regulators 
This observation prompted the question “What are the regulators doing to 
protect users and what do they need to have to be able to review apps 
developers as well as the marketplaces that sell apps?” 
The regulator cannot operate at such a detailed level as the apps themselves 
but would have to regulate at a higher level. The optimal way to do this would 
be to regulate at marketplace level and encourage or enforce the marketplace 
companies to regulate the developers. 
The regulatory control is depicted in Figure 10-1. This shows the flow of 
standards or government requirements of marketplace providers and how 
they should be managing the developers. 
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Figure 10-1 A summary of regulatory control 
The regulatory bodies are in situ to interpret laws for the providers. However, 
the number of providers/developers and their global locations prove difficult 
to regulate as many of the regulator’s requirements are not consistent. To 
simplify, I propose that the Marketplace provider should be regulated and the 
responsibility to regulate the developer should be with the Marketplace 
provider. 
Previously this was difficult to enforce as most of the Marketplace providers 
were based in different countries, although they had subsidiaries across the 
globe. The implementation of GDPR by May of 2018 will be fortuitous as any 
company doing business with the EU or countries signed up to GDPR must 
adhere to its requirements (9.4  GDPR – EU Privacy Regulation). This will 
provide the in-country regulator with the ability to enforce the privacy 
requirements or fine the perpetrator.  
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 Contribution 
The contribution of the study is twofold. Firstly, the development of PEMP to 
provide a solution to a generic problem extracting and processing Android 
Permissions and an application method for the extraction and process. 
Included is a method, developed to enable researchers to download 
commercial apps for testing at no cost. 
The research makes use of a unique historical dataset containing security apps 
from 2011 to 2015. This database provides a research opportunity to be able to 
compare security apps over the 4 years for analysis. The database provides data 
on the evolution of the security apps in the marketplace, the emergence of new 
developers and new apps and the perceived requirements for the user’s 
security.    
Secondly the research crosses the boundary between technology and 
psychology (mainly assessing mobile apps as they relate to social and 
psychological contracts). This has resulted in the provision of a Privacy Impact 
Model which provides a method of analysing requests to Android smartphone 
users and determining which requests are beneficial to the user and which are 
detrimental. Emphasis is placed on protecting the user’s privacy and alerting 
the user if the permission requests made by an application will adversely affect 
the user’s privacy. The Privacy Impact Framework model was created to 
provide a simple visual output to illustrate the privacy impact of the app at a 
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glance. The method for determining the impact to the user is based on 
psychological and social contract theory. 
A summary of the research and results follow showing how the creation and 
implementation of the Privacy Impact Framework Model has aided and 
enhanced the representation of the resultant conclusions. 
11.1 Privacy Impact Framework Model 
Evolution 
The initial idea of a fuel gauge was conceived to illustrate the permission 
results of the antivirus apps in 2011 and to enable a quick view of the relevance 
of the permissions requested and if they include all the permissions to perform 
the antivirus function (efficacy).  
11.1.1 The Antivirus Efficacy Gauge 
The first designs were very crude and attempted to show the permissions, 
using a Goldilocks method, too few, too many and just right (Figure 11-1). This 
model was used to create the initial antivirus framework model (Figure 11-2). 
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Figure 11-1 Initial Design 
using the Goldilocks Method 
Figure 11-2 Framework using 
antivirus as a base. 
 
Creation of the diagram, although simple, would show the state of an antivirus 
app but it was difficult to provide comparisons between apps. The main 
problem was that some of the apps did not request enough permissions to 
include the antivirus permissions and those that did, did not request all 
available permissions (maximum requested was 27). This meant that the 
diagram would not be suitable to illustrate comparisons between apps. 
An additional issue was in defining what was too many or too few permissions. 
The gauge needed to evolve to provide the status at a glance. This was 
necessary once the 2015 apps were analysed and compared to their earlier 2011 
apps.  Attempts were made to show this as a pie chart with exploding slices to 
emphasise the antivirus portions of the permissions (Figure 11-3). 
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Figure 11-3 Initial antivirus framework as a pie chart with exploding slice 
However, the gauge was more responsive to the total permissions requested 
rather than the antivirus permissions requested. When minimum and antivirus 
permissions requested were very small the extra requested permission 
overwhelmed the chart.  
The current model provides an overview of the app antivirus function, 
designated antivirus permissions requested (efficacy) and the antivirus 
permissions as a percentage of the whole request. 
The framework model was applied to the 2011 antivirus apps comparing the 
free with their commercial variants. These developers and their apps that have 
permission request differences are in the following diagrams, Figure 11-4, 
Figure 11-5 and Figure 11-6. 
  
Contribution   
200 
   
 Aegislab 
Aegislab 
Free 
  
Aegislab  
 
 
Figure 11-4 Antivirus framework guage for Aegislab apps 
The framework gauges show a clear improvement of the projected efficacy of 
the commercial app, despite the app requesting apparently less permissions. 
However, further analysis confirms that there was an increase in antivirus 
permissions and total permissions requested which is reflected in the efficacy 
improvement.  
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Bluepoint 
Bluepoint 
free 
  
Bluepoint  
 
  
Figure 11-5 Results of Bluepoint antivirus apps comparison 
In this case the efficacy does not change, although the percentage of antivirus 
permissions reduces. Further analysis shows that an additional permission was 
requested by the commercial app, but the number of antivirus permissions did 
not change. The increase of permissions by 1 was not significant to affect the 
efficacy. 
  
Contribution   
202 
   
Lookout 
Lookout 
Free 
  
Lookout  
  
Figure 11-6 Lookout antivirus apps comparison 
In this case, the Lookout commercial app is requesting more permissions, but 
the efficacy remains the same, showing that there is no difference in the 
number of antivirus permissions requested. 
This demonstrates that the projected efficacy framework gauge is useful as a 
comparison tool in determining the efficiency of the antivirus app, irrespective 
of the number of non-Antivirus permissions requested. 
The model was then used to compare the 2011 antivirus apps with their 
updated 2015 antivirus variants. This is used to show instantly if the app 
efficacy improves over the 4 years (Table 11-1). Six of the eight apps, available 
in an updated version in 2015, had improved effectiveness. The only two apps 
showing no improvement were both by Bluepoint Inc. Their apps contained  
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Table 11-1 Antivirus Products Efficacy in 2011 and 2015 
Company Product 2011 version 2015 version 
AV Free 
AV 
antivirus 
free trial 
  
AVG 
Mobilatio
n 
AntiVirus 
Free AVG 
  
Bluepoint 
Security 
BluePoin
t 
Antivirus 
  
Bluepoint 
Security 
BluePoin
t 
Antivirus 
free 
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Company Product 2011 version 2015 version 
Dr Web 
Ltd 
Dr.Web 
Antivirus 
light 
  
Dr Web 
Ltd 
Dr.Web 
Android 
light 
  
Lookout 
Inc 
Lookout 
Mobile 
Security 
  
NetQin 
Mobile 
Inc. 
Nq 
mobile 
manager 
Trial 
  
 
 the same number of AV_Perms although the number of requested permissions 
had grown. 
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In all cases the number of Antivirus permissions recorded in the Manifest file 
had increased.   
11.1.2 Privacy Impact Analysis 
In 2012 the initial procedures and guidelines for GDPR was proposed. The 
draft was released on the 25th January 2012 and reviewed by various Law 
Groups (Law Patent Group, 2012). In 2016 the implementation date was agreed 
to be 25th May 2018. Therefore, the model was updated to incorporate these 
future privacy guidelines and re named as the Privacy Impact Framework 
Model. The objective of this new model was to incorporate the privacy impacts 
of antivirus apps in relation to the proposed guidelines. 
Existing research has concentrated on the physical or software actions of apps, 
namely; the tracking performed by the mobile device, the API calls of the apps, 
the malware that has been introduced into apps or onto mobiles and the 
security of the mobiles. Little research has been performed on the protection of 
a user’s privacy, other than GPS location tracking. 
Privacy and security are affected by new technology and are not necessarily 
considered during the development process as their addition often impedes 
the “first-to-market” requirements of stakeholders. 
The rapid development of technology prompted many questions. 
· What apps are in existence to review the permissions on the apps? 
The apps request an all or nothing approach, i.e. accept the app 
permissions so the user can download the app and install it or refuse 
the permissions and are not permitted to download and install the 
app.  
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· How does this relate to the social peer pressure to run apps and play 
multi user apps? This clearly applies pressure to the user to accept 
the permissions.  
· What happens then with multi app players?  
· How much data does the developer collect that not only is from each 
user but their interaction and their relationship to each other?  
All of this is a concern for Security and Privacy specialists. 
A tool to measure the privacy impact of an app was required that displayed 
the influencers on the permissions requested during the lifetime of the app. 
Initially the permissions were requested on a best guess basis and future 
requests are determined by a variety of influencers. These influences are; 
variants (changes) to the code (fixes or improvements – e.g. more levels), 
technological advances, commercial differentiators, human, regulatory and 
competition. 
A method to check the privacy status of an app grew from the initial research 
extracting, analysing and assessing app’s permissions to reviewing the output 
in relation to the impact on the user’s privacy. This method evolved into the 
Privacy Impact Framework Model. The framework produces an overview of 
the current permission status as related to the app and their impact on the 
user’s privacy. The format used is that of a fuel gauge and shows if the 
permissions requested are privacy related and if too many or too few 
permissions are requested for the app to function as described11.  
                                                 
 
11 There are no groups or sub-groups to describe the privacy impacts within the 9 Android permission groups.  
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With the emphasis now on the privacy aspects of Antivirus apps and previous 
research showed that the apps were not effective and did not request the 
appropriate permissions to perform their function. If this theme continues then 
what confidence is there that the same consideration is used to safeguard a 
user’s privacy. Therefore, the next step was to use the model from the Efficacy 
Gauge to create an Antivirus Privacy Impact Framework Model.  
 
11.1.3 Antivirus Privacy Impact  
The Antivirus Privacy Impact Model was created to analyse and present the 
privacy status of Security and Antivirus apps on the Google Store, but can be 
adapted to other genres and marketplaces.  
The model was created and used initially to analyse and compare the Antivirus 
apps’ permissions from 2011 and 2015 apps. During 2015 Google introduced 
“protection normal”, see 9.1.3, a permission set which did not require the user’s 
acceptance and was included by default to any app’s permission set.  
The model therefore had to be adapted so that it could be used on its own or 
combined with the Base-line privacy impact identification to provide an overall 
picture of the privacy impact. This would be for apps created or updated after 
2015. 
During the research in 2011 and 2015, there were 17 Android permissions 
identified as being necessary to perform the Antivirus function of Security 
apps, of which 6 impacted the user’s privacy. Table 11-2 contains the required 
permissions and 
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impact (‘M’) or high impact (‘H’) and the reason for the medium and high 
ratings. The low or no impact permission activities are read or view activities. 
Table 11-2 Permissions required for Antivirus function 
Antivirus permissions Privacy 
impacts 
Impact Activity 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE L  
CALL_PHONE H Phone can be used to dial premium numbers 
without user intervention. 
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE H User’s network connectivity can be changed 
CLEAR_APP_CACHE L  
DELETE_PACKAGES M Able to remove installed apps (packages) 
GET_ACCOUNTS M All user’s account details can be read. 
GET_TASKS L  
INTERNET M Switches Internet access off or on. 
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES L  
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS H Update access to user’s accounts 
READ_CONTACTS H Access to all user’s contacts on the device. 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE L  
RECEIVE_MMS M Reads MMS messages 
RECEIVE_SMS M Reads SMS text messages 
WRITE_CALENDAR L  
WRITE_CONTACTS H Add contacts to user’s list. This can be used to 
circumvent caller blocking 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE H Add or update user information on storage 
cards 
   
Earlier research of the 2011 Antivirus apps (Chapter 6) established that none of 
the tested apps requested all 17 permissions necessary to perform the function, 
with the maximum requested being 6, and 10 of the apps (45% of the 22 
analysed) did not request any permissions with a privacy impact. Whereas, in 
2015, the maximum number of Antivirus permissions was 10 and 25 of the 67 
apps (37%) did not request permissions that had been designated as having a 
privacy impact. This showed a slight improvement from 2011. 
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11.1.4 Protection_Normal Privacy Impact  
In 2015, Google had introduced the concept of Protection Normal permissions 
(see 9.1.3). Therefore, a new model was required to evaluate the later (2015) 
Antivirus apps which incorporated the privacy impact of the base protection 
normal permissions with the Antivirus privacy impact permissions.  
Before being able to analyse apps to determine the privacy impact, a baseline 
impact was required. Initially an analysis of the Protection_normal 
permissions was performed to identify the permissions which had an impact 
to the user’s privacy and to determine the Base Privacy Impact (Base_PI). The 
results of the analysis displayed in Table 11-3. 
  
Contribution   
210 
   
Table 11-3 Base-line permissions and their privacy rating 
Permission Privacy 
Impact 
Impact Activity 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS  L Tracking 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE  L  
ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY  L  
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE  L Obtain WiFi status 
BLUETOOTH  M Control access between device and 
other Bluetooth devices 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN  M Control Bluetooth admin, like pairing 
names and codes 
BROADCAST_STICKY  L  
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE  M Control access and possibly make 
device accessible 
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE  M Broadcast device name to WiFi 
networks 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE  M Switch WiFi on/off 
DISABLE_KEYGUARD  L  
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR  L  
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE  L  
INSTALL_SHORTCUT  L  
INTERNET  M Internet access activate or disable 
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES  L  
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS  L  
NFC  M Control transfer of data including 
payment details and make payments 
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS  L  
READ_SYNC_STATS  L  
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED  L  
REORDER_TASKS  M Change task priorities 
REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS  L  
REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES  L  
SET_ALARM  L  
SET_TIME_ZONE  L  
SET_WALLPAPER  L  
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS  L  
TRANSMIT_IR  L  
UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT  L  
USE_FINGERPRINT  L  
VIBRATE  L  
WAKE_LOCK  L  
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS  L  
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There are 34 base-line permissions of which 8 permissions are marked as an 
impact to privacy and are rated ‘M’ (medium), these are referenced and 
labelled as the Base_PI permissions. The other permissions either review, 
obtain or control status of the operating system for the app with one providing 
extra tracking commands, these are labelled as Base permissions and are rated 
as ‘L’ (low or little impact).  
The author decided to illustrate the privacy impact of an app in red to 
demonstrate that the user needs to heed the warning that their privacy is being 
abused. 
 
 
Figure 11-7 Base-line Privacy Impact Status using the Privacy Impact 
Framework Model 
The gauge illustrates that the Base_PI (base-line privacy impact) permissions 
is small, less than 5.2% of the total available permissions within the 
protection_normal group. The impact level will increase as additional 
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permissions are requested by an installed app. The user needs to decide if this 
is an acceptable level of impact.  
 
 
11.2 Privacy Impact Framework Model 
With the addition of the Protection normal or Baseline privacy impact, the 
privacy impact had to evolve to incorporate the impact of newer apps as well 
as to display the impact of earlier apps. 
A matrix was created to determine the level of privacy impact depending on 
the complexity and number of Privacy Impacted permissions (PI_perms). 
The protection normal Base_PI_perms were then combined with the Antivirus 
AV_perms and PI_perms list resulting in 27 minimum permissions for an 
Antivirus app of which 14 had Privacy Impacts (Table 11-4). 
  
Contribution   
213 
   
Table 11-4 Resultant list of permissions to perform basic Antivirus function   
Permission Activity Rating Base_PI_perm 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE AV Low Y 
BLUETOOTH  Control access Medium 
 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN  Control access Medium 
 
CALL_PHONE PI Medium 
 
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE AV Medium Y 
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE  Control access Medium 
 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE  Control access Medium 
 
CLEAR_APP_CACHE AV Low 
 
DELETE_PACKAGES AV Low 
 
DISABLE_KEYGUARD  Change status Low 
 
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR  Change status Low 
 
GET_ACCOUNTS PI Medium 
 
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE  Obtain status Low 
 
GET_TASKS AV Low 
 
INSTALL_SHORTCUT  Change status Low 
 
INTERNET AV Medium Y 
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES AV Low Y 
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS PI Medium 
 
NFC  Control access 
including 
payment details 
Medium 
 
READ_CONTACTS PI Medium 
 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE AV Low 
 
RECEIVE_MMS AV Low 
 
RECEIVE_SMS AV Low 
 
REORDER_TASKS  Change status Medium 
 
WRITE_CALENDAR PI Medium 
 
WRITE_CONTACTS PI Medium 
 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE AV Low 
 
 
The base Privacy Impact Framework Model for an Antivirus app with no 
additional requested permissions is shown in Figure 11-8. 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model gauge (PI_gauge) for Antivirus apps 
was updated to use the defined basic Antivirus permissions available in the 
2015 version of Android (27), 14 of these base permissions have a privacy 
impact. Additional requested PI_perms indicate that there is some risk to the 
user’s privacy and extra requested permissions relate to additional 
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functionality. Having this snapshot view of the app enables the user to decide 
if the additional functionality is worth the additional impact to their private 
information. 
 
Figure 11-8 Privacy Impact Framework Model for Antivirus Function 
The antivirus Base Privacy Impact Framework Model provides the graphical 
representation of the base permissions required to perform the Antivirus 
function. In the 2015 version of Android, a minimum of 27 specified AV_perms 
are required to perform the Antivirus functions of which 4 are already included 
in the set of Base_PIs. Of these 27 permissions, 14 are defined as Privacy Impact 
permissions (4 of which are included in the Base-line set of permissions. The 
app can request more than the specified 27 permissions which are the extra 
requested permissions but if the Privacy Impact permissions increase then the 
red portion of the model increases.  
Here the Privacy Impact Framework Model was used to display the results of 
the two Antivirus apps from 2011, which had differences between the free and 
commercial versions. 
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 Aegislab Free  
   
 Aegislab Commercial  
Figure 11-9 Privacy Impact analysis of a free app with it’s commercial version 
The colours chosen for the display are in respect to the effect on the user. These 
are; green for information, amber for a notification and red to show server 
impact.  
The free app appears to be the better app with regards to the antivirus 
permissions requested and has a low or zero privacy impact. However, the low 
efficacy score indicates that there is something not right here and closer 
inspection shows that the number of permissions requested were abnormally 
small (3). The commercial app, although having a higher privacy impact is 
more effective. Here the commercial app requested 12 permissions in total. The 
comparison also demonstrates that displaying the antivirus permissions as a 
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percentage is meaningless if the apps are not requesting the same number of 
total permissions. This gauge has been removed from the model.   
11.2.1 Privacy Impact of Children’s apps 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model was then used to evaluate the privacy 
around children’s apps. 
In 2015 the number of available permissions had grown to 169. Of which 26 
were designated as Privacy Impacted.  
Table 11-5 The main 11 Privacy Impact permissions 
Android Permission Definition 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Allows an app to access approximate location. 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise location 
CAMERA Required to be able to access the camera device 
CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT Allows an application to capture audio output 
CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPU
T 
Allows an application to capture secure video 
output 
CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT Allows an application to capture video output 
READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages 
READ_VOICEMAIL Allows an application to read voicemails in the 
system 
RECEIVE_MMS Allows an application to monitor incoming MMS 
messages. 
RECEIVE_SMS Allows an application to receive SMS messages 
RECORD_AUDIO Allows an application to record audio 
 
The main 11 privacy impacting permissions provide an app the ability to track, 
eavesdrop and spy on the user.  
The top 20 children’s apps in each age group were evaluated to determine if 
children’s privacy was being impacted. 
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In the 0-5 age group, 5 apps requested at least 1 of the permissions from Table 
11-5, these were Barbie magical fashion, BBC Cbeebies storytime, Cbeebies 
Playtime, Peppa's activity maker and Disney color and play. 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model was used to evaluate the impact for 
these 5 apps and the results are in Figure 11-10. 
 
Barbie magical fashion 
 
Cbeebies Playtime 
 
BBC Cbeebies 
Storytime 
 
Disney color and play 
 
Peppa’s activity maker 
 
Figure 11-10 Childrens apps 0-5 age group privacy impact 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model shows a minimal impact less than 10% 
impact to the children for these apps. 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model was used to evaluate the other two age 
groups, 6-8 years (Figure 11-11) and the 9+ age group (Figure 11-12). 
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Disney color and play 
 
The Smurfs baker 
 
Go CBBC 
 
Hot wheels showdown 
 
Crayola nail party 
 
Planes fire and rescue 
Figure 11-11 Childrens apps 6-8 age group privacy impact 
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Cookies maker salon 
 
Crayola jewellery party 
 
Despicable Me 
 
Littlest pet shop 
 
Mini pets 
 
My little pony 
 
Star chart 
 
Angry Birds 
 
Bad Piggies 
Figure 11-12 Childrens apps 9+ age group privacy impact 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model simplifies the analysis output of the 
privacy impact. The models confirm the previous manual analysis that the 
children’s privacy impact is minimal. 
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11.2.2 Antivirus app Privacy Impact 2011 vs 
2015 
The Privacy Impact of Antivirus apps from 2011 was low. This was mainly due 
to the few permissions requested and even fewer Antivirus permissions. By 
2015 the market had matured. The new privacy guidelines, GDPR, was also 
agreed in his year and the Privacy Impact was assessed for the apps that were 
available in 2011 and 2015 to determine if the developers were ready for 
increased privacy restrictions and if there were any differences between the 
two versions.  
The Privacy Impact Framework Model was used after the comparator analysis 
to display the apps privacy impact. Google also introduced their 
protection_normal permission base in 2017 and this was factored into the 
Privacy Impact Framework Model to show any additional impact with 
unapproved permissions for newer12 apps.  
Using the Privacy Impact Framework Model to compare the privacy impact 
between the 2011 and 2015 apps the output in Table 11-6 show that Bluepoint 
apps are not requesting any PI_Perms in either 2011 and 2015. Lookout is the 
only developer whose request of PI_Perms has decreased. 
  
                                                 
 
12 The Apps used in this study were extracted in January 2015. 
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Table 11-6 Privacy Impact changes for antivirus apps 2011 vs 2015 
Company Product 2011 vs 2015 version 
AV Free 
AV antivirus 
free trial 
      
AVG 
Mobilation 
AntiVirus Free 
AVG 
     
Bluepoint 
Security 
BluePoint 
Antivirus 
     
Bluepoint 
Security 
BluePoint 
Antivirus free 
    
Dr Web Ltd 
Dr.Web 
Antivirus light 
     
Dr Web Ltd 
Dr.Web 
Antivirus 
     
Lookout Inc 
Lookout 
Mobile 
Security 
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Company Product 2011 vs 2015 version 
NetQin 
Mobile Inc. 
Nq mobile 
manager Trial 
     
 
The Privacy Impact Framework Models show clearly the impacts of each app.  
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11.3 Summary 
 
The research began with an analysis of Antivirus apps to determine if they 
were effectively protecting the user against malware. The hypothesis was that 
the Antivirus apps protected the user against malware and that the commercial 
versions provided more protection than their free counterparts. The initial 
investigation was to determine what differences (if any) there were between 
the free and commercial versions of the app. The areas reviewed were the 
specified features and permissions, the sizes of the installed packages and if 
there was any correlation between the number of downloads of the app and 
the user rating. 
The initial testing of the apps involved a laborious process, first downloading 
the app to a suitable device to test the efficacy of the app and to transfer the 
app to a test rig to obtain the values for comparison. Initially each app took 
approximately 30 minutes to perform the download, transfer to the test rig and 
prepare the app in Java source code to perform the analysis. Each step was 
performed manually and required multiple software to be installed to perform 
each step. This manual process was inappropriate to analyse large quantities 
of apps and an automated process was developed. Python code was written 
that would perform the two phases of disassembly from Davlik executable 
code to Java source code. Additional code then analysed the source code and 
extracted the Android Manifest file for inputting into a database. Using this 
process all 22 Antivirus apps were downloaded and analysed in 30 minutes in 
total. The main time was taken up with the download of the app to the device 
and extracting the executable and storing it on the test rig. The preparation of 
the 22 apps for analysis took less than 5 minutes. 
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This process was developed into the P.E.M.P Method which was used in all 
future extractions and preparation of the app and now included preliminary 
analysis of the app’s permissions of those available in the Froyo permission set 
and which Antivirus permissions were requested. 
The result of the research revealed that although the commercial apps offered 
more features, these were not included in the app executable code. The MD5 
hashes of the source code was identical, which indicated that the additional 
features were not built into the app and were probably online functions. The 
correlation between the features and permissions was significant indicating 
that the different number of features and number of permissions were linked. 
Therefore, the conclusion was that the hypothesis was incorrect and there was 
no difference in Antivirus functionality between the free and commercial apps. 
Although, this was not reflected by the user rating which rated the commercial 
version of the app higher than the free version. 
The next step was to determine the efficacy of the Antivirus app. In 2010 the 
Antivirus testing organisation AV-test.org was still concentrating mainly on 
the PC infrastructure marketplace and had started testing apps in the mobile 
marketplace. They initially tested four apps over four operating systems 
(Windows mobile, Symbian, Android and iOS), of which only two apps were 
available for Android. In 2011 the testing had grown to test 6 apps on Android. 
However, only the feature set of the products were tested13. 
To determine a baseline for the efficacy, the permissions required to detect and 
remove malware needed to be defined. Using many years of experience as a 
                                                 
 
13 AV-test.org eventually started testing Antivirus permissions in 2014. 
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Security professional I could describe the various functions of an Antivirus 
Product and select the appropriate permissions required to permit the app to 
perform each of the functions. These have been named and referred to as the 
Antivirus permissions (AV_Perm). There were 17 permissions that performed 
the primary Antivirus roles of which 6 contravened the user’s privacy.  
To evaluate the efficacy and to eliminate outliers, a larger testbed was needed 
and all 22 Antivirus apps in the Android marketplace in 2011 were tested. For 
each product the app was installed onto a clean device, then the app was tested 
to detect the malware at download or via scans, if the app could either 
quarantine or remove the malware, detect if the device was rooted and if any 
rootkits were installed and finally review the malware signature update files. 
All these results were recorded and used to determine the efficacy of the 
Antivirus app. The hypothesis was that the apps that requested the most 
AV_Perms fulfilled the most functions and were therefore more effective. 
However, this was not the case, Aegislab Antivirus apps performed the best 
during the tests with a 90% overall score, but their efficacy rating was 35.3%, 
whilst Lookout Mobile had the better efficacy rating (64.7%) but achieved a 
slightly lower score of 70% overall, mainly due to reduced virus signature 
update functionality, which was not permission related. None of the apps 
tested passed all the tests. 
In 2015, the Antivirus market had grown, but only five developers and their 
products had lasted over the intervening period. The 22 apps in 2011 had 
reduced to 7 as the apps evolved and matured. New apps and developers had 
entered the market and there were 57 developers with 67 products. The 
number of permissions available in the newer version of Android had also 
increased from 82 to 154. The median number of permissions had also 
increased but the maximum had reduced. Three of the apps did not request 
any permissions at all which cast doubts on their ability to perform the 
Contribution   
226 
   
Antivirus function. During the superseding years the commercial antivirus 
testing company started testing on mobile devices, from two Android 
Antivirus apps in 2011 to 12 in March 2015, although there were 67 Antivirus 
apps on the marketplace.   
The Antivirus apps from 2015 were analysed and compared to their 2011 
versions. In each case the number of requested permissions had increased. The 
Antivirus permissions were checked, and the 2015 apps were tested to 
determine if there was an improvement in the efficacy rating. There was a 
strong positive correlation between the Antivirus and Privacy permissions. As 
the apps had matured, more Antivirus permissions were requested and 
therefore so had the number of privacy impacting permissions. 
To enable higher numbers of apps to be reviewed the 2011 process was 
automated and named the P.E.M.P. process (Permission Extraction Method 
and Process). PEMP automates the 2011 process and reduces the processing 
time. The automation was written using opensource code and has been tested 
on a variety of app genres and across multiple versions of Android.  The apps 
from 2011 were re-tested using the PEMP process with the same output results. 
The protection of children has a high priority and the next genre of apps to be 
tested for privacy were a sample of the free children’s apps over 3 age groups. 
The mean number of permissions requested increased with age as did the 
privacy impact permissions. Analysis of the permissions showed that the child 
using some of the apps could be tracked, overheard or seen. The impact though 
was low as these types of permissions were not used in conjunction with each 
other. 
The previous app analysis was concentrating on the protection the user was 
receiving. The next section reviewed the apps from the user perspective, what 
the user expected or what the user perceived the developer providing. Using 
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Social and Psychological contracts to evaluate this expectation, showed that the 
developers were not considering the user’s needs.   
With the agreement of GDPR implementation the marketplace providers 
separated their privacy terms and conditions from their main agreements. The 
privacy fairness of these terms and conditions are yet to be tested by the 
regulators. An overview of how the regulator could implement the controls are 
defined. 
A new concept of Privacy Impact is introduced and how it can be applied to 
the app marketplace. 
Earlier testing of the apps had produced results which were detailed but 
difficult to show at a glance what the results were. A framework model was 
created to evaluate the input and display the results in a clearer, unambiguous 
output. The gauge evolved from simple charts to become the Privacy Impact 
Framework Model. 
The Privacy Impact Framework Model was first used to evaluate and compare 
the efficacy of Antivirus apps, number of permissions requested and if the 
permission was an Antivirus permission.  The model evolved to be able to 
display the privacy ratings of apps and was tested on the previous app genres; 
2011 and 2015 Antivirus apps and the 2015 Children’s apps.   
Once the privacy permissions are designated and recorded in the master 
database, any genre of apps (or just apps) can be downloaded and analysed 
using the PEMP process and the output provided to the Privacy Impact 
Framework for display. 
The model has been successfully tested on multiple genres and across multiple 
versions of Android. 
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Currently the Privacy Impact Framework Model display is only visible on a 
PC, but the intention is to port the Model to a mobile environment as an app 
and have the display immediately available to a user prior to using or starting 
the app, thereby giving the user full control over their own data requirements. 
There are now tools in the marketplace which permit users to switch 
permissions off or on but, they do not provide guidance on which permissions 
to switch or whether these permissions used in conjunction with others affect 
their privacy. An initial privacy matrix was created and is evolving to enable 
greater detail of the privacy impact for the user. 
The problem of communicating to the billions of mobile users the importance 
of their data and keeping it private is huge. I intend this research to be 
incorporated into an app which will be provided by the mobile operators and 
freely available to users. This will encourage use and gradually other 
educational techniques will aid in understanding data privacy and permit the 
user to take more control of their data. 
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 Addendum  
Since this research was performed, Google brought app Ops out in Android 
4.3, but removed the feature from Android 4.4.2, claiming it was released 
accidentally. This app provided the ability to switch permissions off once an 
app had been downloaded and installed. It is now available on the Google Play 
Store (https://play.google.com/store/) on Android 5.0. It will work on earlier 
releases of Android, but the device is required to be rooted. How to use this 
utility is described in 12.1.1. 
There are also other apps available that allow the user to display and revoke 
permissions for an app. Some are described below. 
Permission Explorer allows the user to filter apps and permissions by 
categories, giving more details about the permissions that were granted at 
installation time. 
Permissions Observatory and app Permissions perform a similar function. 
These apps assist in determining if there are any apps with problematic 
permissions that need to be revoked or perhaps even uninstalled completely. 
These are just a few guides that can be used. 
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12.1.1 Permission Control 
Once an app is authorised to access a permissions group, the app may use any 
of the individual permissions that are part of that group. The user does not 
need to manually approve individual permissions updates that belong to a 
permissions group that are already accepted. 
Subsequently Google has introduced a setting that permits a user to switch a 
permission on or off. The following process should be used (Android V6.0). 
When you use an instant app 
When you use an instant app, you can allow or deny permissions. To see what 
permissions an instant app has: 
· On your device, open the Settings app . 
· Go to Google   Instant Apps. 
· Tap the app you want to see more about.  
· Look under “Permissions” to see what permissions the app has.  
  
Turn permissions on or off 
You can change the permissions that apps can access in the main Settings app 
on your device at any time. Keep in mind turning off permissions may cause 
apps on your device to lose functionality. 
 
See all permissions for each app 
For apps installed on your device: 
· On your device, open the main Settings app . 
Addendum   
231 
   
· Tap Apps or Application Manager (depending on your device, this may 
look different). 
· Tap the app you want to update. 
· Tap Permissions. 
· Next to a permission you want to turn on, move the switch to the right 
until it turns green. If you want to turn a permission off, move the switch 
to the left until it turns gray. 
 
For instant apps 
· On your device, open the Settings app . 
· Go to Google   Instant Apps. 
· Tap the app you want to see more about.  
· Look under “Permissions”.  
 
See all apps installed on your device that can access permissions 
· On your device, open the main Settings app . 
· Tap Apps or Application Manager (depending on your device, this may 
look different). 
· Tap Settings   app permissions. If you can't find app permissions, you 
may need to tap Privacy and safety  app permissions. 
· Tap a permission. 
· If you want to turn that permission on for a specific app, move the switch 
to the right until it turns green. If you want to turn a permission off, move 
the switch to the left until it turns gray. 
Check app permissions if an app isn’t working 
If a feature within an app isn't working as you would expect, try the steps 
below. 
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Step 1: Follow the instructions to contact the developer of the app. 
Step 2: Check to see if any permissions have been disabled. To check app 
permissions: 
· On your device, open the main Settings app . 
· Tap Apps or Application Manager (depending on your device, this may 
look different). 
· Tap the app you want to review. 
· Tap Permissions. If a permission is turned off, the switch next to it will be 
gray. 
· You can consider turning permissions on to see if that resolves your issue. 
To turn a permission on, move the switch to the right until it turns green. 
· Try using the app again. 
Google has also simplified the list of permissions that are presented to the user 
to enable them to better decide if the permissions requested is acceptable to 
them. The permissions are listed in permission groups and show the user the 
high-level name of the permission and not the more detailed permission. To 
review the permissions in detail, use the instructions in See all permissions for 
each app. 
The permission groups are14: 
· Body Sensors 
· Calendar 
                                                 
 
14 These permission groups are for the permissions available on Android 6.0 and up. Permissions also vary by device 
and manufacturer. 
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· Camera 
· Contacts 
· Location 
· Microphone 
· Phone 
· SMS 
· Storage 
Each of the groups contain the detailed permission linked to that group. 
Body Sensors – Access fingerprint data 
Calendar – Read and write access to the calendar 
Camera – Access the camera device and take photos and/or videos 
Contacts – Read and write access to contacts 
Location – Access detailed (fine) location 
Microphone – Access audio via the microphone and record the audio. 
Phone – Access to view number being dialled, answer incoming calls, manage 
calls, continue a call started from another app and accept calls. 
SMS – Access to receive and send SMS messages 
Storage – Read and write to external storage 
All the above groups could be dangerous to the user as they permit any app to 
track, overhear, spy, send SMS texts to premium numbers, make and receive 
calls without any intervention by the user. Google leaves it to the developer to 
remove permissions from the groups. The user is not asked to accept these 
permissions. 
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12.1.2  RA Remover 
For users that do not have a technical background to manage or remove app 
permissions an app, RA (remover app) is available. The app only displays the 
permissions from the manifest file as bad or not bad.  
As with the Google Permission Control method, the system does not check to 
see which combination of permissions is harmful to the user’s privacy etc. The 
user cannot define what is important to them, maybe permit a little loss of 
privacy so that they can play the app as single user as compared to the app as 
multi user. This would provide a fairer “social contract” for the user.  
The users and regulators (and developers) require a system that clearly 
highlights the effect of the user on the installation/use of the app. A traffic light 
system is too simple, and a fuel gauge or side bar chart with depth that can 
show the depth of the effect on “privacy or security” as well as how the 
combination of the permissions is affecting the user.  
Also, what difference does the mobile suppliers skin have on the user’s 
privacy, are the hardware providers also obtaining usage data on the users? 
When do they request this? Another area for future research. 
There also needs to be some sort of visual display for the user to show what 
benefit they have on top of using the app. 
Hardening mobiles – what permissions need to be de-activated. Clearly as 
demonstrated in the initial research into antivirus apps, some of the apps that 
were supposed to protect the user were clearly spying on the user. 
What detection is being performed on re-packaged apps? Users downloading 
“beta” or “pre-release” popular apps from third party sites as was the case with 
the “early release” of a “Guide to Pokémon Go” which contained rooting 
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malware (“Fake Apps Affect ANDROID OS Users,” 2011).  Users have also 
downloaded Trojanised apps in the belief that these were legitimate app 
updates as discussed by Oscar Abendan in his report, “Trojanised apps are 
legitimate Android apps that cybercriminals maliciously altered to serve their 
own purposes. They download, modify, and upload legitimate apps to the 
Android Market or other app stores. These apps are usually free, so more users 
are likely to download them onto their mobile devices”. To be able to detect 
that the app/update is not legitimate the user would have to have a security 
product installed on their device that would detect malware at download.  
Android app updates can add new “sub-permissions” in a category without 
requesting acceptance of these new permissions. The user would only be able 
to detect this by comparing permissions in the manifest files. A shorthand 
method to determine if there has been a change is to hash the package’s 
manifest files to ensure that nothing was injected.  
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Appendix A Detailed Permission tables 
A.1. Antivirus Apps Analysis Input Tables 
The extraction of data during the research process produced a variety of input 
tables. These tables were used as a base for the research. A summary of each of 
the tables is included in the main text of the thesis.  
Table A-1, shows the Antivirus products with the highest downloads 
according to the Androlib Market site (Androlib Market , 2011) on February 
28th, 2011. Beta and trial products have been included in the selection, although 
applications with downloads lower than 50 and/or with zero (nil) ratings have 
been excluded. 
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Table A-1 Security Applications on Androlib Marketplace as at 28/02/2011 
Application 
Company Rating # of reviews # of downloads reviews 
as a % of 
download 
Lookout Mobile Security 
Lookout Inc 4.6 126412 20,587,202 0.61 
AntiVirus Free AVG 
Droidsecurity - 
AVG 
4.4 80331 13,082,544 0.61 
Dr Web for Android light 
Doctor Web Ltd 4.6 14655 896,001 1.64 
Antivirus Free 
Creative Apps 4.33 7689 591,624 1.30 
NQmobile Antivirus 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 4.5 5566 250,000 2.23 
NQmobile Antivirus For 
1.5/1.6 Android 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 4.4 783 250,000 0.31 
Super Security Standard 
superdroid.net 4.3 1950 128,798 1.51 
ViRobot Mobile 
Hauri Inc 4.3 1254 123,425 1.02 
AppScan Beta 
Aegislab 4.3 1066 80,514 1.32 
Super Task Killer 2011 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 4.2 1512 75,600 2.00 
MyAndroid Protection 
2.0+ 
Mymobile Security 3.9 234 60,622 0.39 
MyMobile Protection 2.0+ 
Mymobile Security 3.6 94 33,571 0.28 
MyAndroid Protection 
1.5/1.6 
Mymobile Security 3.78 55 17,742 0.31 
Anti virus 
Andro Security 3.7 128 16,410 0.78 
MyMobile Protection 
v.1.5/1.6 
Mymobile Security 3.9 63 15,366 0.41 
BluePoint Antivirus 
Bluepoint security 
Inc 
4.1 231 10,645 2.17 
MobiShield 
Trustmobi 4.2 71 10,000 0.71 
Kinetoo Malware scan 
CPU Media Sarl 4.1 65 5,000 1.30 
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Application 
Company Rating # of reviews # of downloads reviews 
as a % of 
download 
Antivirus - Risk Detector 
eDroid Apps 4 28 1,000 2.80 
Onetouch antivirus 
Shipwrecktech 3.7 10 1,000 1.00 
BlackBelt AntiVirus 
UMU Ltd 4 11 49 22.45 
The table contains the free security apps that contain an Antivirus component 
and the developer. Details of the user rating and the number of reviews and 
downloads are also recorded. The number of reviews as a percentage of the 
download were calculated to determine if the rating value was a true 
representative of the users downloading the product. The lower the figure 
indicated that more users that download the product provided a rating. This 
was then used to rank the apps. 
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Table A-2 Companies with free and commercial versions of Antivirus apps 
Company 
Application Order in free 
list 
Cost 
Lookout Inc 
Lookout Mobile Security 1 free 
Lookout Inc 
Lookout Mobile Security 1 $29.99 
AVG Mobilation 
AntiVirus Free AVG 2 free 
AVG Mobilation 
AntiVirus Pro 2 £6.10 
AVG Mobilation 
Security Pro 2 £3.05 
Doctor Web Ltd 
Dr Web Anti-virus 3 $4.99 
Doctor Web Ltd 
Dr Web Antivirus light 3 free 
Creative Apps 
Antivirus Free 4 free 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 
NQmobile Antivirus 5 free 
NetQin Mobile Inc. 
NQmobile Antivirus for 1.5/1.6 Android 6 free 
superdroid.net 
Super Security Standard 7 free 
Hauri Inc 
ViRobot Mobile 8 free 
Aegislab 
Aegislab Antivirus free 9 free 
Aegislab 
AntiVirus Elite 9 £4.88 
Bluepoint security Inc 
BluePoint Antivirus 16 free 
Bluepoint security Inc 
BluePoint Antivirus 16 £3.05 
Trustmobi 
MobiShield 17 free 
CPU Media Sarl 
Kinetoo Malware scan 18 free 
Shipwrecktech 
Onetouch antivirus 20 free 
Qianjun 
Virus Terminator new free 
MoonBeam Development 
Android defender virus protect new free 
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Moonbeam Development 
Defender Pro virus new $4.99 
McAfee 
McAfee WaveSecure trial $19.90 
Mymobile Security 
MyAndroid Protection 2.0+  trial 
€ 36 
Mymobile Security 
MyAndroid Protection 1.5/1.6 trial 
€ 36 
P.Defender Antivirus 
MyAntiVirus Pro paid $10.12 
UMU Ltd 
BlackBelt Antivirus trial £9.95 
Kaspersky 
Kaspersky Mobile Security paid £6.07 
DMA 
Antivirus paid £0.85 
UMU Ltd 
BlackBelt Security trial £19.95 
Livezen 
Smart Defender Pro paid $1.99 
Webroot 
Webroot Mobile Security basic new free 
Webroot 
Webroot Mobile Security new £9.15 
The table orders the security applications by the number of downloads as at 
04/05/2011. The price of the product is also included in the currency as 
specified on the Play Store. The order provides the rank of the free app 
according to the rating co-efficient. The other values indicate that the product 
is new (new since 28/02/2011), a trial version, or paid (commercial only). 
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Table A-3 Comparison of features of Antivirus products in the study 
 
Lookout 
Mobile 
AVG Dr Web Aegislab Bluepoint 
 
Moonbeam 
Scheduled scans 
Y Y Y Y Pro version only Y 
Email support 
Y Y Y N Y Y 
Real Time Protection 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Scan Memory cards 
N Y Y N Y N 
Virus definition Update 
Y Y Y Y (Uses cloud) Y 
Real Time Scan of 
Audio files 
N Pro 
version 
only 
N N Y N 
Real Time scan of Email 
Y Y Y N Y N 
Real Time scan of SMS 
Y Y Y Elite 
version 
only 
Y N 
Real Time scan of 
Market Apps 
Y Y Y Y Pro Version only Y 
The features of the products, as stated by the developers, were documented 
and used in the comparisons. 
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Table A-5 Details of  non-android permissions requested 
 
Lookout Inc AVG 
Mobilation 
Other Permissions Lookout 
Mobile 
Security 
(Premium) 
Lookout 
Mobile 
Security 
(Free) 
AVG 
AV 
Pro 
AV
G 
AV 
free 
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOK
MARKS 
y y y y 
com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOK
MARKS 
y y y y 
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT     y y 
com.android.launcher.permission.UNINSTALL_SHORTCU
T 
    y y 
com.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS     y y 
com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE     y   
com.antivirus.permission.C2D_MESSAGE       y 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE y y y y 
com.htc.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS     y y 
com.lookout.permission.C2D_MESSAGE y y     
com.sonyericsson.homescreen.permission.READ_SETTINGS     y y 
com.sonyericsson.homescreen.permission.WRITE_SETTING
S 
    y y 
org.antivirus.permission.C2D_MESSAGE     y   
Total permissions 4 4 11 10 
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Two of the developers requested additional permissions, Lookout Mobile and 
AVG. The permissions requested by each of these developer’s apps are 
recorded. 
The analysis of the ratings was similar irrespective of the number of features 
of the app (Table 6-2). 
As the popularity of the Android OS grew many antivirus and security 
developers were bought by the mainstream Security software companies. The 
Antivirus arena on mobiles which was in its infancy in 2011 matured over the 
four years. The major providers of Antivirus programs from the PC/Laptop 
arena consolidated their position by purchasing or by merging with other 
companies, as in the case with AVG entering the mobile Antivirus market by 
purchasing DroidSecurity (Horn, 2010). This meant that multiple Antivirus 
products were available from one company, whilst the products were 
consolidated, incorporated into an existing product or dropped from the 
marketplace altogether. 
The growth of apps with Antivirus components from 2011 to 2015 is shown in  
Table A-6. 
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Table A-6 Android Antivirus apps in 2011 and 2015 
2011 apps 2015 apps 
Aegis Appscan Beta 360_security_-_antivirus_boost Dr.Web_v.9_Anti-virus 
Aegislab Antivirus 
free 
Advanced_Task_Manager_-_Boost Dr.Web_v.9_Anti-virus_Light 
Aegislab mobile ALYac_Android DU_Speed_Booster_Cache_Cleaner 
Android defender 
virus protect 
AMC_Security_-_Clean_n_Booster eScan_-_Mobile_Antivirus 
Antivirus droid Android_Optimizer Free_Antivirus_2014_+_Security 
Antivirus Free Anti_Virus_Android free_antivirus_2015_security 
AntiVirus Free AVG Antivirus Pro for Android Free_Antivirus_and_Security(panda) 
AV antivirusfree trial Anti-Virus_Android Free_Antivirus_and_Security(sophos) 
BlackBelt Antivirus Antivirus_Android(androhelm) Free_Antivirus_Pro_2014 
BluePoint Antivirus Antivirus_Booster_&_Cleaner Free_Security_n_Antivirus 
BluePoint Antivirus 
free 
Antivirus_Complete_Protection Free_virus_scan_(Antivirus) 
Defender Pro virus Antivirus_for_Android(A.A) GuardX_Antivirus 
Dr. Web Android light Antivirus_for_Android(dala) Hornet_AntiVirus_Free 
Dr. Web Antivirus 
light 
Antivirus_for_Android(itus) kaspersky_internet_security 
Lookout Mobile 
Security 
Antivirus_for_Android(lab4) LINE_Antivirus 
Lookout Mobile 
Security trial 
Antivirus_for_Android(moobila) lookout_security_n_antivirus 
MyAndroid 
Protection 
Antivirus_for_Android_FREE Mobile_Security_and_Antivirus(bullguard) 
Nqmobile booster antivirus_for_android_TM Mobile_Security_n_Antivirus(avast) 
Nqmobile manager 
Trial 
Antivirus_for_androids_2015 Mobile_Security_n_Antivirus(bitdefender) 
ScanLife antivirus_free-mobile_security Mobile_Security_n_Antivirus(eset) 
SmrtGuard Pro Trial AntiVirus_n_Anti-Adware norton_security_and_antivirus 
Super Security 
Standard 
Antivirus_n_Mobile_Security(trustgo) NQ_Mobile_Security_&_Antivirus 
 antivirus_n_mobile_security_(quickheal) Secure_Antivirus 
 antivirus_Security_-_FREE Security_-_Free 
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 Armor for Android Security_n_Antivirus_-_FREE(mcafee) 
 avira_antivirus_security Tablet Antivirus Security PRO 
 bitdefender_antivirus_free tablet_antivirus_security_FREE 
 Bkav_Security_-_Antivirus_Free Virus_Removal_for_Android 
 BluePoint_Antivirus_Free virus_scan_(antivirus) 
 clean_master_(speed_booster) VIRUSfighther_Antivirus_FREE 
 Cleaner_Master_Antivirus_Plus White-Gate_Antivirus 
 cm_security_antivirus_applock Zoner_AntiVirus 
 Comodo_Security_&_Antivirus Zoner_AntiVirus_-_Tablet 
 CY_Security_Antivirus_Cleaner  
 
In 2011 there were 22 apps with Antivirus components. In 2015 the number of 
apps with Security or Antivirus functions was 240, of which 67 were Antivirus 
apps. Developers use multiple tags or keywords to provide greater visibility of 
their apps during searches. The 240 apps contained the keywords “security” or 
“antivirus” or both. These apps were reviewed to confirm that they did possess 
an Antivirus component. In total 67 of the 240 apps performed Antivirus 
functions.  
This research added to the initial 2011 research and concentrated on analysing 
the permissions of the 67 Antivirus apps in 2015. The permissions and features 
from the initial 2011 Antivirus apps were available to perform comparison 
testing between the apps that were available in both 2011 and 2015, albeit at a 
newer release.  
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Table A-7 List of Security and Antivirus apps in 2015 
app Name Developer 
360 Security Antivirus Boost   Qihoo 360 (NYSE:QIHU)  
360????   360mobilesafe  
70 Antivirus Programs for Free   Lev Well  
960 Clean Antivirus Security +   STAR APPS PVT LTD  
Advanced Mobile Antivirus Tips   PhanQuocQuan  
Advanced Mobile Care Antivirus   Galileo Best Free Download  
AegisLab Antivirus Free   AegisLab  
AegisLab Antivirus Premium   AegisLab  
All About Antivirus   Havana Apps  
AMC Security Clean & Booster   IObit Mobile Security  
AMS Antivirus Mobile Security   AMS Antivirus Mobile Security  
Anti Virus & Mobile Security!   Suzy Software  
Anti Virus 2014   Plato Information Best Apps  
ANTI VIRUS 2014   Puttarapha LLC.  
Anti Virus and Spyware Remover   IZSALA KANTIWONG  
Anti Virus Android   PiggiesMaz  
Anti Virus Info   Appsplan1  
Anti Virus Remover   Stephen Best Free Apps  
AntiGen Max Anti Virus   Ian Voorhies  
AntiVirus   AndroHelm Antivirus  
AntiVirus - Android  AndroHelm Antivirus 
AntiVirus   Kevlanche  
AntiVirus   Playerum  
AntiVirus – Spanish   MyPengo Mobile  
AntiVirus & Anti-Adware   SeCore Mobile Security  
Antivirus & Mobile Security   Quick Heal Technologies America Inc  
Antivirus & Mobile Security   TrustGo Inc.  
Antivirus & Mobile Security   Trustlook Mobile Security  
Antivirus & Security   AVAST Software  
Antivirus 2014 for Android   Wequees  
Antivirus 2015 Virus Security   Complete mobile security AntiVirus Free 
Anti virus  
Antivirus and Mobile Security   Plato Information Best Apps  
Antivirus Android   AndroHelm Antivirus  
Anti-Virus Android   AndroHelm Antivirus  
antivirus Android phones 2015   Mobile Speed Booster, Clean Free Master 
Antivirus  
AntiVirus Android.   AndroHelm Antivirus  
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   Jonesaevan  
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   koogoo  
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app Name Developer 
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   MoneyLand  
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   NZ Design  
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   Plato Information Best Apps  
Antivirus Auto Remove Virus   Stephen Best Free Apps  
antivirus auto remove virus   Tkdevmobile  
Antivirus Booster & Cleaner   PSafe Tecnologia S.A.  
Antivirus Complete Protection   sagamore  
Antivirus Download Free   Stephen Best Free Apps  
Antivirus for Android   Android Antivirus  
Antivirus for Android   Dala Apps  
Antivirus for Android   Itus Mobile Security  
Antivirus for Android   Moobila Corporation  
ANTIVIRUS FOR ANDROID   New Papa  
Antivirus for Android FREE   XipIO  
Antivirus for Android Pro   Itus Mobile Security  
Antivirus for Android.   Android Antivirus  
ANTIVIRUS FOR ANDROID™   Tap Media Inc.  
AntiVirus FREE   Kevlanche  
Antivirus Free   Wequees  
Antivirus Free Phones   Jackson app  
Antivirus Free-Mobile Security   NQ Creative Apps  
Antivirus guide   Havana Apps  
AntiVirus Laser   MyNikko  
AntiVirus Laser Pro   MyNikko  
Antivirus Manual   Havana Apps  
Antivirus Mobile Security Scan   Mohammad Ashraf Hossain  
Antivirus Plus   ABV Corporation  
Antivirus Plus   Zr technologies  
Antivirus Pro   ABV Corporation  
Antivirus Pro   NCN-NetConsulting Ges.m.b.H.  
Antivirus Pro 2014   NCN-NetConsulting Ges.m.b.H.  
Antivirus Pro 2015 Security   Antivirus Pro  
AntiVirus PRO Android Security   AVG Mobile  
Antivirus Pro for Android   Android Antivirus  
Antivirus Programs   Havana Apps  
Antivirus Protection   BachTruongSon  
Antivirus Protection Gold   sagamore  
Antivirus Quiz   theandroidgalaxy  
Antivirus Realtime   Blue Master  
Antivirus Scanner Security app   Free mobile speed booster, anti virus 
clean master  
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app Name Developer 
AntiVirus Security   AndroHelm Antivirus  
AntiVirus Security - FREE  AVG Mobile 
Antivirus Security Free 2015   koogoo  
Antivirus Security Manager   Blue Application  
Antivirus security pro   Antivirus Security Complete Virus 
Protection  
Antivirus Security Pro   Appatron Soft  
Antivirus Security Scanner   Appatron Soft  
AntiVirus Software   ESTSoft  
Antivirus Tablet   AndroHelm Antivirus  
Antivirus TESTVIRUS   P.Defender Antivirus  
Antivirus Tips   Chatura Dange  
Antivirus Ultimate   ABV Corporation  
AntiVirus VIP   Run+Run+Now  
Antivirus*   DMA  
Armor for Android™ Antivirus   Armor for Android™  
Audio Book Anti Virus  Twayesh Projects 
AVG AntiVirus PRO for Xperia™   AVG Mobile  
Avira Antivirus Security   AVIRA  
AVL Pro Antivirus & Security   AVL Team  
Bastiv Security Antivirus   Bastiv Security  
Best Antivirus   ru.fo  
Best Antivirus Security   AndroidAppTools  
Best Free Antivirus   Jonesaevan  
Bitdefender Antivirus Free   Bitdefender  
Bkav Security – Antivirus Free  Bkav Corporation 
BlackBelt AntiVirus Trial   BlackBelt SmartPhone Defence Ltd.  
BluePoint Antivirus Free   BluePoint Security, Inc.  
BluePoint Antivirus Pro   BluePoint Security, Inc.  
Bornaria security (Antivirus)   Ariasecure Corp.  
CCleaner   Piriform  
Clean Master (Speed Booster)   Cheetah Mobile  
Cleaner Booster 360 Antivirus   PLUSStudio  
Cleaner Master & Antivirus   Heart Throb  
Cleaner Master Antivirus   RED ANDRO SOLUTIONS  
Cleaner Master Antivirus Plus   IFSC Code  
Cleaner Master AntiVirus Pro   RED ANDRO SOLUTIONS  
Cloud Security & Antivirus   Cloud Mobile Apps  
Cloud Security AntiVirus FREE   AuroraTeam  
CM Security Antivirus AppLock   Cheetah Mobile (AntiVirus & AppLock)  
CM Security Antivirus Plus   RED ANDRO SOLUTIONS  
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app Name Developer 
Comodo Security & Antivirus   Comodo Security Solutions  
CoolAntivirus Antivirus   SOR ENTERTAIMENT, S.L.  
CY Security Antivirus Cleaner   CY Security  
Dr.Mobile Antivirus & Security   SSME  
Dr.Mobile PRO Antivirus   SSME  
Dr.Web v.9 Anti-virus   Doctor Web, Ltd  
Dr.Web v.9 Anti-virus Life lic   Doctor Web, Ltd  
Dr.Web v.9 Anti-virus Light   Doctor Web, Ltd  
DU Speed Booster?Cache Cleaner   DU Apps  
EICAR Anti-virus Test   eXtorian  
eScan - Mobile Antivirus MicroWorld Technologies Inc.  
eScan - Tablet Antivirus MicroWorld Technologies Inc.  
Fastscan Anti-Virus   K-TEC Inc.  
Fastscan free Anti-Virus   K-TEC Inc.  
FREE Android Antivirus   Simple Soft Alliance  
Free Antivirus   DavmaTech  
Free Antivirus 2015 Security   Antivirus Pro  
Free Antivirus 360°   Android Antivirus Free  
Free Antivirus and Security   Panda Security  
Free Antivirus and Security   Sophos Limited  
Free Antivirus for Android   NZ Design  
Free Antivirus Pro   NCN-NetConsulting Ges.m.b.H.  
Free Antivirus Pro 2014   NCN-NetConsulting Ges.m.b.H.  
Free Antivirus Pro 2015   NCN-NetConsulting Ges.m.b.H.  
Free Antivirus Protection   Blue Application  
Free Antivirus Security 2014   apps for life  
Free Antivirus Software   Plato Information Best Apps  
Free Cleaner 360 For Antivirus   BallDEVELOPER  
Free Mobile Antivirus   Blue Application  
Free Tablet Antivirus Security   Best Free of Best Apps  
Free virus scan (Antivirus)   Complete mobile security AntiVirus Free 
Anti virus  
F-Secure Antivirus Test   F-Secure Corporation  
F-Secure Mobile Security   F-Secure Corporation  
G-Protector Anti Virus Utility   Gpc  
GreenShield Antivirus Suit   Trantor Soft  
GuardX Antivirus   QStar  
Hornet AntiVirus Free   Hornet Mobile Security  
Hornet AntiVirus PRO   Hornet Mobile Security  
IKARUS mobile.security   IKARUS Security Software GmbH  
Kaspersky Internet Security   Kaspersky Lab  
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app Name Developer 
KT Antivirus   Katyayini Infotech Private Limited  
LabMSF Antivirus beta   LabMSF  
LabMSF Antivirus Premium   LabMSF  
LINE Antivirus   LINE Corporation  
Ma Antivirus   GenieSoftSystem Pvt Ltd.  
Malwarebytes Anti-Malware   Malwarebytes  
MAX GAMER ANTIVIRUS   Max Mobi Secure  
Mobile & Security & Antivirus   Star Cube Applications  
Mobile Antivirus AntiBug   ABV Corporation  
Mobile Antivirus Security   Blue Application  
Mobile Antivirus Security Info   NgoQuocHung  
Mobile Cleaner - Antivirus   artbenad 
Mobile Cleaner - Antivirus   Azedev  
Mobile Cleaner And Antivirus   KITMADE  
Mobile Cleaner Antivirus 360   BallDEVELOPER  
Mobile Safe Antivirus   Blue Application  
Mobile Security & Antivirus   ESET  
Mobile Security & Antivirus   Trend Micro EMEA  
Mobile Security & Antivirus -Bitdefender   Bitdefender 
Mobile Security and Antivirus   BullGuard  
Mobile Security and Antivirus   SecuraLive  
Mobile Security Antivirus   koogoo  
My anti virus   PLAY FUN  
My AntiTheft & Antivirus   Mobile Cloud Labs Plc.  
My Antivirus   Mobile Cloud Labs Plc.  
Netlux Mobile Antivirus   Netlux Systems Private Limited  
New Antivirus 2014   Plato Information Best Apps  
Norton Security and Antivirus    NortonMobile  
NQ Mobile Security & Antivirus   NQ Mobile Security (NYSE:NQ)  
Octo Antivirus Free   Octappis  
Operation Antivirus   MobiTrail  
Othello Anti-virus   webmarkcom  
Phone Antivirus   ISawan  
Phone Clean Virus   Monoapps  
Quick AntiVirus   ONS  
Ram Cleaner - Antivirus  Azedev 
Ram Cleaner And Antivirus   artbenad  
Right Antivirus – Top Security  VcareAll 
Secure Antivirus   Secure Antivirus  
SecureBrain Antivirus (BETA)   SecureBrain  
SecureIT Antivirus & Security   SecurityCoverage, Inc.  
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app Name Developer 
Security - Free  Webroot Inc.   
Security & Antivirus | Lookout   Lookout Mobile Security  
Security & Antivirus -FREE   McAfee (Intel Security)  
Security & Antivirus Guard   Sophos Limited  
Shield Antivirus Protection   Gauraw_Yadav  
SkyShield Mobile AntiVirus   SmartInstall Sp. z o.o.  
Smart Android Antivirus   Samtech Solutions  
Smart Antivirus   VcareAll  
Smart Antivirus 2014   Deeni Apps  
Snap Secure   SnapOne, Inc.  
Star Antivirus   Secure Antivirus  
Super Antivirus Defender   Mobile DevTeam  
Super Security & Antivirus   Innovative & Creative Apps  
SVS Antivirus Security Scanner   Mohammad Ashraf Hossain  
syncNscan -  Security/Antivirus  syncNscan Mobile Security 
Tablet AntiVirus Security FREE   AVG Mobile  
Tablet AntiVirus Security PRO   AVG Mobile  
Test Virus   Itus Mobile Security  
Top 10 Mobile Antivirus   mzpassiona  
Total Antivirus Defender FREE   Security Defend  
ULTIMATE U ANTIVIRUS   MrPaul (Pavel Gutsalov)  
VG ??? Web SDK   Infraware Technology, Inc  
Video antivirus review   PashaYakushev  
Virus Cleaner AntiVirus Prank   Technologizer  
Virus Cleaner antivirus(Prank)   Alieman studio  
Virus Guard (AntiVirus)   Mob&Me  
Virus scan (Antivirus 2015)   Viking Mobile Inc  
Virus Scan (Antivirus)   pablosoftware  
Virus Scan (Antivirus)   Wequees  
Virus Scan(Antivirus)   MoneyLand  
VIRUSfighter Antivirus FREE   SPAMfighter aps  
VIRUSfighter Antivirus PRO   SPAMfighter aps  
White-Gate Antivirus   White Gate  
xCore Antivirus Free   xCore LLC  
XRIME Mobile Antivirus   XRIME Mobile  
Zoner AntiVirus - Tablet  ZONER, Inc. 
Zoner AntiVirus   ZONER, Inc.  
Zoner AntiVirus Test   ZONER, Inc.  
Zoon Mobile Antivirus   Zoon Developers  
Zoon Mobile Antivirus Free   Zoon Developers  
Zoon Tablet Antivirus Free   Zoon Developers  
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Of the 67 Antivirus apps the 64 free apps were downloaded and prepared for 
analysis. The app name, package name, developer, rating, number of 
downloads and size were recorded. 
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A.3. Protection Normal Input Table 
To minimise the number of permissions that the user consents to at app 
download and install, Google introduced the designation “protection_normal” 
(“Protection Normal,” 2017). This designation applies to permissions which 
Google has determined that there's “no great risk to the user's privacy or 
security in letting apps have those permissions”. If the app declares in the 
manifest file that it needs a normal permission, then the system automatically 
provides the app with that permission at install time. The user is not prompted 
at install time to agree to these permissions and is not able to revoke any of 
them. 
 
Table A-14 Permissions classified as Protection_Normal in Android V6.0  
Permission Activity Rating 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS  Track Low 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE  Obtain status Low 
ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY  Review status Low 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE  Obtain status Low 
BLUETOOTH  Control access Medium 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN  Control access Medium 
BROADCAST_STICKY  Change status Low 
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE  Control access Medium 
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE  Control access Medium 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE  Control access Medium 
DISABLE_KEYGUARD  Change status Low 
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR  Change status Low 
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE  Obtain status Low 
INSTALL_SHORTCUT  Change status Low 
INTERNET  Control access Medium 
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES  Change status Low 
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS  Change status Low 
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NFC  Control access including 
payment details 
Medium 
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS  Obtain status Low 
READ_SYNC_STATS  Obtain status Low 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED  Obtain status Low 
REORDER_TASKS  Change status Medium 
REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS  Obtain status Low 
REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES  Obtain status Low 
SET_ALARM  Change status Low 
SET_TIME_ZONE  Change status Low 
SET_WALLPAPER  Change status Low 
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS  Change status Low 
TRANSMIT_IR  Change status Low 
UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT  Change status Low 
USE_FINGERPRINT  Change status Low 
VIBRATE  Obtain status Low 
WAKE_LOCK  Obtain status Low 
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS  Change status Low 
 
Unlike the permissions request made by apps, these permissions are implicitly 
accepted as part of using an Android handset, the app permissions are 
requested for acceptance as normal. 
 
A.4. Detailed Permissions of Antivirus apps in the 
study 
There are 154 permissions defined for Lollipop, Version 5 of Android (V5), 
which was the latest version the time of this research. Version 5 was available 
in two releases, version 5.0 which had a market share of 13.1% and version 5.1 
which had a market share of 21.9%. The preliminary analysis showed that there 
were also fifteen (15) permissions requested which were not valid in this 
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version. These non-valid permissions are included here and are highlighted in 
the tables. 
The detailed permissions requested are shown in tables Table A-15 to Table 
A-19. There were sixty-seven Apps in the study, and they are displayed below 
in groups of 12 to 15 apps. The number of Apps in each set are;  
· Set 1 – 12 Apps (Table A-15)   
· Set 2 – 14 Apps (Table A-16) 
· Set 3 – 15 Apps (Table A-17) 
· Set 4 – 13 Apps (Table A-18) 
· Set 5 – 13 Apps (Table A-19) 
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Appendix B Android Operating System 
The Android operating system (OS) is a privilege-separated OS and by default 
applications (apps) or packages are not permitted to perform any operation 
that would impact another app, the operating system or the user, this is known 
as sandboxing. The sandbox creates an area for applications to run in and the 
access that is available to the installed app to a system resource. This access is 
controlled using a system of permissions. These permissions form part of the 
application sandbox and provide a modicum of basic security to the operating 
system.  These permissions are defined and declared in an application’s 
manifest file.  
The source code of an Android app is written in Java and to run on an Android 
mobile the code is first compiled into Java Executable (.JAR), installed on the 
device and converted into Davlik bytecode. Davlik bytecode is compact and is 
suited for systems that are constrained by processor speed and memory, as is 
the case with mobiles which are limited by size and technology available in the 
small form factor15.  Davlik compiles the application to machine code at 
runtime, which increases power consumption as the app is compiled at every 
initiation.  
 
 Android Architecture 
The Android operating system consists of five layers, these are: 
                                                 
 
15 Davlik has since been superseded by Android Runtime (ART), which was first used 
in beta form in KitKat (Android V4.4). 
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Application. 
Application Framework 
Libraries  
Android runtime  
the Linux kernels  
 
Figure B-0-1 Android Architecture (2011) 
The application (app) is written in Java source code, compiled to Java bytecode 
and then assembled into Davlik. The framework services and libraries are 
mainly written in Java. 
The applications and most framework code executes in the Android Runtime 
service and the app runs in the Davlik Virtual Machine (DVM). The native 
libraries, daemons and services are written in C or C++ and the system core 
libraries also reside in the Android Runtime layer. 
The Linux kernel consists of the hardware drivers, networking, file system 
access and inter-process-communication. 
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 Android Internals 
The Android OS is classed as an open system. Internal layers and 
interconnectivity details are freely available. This type of information is not 
available on proprietary systems like Apple’s iOS. A pictorial overview of the 
internals by Constantine Shulupin is shown in Figure B-0-2. 
 
Figure B-0-2 Android Internals for API Level 9 
The figure displays the interconnections between the functions in the 
application layer with the application framework and services layers. The 
figure also provides examples of the physical location or hardware that the 
various functions interact with.  
The Android system provides individual permissions and permission groups 
that can be requested in the app Manifest file. The permission groups 
correspond to the system applications in the application level. Specification of 
the group enables the app to have control over the individual permissions 
within that group.   
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 Android Vulnerabilities 
The benefit of an open OS is the speed that developers can get apps to the 
marketplace. However, the openness also provides the internal working of 
Android open to attack. This simplifies the development of malware to attack 
internal systems by gaining access to the administrative side of the OS. Users 
can facilitate access to this vulnerability by “rooting” the device and installing 
apps from non-legitimate app stores. Some actors injected malware into apps 
and have them made available on the Google Marketplace 
(Https://market.android.com/). To protect the user from these apps, Google 
introduced Google Bouncer in February 2012 (Albanesius, 2012), an antivirus 
program that scanned apps before they were made available on the Google 
PlayStore16. The article also described how it worked, “once an application is 
uploaded, the service immediately starts analyzing it for known malware, 
spyware and trojans. It also looks for behaviors that indicate an application 
might be misbehaving and compares it against previously analyzed apps to 
detect possible red flags." Google stated that “it runs every app in its cloud 
infrastructure to simulate how it might work on an Android device to look for 
anything fishy. Developer accounts are also scrutinized to guard against 
banned individuals making a reappearance”. 
 Android Permissions 
In 2011 an application did not have any associated permissions17 and declared 
in the manifest file which permissions it needed. At installation time the user 
is notified by the installer the permissions that the app is requesting, and the 
                                                 
 
16 Google PlayStore is the new name for Google Marketplace. 
17 Google introduce the concept of default permissions called normal_protection in API 23 (Marshmallow) 2015 
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user then has the option to deny (don’t install) or accept (continue install) the 
permissions. 
The user is not able to select which permissions the app can receive during the 
installation process. 
To aid developers the permissions have been explicitly mapped to resources 
and the resource functions as defined in the API level for that version of 
Android. The Android Developers forum documents the Permissions available 
to developers of Android apps and provides a list of the permissions grouped 
by function and with a brief description (Manifest Permissions, 2011). In 2011 
Froyo was the most common version of Android and there were 130 available 
permissions available for definition in the Manifest file as an API.  As newer 
versions of Android were released there were changes in the functionality of 
the operating system and this is reflected in the API calls available. These API 
calls are defined by their corresponding permissions. New permissions are 
added and or deleted in each re-iteration of Android, but most permissions 
remain constant, albeit with some minor variations or consolidations of sub-
functions. 
Example 
Using the Bluetooth permission as an example; the manifest file would contain the 
string 
android.permission-group.BLUETOOTH_NETWORK 
The API which this relates to this permission is android.bluetooth 
 
This lets applications 
· Scan for other Bluetooth devices 
· Query the local Bluetooth adapter for paired Bluetooth devices 
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· Establish RFCOMM channels/sockets 
· Connect to specified sockets on other devices 
· Transfer data to and from other devices 
The control is performed through the defined two interfaces and 14 classes of 
the API. 
In 2011 there were 17 API levels and additional APIs being introduced in 
subsequent levels. The API level provides the developer with program 
functionality that can be written whilst the level indicates to the user that new 
features are available18.  
Further information on Android permissions can be found in Android 
Permissions Demystified (A. P. Felt et al., 2011). 
                                                 
 
18 New functionality can be added to an API without requesting user permission. 
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Appendix C Antivirus Function testing 
The malware installed consisted of two viruses, an application containing adware and an 
application that permits root access to the device. Test Viruses were freely available on the 
marketplace sites to assist in testing AntiVirus products and the following two were 
downloaded from the Google Marketplace and used in the testing process.  
Antivirus TESTVIRUS from 
P.Defender Antivirus. This file contains code 
which antivirus products detect as a virus 
signature. 
 
 
 
 EICAR Anti-virus Test from 
Extorian. The file also contains code which is 
detected by antivirus programs as a virus 
signature. 
 
 
The application containing the adware was QR Droid, package name is la.droid.qr 
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The application permitting root access was installed as part of the jail-breaking/rooting of the 
device and is called Superuser, which provides root access to the device, package name is 
com.noshufou.android.su.  
The testing consisted of the following; 
· Downloading and install the app. 
o The app is downloaded to the G1 device from the marketplace and installed. 
· Checking for any antivirus database updates. 
o The app is started, and a note is made if the app requires an update to its 
antivirus/signature database and if the update must be initiated manually or 
if it is performed automatically.   
· Ease of scanning. 
o Is the scanning performed automatically and can it be scheduled, or does it 
need to be initiated manually? 
· Scanning to detect malware. 
o A full scan of the G1 device is performed and the scan results reviewed to 
verify that the installed malware was detected.  
· Removal of malware and rescanning to verify its removal 
o Does the product remove or quarantine the malware automatically or is 
manual intervention required? Once the item has been removed/quarantined 
does the product automatically re-scan and has the malware been removed 
(this is checked by accessing the filesystem of the device as well as using file 
management programs). 
· Downloading malware to verify real time monitoring (protection) and removal or 
blocking of the malware during download. 
o The two viruses are removed from the device, the app is started, and a test 
virus is then downloaded from the marketplace. Is the malware detected 
during the download and prevented from installing or is the user permitted 
to override the detection and installation? 
· Re-scanning of the device to verify that the malware is detectable by the product if not 
detected in real time mode. 
o If the malware was not detected during the download and installation 
process, verify that it is detected during the subsequent scan.    
The app testing results are shown below with snapshot images taken during the testing. 
  Lookout Free 
The app downloaded and installed without any issues. Scanning was performed manually and 
there were no options for scheduling scans. The product does not have an option to update the 
malware database but instead notifies the user of additional malware and requests that the 
user installs the newer version of the app containing the updated signatures.  The app detected 
both installed viruses but did not detect the adware application or the superuser toolkit. The 
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app has a status interface which provides a summary of detected threats and a security 
dashboard with details of the threats. 
       
The app detected the download and installation of the malware and provided the option to 
remove (uninstall) the malware.  
 
 
 
 
The app downloaded and installed without any issues. Starting the app, the user is given the 
option to either protect or configure the device. Scanning was performed manually after 
selecting the option to protect the device, there were no options for scheduling scans. The app 
detected only one of the installed virus test files and the root access but did not detect the 
adware application. 
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The app detected the download and installation of the malware and provided the option to 
remove (uninstall) the malware. 
Dr.Web Anti-virus Light  
 
The app downloaded and installed after the second attempt. Starting the app, the user is 
presented with the security interface of the product. This interface provides the ability to turn 
on real time monitoring, run a scan, update the virus database and review threat statistics. 
       
Multiple scan profiles are available to perform one of three types of scan profiles: 
1. Quick scan 
2. Full scan 
3. Custom scan 
A full scan was performed.  The app detected one of the installed viruses but did not detect 
the adware application or the root access. Selecting the threat result prompted the user to either 
remove or ignore the malware. The product also correctly identified the virus as an Antivirus 
Test file. 
Removal of the malware was successful, but also produced a scanning error message. 
Updating of the database resulted in the new malware signatures being downloaded from a 
central server and the date and time of the update was recorded on the Security Centre screen. 
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The SpIDer Guard option is switched off by default and had to be switched on to detect the 
malware being downloaded.   
A subsequent full re-scan and a quick scan also detected the malware. The only other area of 
note was the length of time which the full scan took (over 5 minutes) in comparison to the other 
products (less than 3 minutes).   
 Aegislab Antivirus Free  
The app downloaded and installed without any issues. When started, the app loads the 
malware definition file and then presents an initial screen which provided the option to scan, 
update the malware database, exclude apps or review the network statistics of the device.  
Scanning was performed manually after selecting the scan option. The app detected both 
installed viruses and the adware application, but not the root access. 
   
Appendices   
341 
   
Options were provided to uninstall or exclude the detected malware. Removal was successful, 
and the product immediately re-scanned to ensure that the malware had been removed. 
Selecting exclude placed the malware into an exclusion list. 
The product detected the download of the malware and provided a notification that the 
product is suspicious. A second product was downloaded and was also detected. 
 
  
The product also gave the user the option to update the malware definition file, which was 
downloaded to the device. 
 
 
 
 
Bluepoint Antivirus Free 
  
The app downloaded and installed without any issues. When started the initial screen displays 
options to scan, change settings and review events. This app uses a cloud malware database so 
there is no requirement to update or load a database onto the device. The detection database 
in the cloud receives the queries in real time when the Antivirus app needs to check a file.  
Selecting settings displays the status of the product. Scanning was performed manually after 
selecting the scan option. 
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 The app detected both installed viruses but did not detect either the adware application or the 
root access. 
The product detected the download and installation of the malware and provided a 
notification to the user. Selecting the detected threat provides an option to remove and the 
product confirms the removal. A re-scan of the device confirms the removal of the malware. 
    
 
 
 Android Defender Virus Protect  
 
The app downloaded and installed without any issues. When started the app requires the user 
to enter personal contact details, name, email address and zip code. No checking is performed 
other than that the zip code entered is a valid US zip code.  Once the data is entered, the main 
screen requires confirmation from the user to perform scanning. 
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Scanning is then performed. The app detected both installed viruses but not the adware 
application or the root access. 
Selection of the malware provided an option to remove (uninstall) the 
malware.  
    
The app did not detect the malware during download or installation, but only 
when a scan was run.  
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T
h
ir
d
 v
ar
ia
n
t 
of
 t
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
SM
S.
A
n
d
ro
id
O
S.
Fa
ke
P
la
ye
r.
A
. 
N
ew
 p
or
n
og
ra
p
h
ic
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
, 
ol
d
 
ic
on
. S
en
d
s 
2 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 s
h
or
t 
co
d
es
, a
t 
th
e 
en
d
-u
se
r’
s 
ex
p
en
se
. 
D
ec
 2
9,
 2
01
0 
A
n
d
ro
id
.G
ei
n
im
i 
Fi
rs
t e
xa
m
p
le
 o
f a
 B
ot
n
et
-L
ik
e 
M
al
w
ar
e 
on
 A
nd
ro
id
. “
G
ra
ft
ed
”
 o
n
to
 r
ep
a
ck
a
g
ed
 v
er
si
o
n
s 
o
f 
le
g
it
im
a
te
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s,
 p
ri
m
a
ri
ly
 g
a
m
es
, 
an
d
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 in
 t
h
ir
d
-p
ar
ty
 C
h
in
es
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 a
p
p
 m
ar
ke
ts
. O
n
ce
 t
h
e 
m
al
w
a
re
 i
s 
in
st
al
le
d
 o
n
 a
 u
se
r’
s 
p
h
o
n
e,
 i
t 
h
a
s 
th
e 
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
to
 
re
ce
iv
e 
co
m
m
an
d
s 
fr
om
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
se
rv
er
 t
h
at
 a
ll
ow
 t
h
e 
ow
n
er
 o
f 
th
at
 s
er
ve
r 
to
 c
on
tr
ol
 t
h
e 
p
h
on
e.
 T
h
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 it
 c
ol
le
ct
s 
in
cl
u
d
es
 lo
ca
ti
on
 c
oo
rd
in
at
es
 a
n
d
 u
n
iq
u
e 
id
en
ti
fi
er
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
(I
M
E
I)
 a
n
d
 S
IM
 c
ar
d
 (
IM
SI
).
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ro
id
.A
d
rd
 A
K
A
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.H
on
gT
ou
T
ou
 
N
ew
 M
al
w
ar
e 
w
it
h
 B
ot
n
et
-l
ik
e 
Fe
at
u
re
s 
fr
om
 C
h
in
a.
 T
h
e 
tr
oj
an
 c
om
p
ro
m
is
es
 p
er
so
n
al
 d
at
a 
su
ch
 a
s 
IM
E
I/
IM
SI
 o
f 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 
se
n
d
s 
th
em
 b
ac
k 
to
 t
h
e 
re
m
ot
e 
si
d
e 
to
 r
ea
ct
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 th
e 
co
m
m
an
d
s 
fr
om
 t
h
er
e.
 L
ik
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
.G
ei
n
im
i b
u
t 
w
it
h
 a
 lo
w
er
 p
ro
fi
le
 (
le
ss
 
co
m
m
an
d
s)
 
Fe
b 
22
, 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.P
ja
p
p
s 
N
ew
 T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
 e
m
be
d
d
ed
 o
n
 t
h
ir
d
 p
ar
ty
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 I
t 
op
en
s 
a 
ba
ck
 d
oo
r 
on
 t
h
e 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 r
et
ri
ev
es
 c
om
m
an
d
s 
fr
om
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
co
m
m
an
d
 a
n
d
 c
on
tr
ol
 s
er
ve
r.
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ro
id
D
re
am
 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.R
oo
tc
ag
er
 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
O
S_
L
oo
to
or
.A
 
 
T
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
ex
am
p
le
 o
f 
a 
n
ew
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 o
f 
M
ob
il
e 
M
al
w
ar
e:
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 t
h
e 
O
ff
ic
ia
l 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t,
 a
ff
ec
te
d
, a
cc
or
d
in
g 
to
 
Sy
m
an
te
c 
50
,0
00
 t
o 
20
0,
00
0 
u
se
rs
. E
xp
lo
it
s 
tw
o 
d
if
fe
re
n
t t
oo
ls
 (
ra
ge
ag
ai
n
st
th
ec
ag
e 
an
d
 e
xp
lo
id
) 
to
 r
oo
t 
th
e 
p
h
on
e 
M
ar
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, 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.B
gS
er
v 
A
K
A
 T
ro
j/
B
gs
er
v
-A
 
A
K
A
 A
n
d
ro
id
O
S_
B
G
SE
R
V
.A
 
T
ro
ja
n
is
ed
 v
er
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 t
oo
l r
el
ea
se
d
 b
y 
G
oo
gl
e,
 o
n
 M
ar
ch
 t
h
e 
6t
h
, t
o 
re
m
ov
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 D
ro
id
D
re
am
. 
T
h
e 
tr
oj
an
 o
p
en
s 
a 
ba
ck
 d
oo
r 
an
d
 t
ra
n
sm
it
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
to
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
. I
t 
sh
ow
s 
m
or
e 
th
an
 e
ve
r 
se
cu
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
on
 f
la
w
s 
in
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
P
ro
p
os
it
io
n
 M
od
el
. 5
,0
00
 u
se
rs
 a
ff
ec
te
d
. 
M
ar
 2
0,
 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.Z
ea
h
ac
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
 t
h
at
 e
le
va
te
s 
p
ri
vi
le
ge
s 
on
 t
h
e 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 d
ev
ic
e,
 d
is
co
ve
re
d
 o
n
 a
 C
h
in
es
e 
la
n
gu
ag
e 
ap
p
 a
va
il
ab
le
 f
or
 d
ow
n
lo
ad
 o
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
C
h
in
es
e 
ap
p
 m
ar
ke
ts
. T
h
e 
ap
p
 h
as
 t
h
e 
ab
il
it
y 
to
 r
oo
t 
an
 A
n
d
ro
id
 d
ev
ic
e 
(b
y 
m
ea
n
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
p
lo
id
 t
oo
l 
ca
ll
ed
 b
y 
zH
as
h
 
bi
n
ar
y)
, l
ea
vi
n
g 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
vu
ln
er
ab
le
 t
o 
fu
tu
re
 t
h
re
at
s.
 T
h
e 
ap
p
, w
h
ic
h
 p
ro
vi
d
es
 c
al
li
n
g 
p
la
n
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ca
p
ab
il
it
ie
s 
w
as
 f
ou
nd
 
al
so
 o
n
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
al
be
it
 t
h
is
 v
er
si
on
 la
ck
ed
 t
h
e 
co
d
e 
to
 in
vo
ke
 t
h
e 
ex
p
lo
it
. 
M
ar
 3
0,
 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.W
al
ki
n
w
at
 
M
an
u
al
ly
 i
n
st
al
le
d
 f
ro
m
 n
on
-o
ff
ic
ia
l 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
ts
, 
th
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 m
od
if
ie
s 
ce
rt
ai
n
 p
er
m
is
si
on
s 
on
 t
h
e 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 d
ev
ic
e 
th
at
 
al
lo
w
 i
t 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
ac
ti
on
s:
 A
cc
es
s 
co
n
ta
ct
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ad
d
re
ss
 b
oo
k,
 a
cc
es
s 
n
et
w
or
k 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
, 
ac
ce
ss
 t
h
e 
p
h
on
e 
in
 a
 
re
ad
-o
n
ly
 s
ta
te
, 
ac
ce
ss
 t
h
e 
v
ib
ra
to
r 
o
n
 t
h
e 
p
h
o
n
e,
 C
h
ec
k
 t
h
e 
li
ce
n
se
 s
er
v
er
 f
o
r 
th
e 
a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
, 
fi
n
d
 t
h
e 
p
h
o
n
e’
s 
lo
ca
ti
o
n
, 
in
it
ia
te
 a
 
p
h
on
e 
ca
ll
 w
it
h
ou
t 
u
si
n
g 
th
e 
in
te
rf
ac
e,
 o
p
en
 n
et
w
or
k 
so
ck
et
s 
to
 a
cc
es
s 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
, r
ea
d
 lo
w
-l
ev
el
 lo
g 
fi
le
s,
 s
en
d
 S
M
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s,
 tu
rn
 
th
e 
p
h
on
e 
on
 a
n
d
 o
ff
. I
t 
gi
ve
s 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 t
o 
u
se
r 
tr
yi
n
g 
to
 d
is
ci
p
li
n
e 
u
se
rs
 t
h
at
 d
ow
n
lo
ad
 f
il
es
 il
le
ga
ll
y 
fr
om
 u
n
au
th
or
iz
ed
 s
it
es
. 
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d
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s 
A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
O
S_
A
d
sm
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A
 
T
h
is
 m
al
w
ar
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
al
ly
 t
ar
ge
te
d
 C
h
in
a 
M
ob
il
e 
su
bs
cr
ib
er
s.
 T
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
ar
ri
ve
d
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 a
 l
in
k 
se
n
t 
th
ro
u
gh
 S
M
S.
 T
h
e 
sa
id
 
m
es
sa
ge
 t
el
ls
 t
h
e 
C
h
in
a 
M
ob
il
e 
u
se
rs
 t
o 
in
st
al
l 
a 
p
at
ch
 f
or
 t
h
ei
r 
su
p
p
os
ed
ly
 v
u
ln
er
ab
le
 d
ev
ic
es
 b
y 
ac
ce
ss
in
g 
th
e 
gi
ve
n
 l
in
k,
 w
h
ic
h
 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 m
al
ic
io
u
s 
co
n
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
 f
il
e.
 T
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
th
en
 s
en
d
 m
es
sa
ge
 t
o 
p
re
m
iu
m
 n
u
m
be
rs
. 
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M
ay
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01
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A
n
d
ro
id
.Z
so
n
e 
A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.S
m
st
ib
oo
k 
G
oo
gl
e 
re
m
ov
ed
 a
 T
ro
ja
n
, Z
so
n
e,
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
ab
il
it
y 
to
 s
u
bs
cr
ib
e 
u
se
rs
 i
n
 C
h
in
a 
to
 p
re
m
iu
m
 r
at
e 
Q
Q
 c
od
es
 
vi
a 
SM
S 
w
it
h
ou
t 
th
ei
r 
kn
ow
le
d
ge
. 1
0,
00
0 
u
se
rs
 a
ff
ec
te
d
. 
M
ay
 2
2,
 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.S
p
ac
em
 
A
 b
ib
li
ca
l 
p
la
gu
e 
Fo
r 
A
n
d
ro
id
! 
T
ro
ja
n
is
ed
 v
er
si
on
 o
f 
a 
le
gi
ti
m
at
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 t
h
at
 i
s 
p
ar
t 
th
re
at
, 
p
ar
t 
d
oo
m
sa
ye
r.
 T
h
e 
th
re
at
 w
as
 
em
be
d
d
ed
 in
 a
 p
ir
at
ed
 v
er
si
on
 o
f a
n
 a
p
p
 c
al
le
d
 ‘H
o
ly
 *
**
k
in
g
 B
ib
le
’,
 w
h
ic
h
 i
ts
el
f 
h
a
s 
st
ir
re
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
v
er
sy
 o
n
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
o
ru
m
s 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 
th
e 
ap
p
 is
 in
 c
ir
cu
la
ti
on
. T
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
ta
rg
et
ed
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
an
 U
se
rs
. A
ft
er
 t
h
e 
re
bo
ot
, i
t 
st
ar
ts
 a
 s
er
vi
ce
 w
h
ic
h
 a
t 
re
gu
la
r 
in
te
rv
al
s,
 
a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 a
 h
o
st
 s
er
v
ic
e,
 p
a
ss
in
g
 a
lo
n
g
 t
h
e 
d
ev
ic
e’
s 
p
h
o
n
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 a
n
d
 o
p
er
a
to
r 
co
d
e.
 I
t 
th
en
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o
 r
et
ri
ev
e 
a
 
co
m
m
an
d
 f
ro
m
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
 i
n
 i
n
te
rv
al
s 
of
 3
3 
m
in
u
te
s.
 I
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
 t
o 
h
av
in
g 
ab
il
it
ie
s 
to
 r
es
p
on
d
 t
o 
co
m
m
an
d
s 
th
ro
u
gh
 t
h
e 
In
te
rn
et
 a
n
d
 S
M
S,
 t
h
e 
th
re
at
 a
ls
o 
h
as
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 d
es
ig
n
ed
 t
o 
tr
ig
ge
r 
on
 t
h
e 
21
 a
n
d
 2
2 
of
 M
ay
 2
01
1,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
ve
ly
 (
T
h
e 
E
n
d
 o
f 
T
h
e 
W
or
ld
).
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ig
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D
 
A
 b
ra
n
d
 n
ew
 v
er
si
on
 o
f 
A
n
d
ro
id
.D
ro
id
D
re
am
, 
d
u
bb
ed
 D
ro
id
D
re
am
L
ig
h
t,
 w
as
 f
ou
n
d
 i
n
 2
4 
ad
d
it
io
n
al
 a
p
p
s 
re
p
ac
ka
ge
d
 a
n
d
 
re
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
m
al
ic
io
u
s 
p
ay
lo
ad
 a
cr
os
s 
a 
to
ta
l o
f 
5 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
ev
el
op
er
s 
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 in
 t
h
e 
A
nd
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t.
 B
et
w
ee
n
 3
0.
00
0 
an
d
 1
20
.0
00
 u
se
rs
 a
ff
ec
te
d
. 
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n
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A
n
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id
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D
ro
id
K
u
n
gF
u
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 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.G
u
n
fu
 
M
al
w
ar
e 
w
h
ic
h
 u
se
s 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ex
p
lo
it
 t
h
an
 D
ro
id
D
re
am
, 
ra
ge
ag
ai
n
st
th
ec
ag
e,
 t
o 
ga
in
 r
oo
t 
p
ri
vi
le
ge
 a
n
d
 i
n
st
al
l 
th
e 
m
ai
n
 m
al
w
ar
e 
co
m
p
on
en
t.
 O
n
ce
 in
st
al
le
d
, t
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
h
as
 b
ac
kd
oo
r 
ca
p
ab
il
it
ie
s 
an
d
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
: e
xe
cu
te
 c
om
m
an
d
 t
o 
d
el
et
e 
a 
su
p
p
li
ed
 f
il
e,
 e
xe
cu
te
 
a 
co
m
m
an
d
 t
o 
op
en
 a
 s
u
p
p
li
ed
 h
om
ep
ag
e,
 d
ow
n
lo
ad
 a
n
d
 i
n
st
al
l 
a 
su
p
p
li
ed
 A
P
K
, 
op
en
 a
 s
u
p
p
li
ed
 U
R
L
, 
ru
n
 o
r 
st
ar
t 
a 
su
p
p
li
ed
 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 p
ac
ka
ge
. T
h
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
is
 m
or
eo
ve
r 
ca
p
ab
le
 to
 o
bt
ai
n
 s
om
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 s
en
d
 th
em
 to
 a
 r
em
o
te
 
se
rv
er
: T
h
e 
co
ll
ec
te
d
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 i
n
cl
u
d
e:
 I
M
E
I 
n
u
m
be
r,
 B
u
il
d
 v
er
si
o
n
 r
el
ea
se
, 
S
D
K
 v
er
si
o
n
, 
u
se
rs
’ 
m
o
b
il
e 
n
u
m
b
er
, 
P
h
o
n
e 
m
o
d
el
, 
N
et
w
or
k 
O
p
er
at
or
, T
yp
e 
of
 N
et
 C
on
n
ec
ti
vi
ty
, S
D
 c
ar
d
 a
va
il
ab
le
 m
em
or
y,
 P
h
on
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
m
em
or
y.
 In
 fe
w
 w
or
d
s,
 th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
is
 tu
rn
ed
 
in
to
 a
 m
em
be
r 
of
 a
 b
ot
n
et
. 
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n
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ge
 
T
ro
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n
 H
or
se
 t
h
at
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o 
se
n
d
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 p
re
-d
et
er
m
in
ed
 n
u
m
be
rs
. 
W
h
en
 a
n
 i
n
fe
ct
ed
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
 i
s 
in
st
al
le
d
, i
t 
at
te
m
p
ts
 t
o 
ex
p
lo
it
 t
h
e 
u
d
ev
 N
et
li
n
k 
M
es
sa
ge
 V
al
id
at
io
n
 L
oc
al
 P
ri
vi
le
ge
 E
sc
al
at
io
n
 V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y 
(B
ID
 3
45
36
) 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
“
ro
o
t”
 p
ri
v
il
eg
es
.  
O
n
ce
 r
u
n
n
in
g
 w
it
h
 “
ro
o
t”
 p
ri
v
il
eg
es
 i
t 
in
st
a
ll
s 
a
n
 e
x
ec
u
ta
b
le
 w
h
ic
h
 c
o
n
ta
in
s 
fu
n
ct
io
n
a
li
ty
 t
o
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
w
it
h
 a
 
co
n
tr
ol
 s
er
ve
r 
u
si
n
g 
H
T
T
P
 p
ro
to
co
l a
n
d
 s
en
d
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
Su
bs
cr
ib
er
 I
D
, M
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
r 
an
d
 M
od
el
 o
f 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e,
 V
er
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
A
nd
ro
id
 o
p
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
. T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 a
ls
o 
p
er
io
d
ic
al
ly
 c
on
n
ec
ts
 t
o 
th
e 
co
n
tr
ol
 s
er
ve
r 
an
d
 m
ay
 p
er
fo
rm
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
ac
ti
o
n
s:
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D
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w
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e 
N
am
e 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
 
se
n
d
 S
M
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s,
 r
em
ov
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
In
bo
x 
an
d
 d
ia
l p
h
on
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
. T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 a
ls
o 
co
n
ta
in
s 
fu
n
ct
io
n
al
it
y 
to
 m
on
it
or
 
p
h
on
e 
u
sa
ge
. 
Ju
n
 9
, 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.U
xi
p
p
 
A
K
A
 A
n
d
ro
id
/
Y
Z
H
C
SM
S.
A
  
T
ro
ja
n
 H
or
se
 t
h
at
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o 
se
n
d
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 p
re
d
et
er
m
in
ed
 n
u
m
be
rs
. A
ga
in
, t
h
e 
th
re
at
 i
s 
as
 a
n
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
 
fo
r 
a 
C
h
in
es
e 
ga
m
in
g 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y.
 W
h
en
 e
xe
cu
te
d
, t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 to
 s
en
d
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 s
ev
er
al
 n
u
m
be
rs
 a
n
d
 
re
m
ov
e 
th
e 
SM
S 
se
n
t.
  
T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 s
en
d
s 
d
ev
ic
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
, s
u
ch
 a
s 
IM
E
I 
an
d
 I
M
SI
 n
u
m
be
rs
. 
Ju
n
 1
0,
 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
r/
P
la
n
kt
on
-A
 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.T
on
cl
an
k 
  
T
h
is
 is
 a
 T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
 w
h
ic
h
 s
te
al
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 m
ay
 o
p
en
 a
 b
ac
k 
d
oo
r 
on
 A
nd
ro
id
 d
ev
ic
es
. A
va
il
ab
le
 fo
r 
d
ow
n
lo
ad
 in
 th
e 
A
nd
ro
id
 
M
ar
ke
t 
em
be
d
d
ed
 i
n
 s
ev
er
al
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s,
 w
h
en
 t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 i
s 
ex
ec
u
te
d
, i
t 
st
ea
ls
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
ev
ic
e:
 D
ev
ic
e 
ID
 a
n
d
 D
ev
ic
e 
p
er
m
is
si
on
s.
 T
h
e 
ab
ov
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 t
h
en
 s
en
t t
o 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
se
rv
er
 f
ro
m
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 d
ow
n
lo
ad
s 
a 
.ja
r 
fi
le
 w
h
ic
h
 
op
en
s 
a 
ba
ck
 d
oo
r 
an
d
 a
cc
ep
ts
 c
om
m
an
d
s 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
ac
ti
on
s 
on
 th
e 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 d
ev
ic
e:
 c
op
ie
s 
al
l t
h
e 
bo
ok
m
ar
ks
 o
n
 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e,
 c
op
ie
s 
al
l 
th
e 
h
is
to
ry
 o
n
 t
h
e 
d
ev
ic
e,
 c
op
ie
s 
al
l 
th
e 
sh
or
tc
u
ts
 o
n
 t
h
e 
d
ev
ic
e,
 c
re
at
es
 a
 lo
g 
of
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 p
er
fo
rm
ed
 o
n
 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e,
 m
o
d
if
ie
s 
th
e 
b
ro
w
se
r’
s 
h
o
m
e 
p
a
g
e,
 r
et
u
rn
s 
th
e 
st
a
tu
s 
o
f 
th
e 
la
st
 e
x
ec
u
te
d
 c
o
m
m
a
n
d
. 
T
h
e 
g
a
th
er
ed
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 i
s 
th
en
 
se
n
t 
to
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
. 
A
lt
h
ou
gh
 th
is
 m
al
w
ar
e 
d
oe
s 
n
ot
 r
oo
t t
h
e 
p
h
on
e,
 it
s 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
 o
f l
oa
d
in
g 
ad
d
it
io
n
al
 c
od
e 
d
oe
s 
n
ot
 a
ll
ow
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 s
of
tw
ar
e 
on
 A
n
d
ro
id
 
to
 i
n
sp
ec
t 
th
e 
d
o
w
n
lo
a
d
ed
 f
il
e 
in
 t
h
e 
u
su
al
 “
o
n
-a
cc
es
s”
 f
a
sh
io
n
, 
b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 s
ch
ed
u
le
d
 a
n
d
 “
o
n
-d
em
an
d
” 
sc
a
n
s.
 T
h
is
 i
s 
th
e 
re
as
on
 w
h
y 
th
e 
m
al
w
ar
e 
w
as
 n
ot
 d
is
co
ve
re
d
 b
ef
or
e.
 
Ju
n
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A
n
d
ro
id
.J
sm
sh
id
er
 
T
ro
ja
n
 f
ou
n
d
 i
n
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 m
ar
ke
ts
 t
h
at
 p
re
d
om
in
at
el
y 
ta
rg
et
 C
h
in
es
e 
A
nd
ro
id
 u
se
rs
. 
T
h
is
 T
ro
ja
n
 p
re
d
om
in
an
tl
y 
af
fe
ct
s 
d
ev
ic
es
 w
it
h
 a
 c
u
st
om
 R
O
M
. T
h
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 m
as
q
u
er
ad
es
 a
s 
a 
le
gi
ti
m
at
e 
on
e 
an
d
 e
xp
lo
it
s 
a 
vu
ln
er
ab
il
it
y 
fo
u
n
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
w
ay
 m
os
t 
cu
st
om
 R
O
M
s 
si
gn
 th
ei
r 
sy
st
em
 im
ag
es
 t
o 
in
st
al
l a
 s
ec
on
d
ar
y 
p
ay
lo
ad
 (
w
it
h
ou
t 
u
se
r 
p
er
m
is
si
on
) 
on
to
 t
h
e 
R
O
M
, g
iv
in
g 
it
 t
h
e 
ab
il
it
y 
to
 c
om
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
w
it
h
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
se
rv
er
 a
n
d
 r
ec
ei
ve
 c
om
m
an
d
s.
 O
n
ce
 i
n
st
al
le
d
 t
h
e 
se
co
n
d
 p
ay
lo
ad
 m
ay
 r
ea
d
, 
se
n
d
 a
n
d
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
in
co
m
in
g 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
(p
ot
en
ti
al
ly
 fo
r 
m
T
A
N
 in
te
rc
ep
ti
on
 o
r 
fr
au
d
u
le
n
t p
re
m
iu
m
 b
il
li
n
g 
su
bs
cr
ip
ti
on
s)
, i
n
st
al
l a
p
p
s 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
tl
y,
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
w
it
h
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
se
rv
er
 u
si
n
g 
D
E
S 
en
cr
yp
ti
on
. 
Ju
n
 2
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A
n
d
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id
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G
T
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ck
er
 
T
h
is
 t
ro
ja
n
 i
s 
a
u
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 d
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 t
o
 a
 u
se
r’
s 
p
h
o
n
e 
a
ft
er
 v
is
it
in
g
 a
 m
a
li
ci
o
u
s 
w
eb
p
a
g
e 
th
a
t 
im
it
at
es
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
a
rk
et
. T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
, w
h
ic
h
 ta
rg
et
s 
u
se
rs
 in
 th
e 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
by
 in
te
ra
ct
in
g 
w
it
h
 s
ev
er
al
 p
re
m
iu
m
 S
M
S 
su
bs
cr
ip
ti
on
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
w
it
h
ou
t c
on
se
n
t,
 c
an
 
si
gn
-u
p
 a
 v
ic
ti
m
 t
o 
se
ve
ra
l 
p
re
m
iu
m
 S
M
S
 s
u
b
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 s
er
v
ic
es
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
th
e 
u
se
r’
s 
co
n
se
n
t.
  T
h
is
 c
an
 le
ad
 t
o 
u
n
ap
p
ro
ve
d
 c
h
ar
ge
s 
to
 
A
pp
en
di
ce
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w
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e 
N
am
e 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
 
a
 v
ic
ti
m
’s
 p
h
o
n
e 
b
il
l.
 A
n
d
ro
id
 u
se
rs
 a
re
 d
ir
ec
te
d
 to
 in
st
al
l t
h
is
 T
ro
ja
n
 a
ft
er
 c
li
ck
in
g 
on
 a
 m
al
ic
io
u
s 
in
-a
p
p
 a
d
ve
rt
is
em
en
t,
 fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
 
a 
Fa
ke
 B
at
te
ry
 S
av
er
. 
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01
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A
n
d
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id
.K
u
n
gF
u
 V
ar
ia
n
ts
 
R
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 a
n
d
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
fo
rm
 o
f 
“l
eg
it
im
a
te
”
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s,
 t
h
es
e 
tw
o
 v
a
ri
an
ts
 a
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
o
ri
g
in
a
l 
o
n
e 
by
 r
e-
im
p
le
m
en
ti
n
g 
so
m
e 
of
 t
h
ei
r 
m
al
ic
io
u
s 
fu
n
ct
io
n
al
it
ie
s 
in
 n
at
iv
e 
co
d
e 
an
d
 s
u
p
p
or
ti
n
g 
tw
o 
ad
d
it
io
n
al
 c
om
m
an
d
 a
n
d
 c
on
tr
ol
 (
C
&
C
) 
d
om
ai
n
s.
 T
h
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
ar
e 
p
os
si
bl
y 
in
 p
la
ce
 to
 m
ak
e 
th
ei
r 
d
et
ec
ti
on
 a
n
d
 a
n
al
ys
is
 h
ar
d
er
. 
T
h
e 
re
p
ac
ka
ge
d
 a
p
p
s 
in
fe
ct
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
D
ro
id
K
u
n
gF
u
 v
ar
ia
n
ts
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
th
ro
u
gh
 s
ev
er
al
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
ap
p
 m
ar
ke
ts
 a
nd
 
fo
ru
m
s 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
C
h
in
es
e-
sp
ea
ki
n
g 
u
se
rs
. 
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A
n
d
ro
id
O
S_
C
ru
se
w
in
.A
 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.C
ru
se
w
in
d
 
A
n
ot
h
er
 e
xa
m
p
le
 o
f a
 tr
oj
an
 w
h
ic
h
 s
en
d
s 
SM
S 
to
 p
re
m
iu
m
 r
at
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
. I
t a
ls
o 
ac
ts
 a
s 
a 
SM
S 
R
el
ay
. I
t d
is
p
la
ys
 a
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 F
la
sh
 ic
on
 
in
 t
h
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 l
is
t.
 T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o 
d
ow
n
lo
ad
 a
n
 X
M
L
 c
on
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
 f
il
e 
an
d
 u
se
s 
it
 t
o 
re
tr
ie
ve
 a
 l
is
t 
of
 f
u
rt
h
er
 U
R
L
s 
to
 
se
n
d
 a
n
d
 r
ec
ei
ve
 a
d
d
it
io
n
al
 d
at
a.
 T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 a
ls
o 
co
n
ta
in
s 
fu
n
ct
io
n
al
it
y 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
ac
ti
on
s:
 d
el
et
e 
it
se
lf
, d
el
et
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s,
 s
en
d
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 th
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
th
at
 is
 s
p
ec
if
ie
d
 in
 th
e 
d
ow
n
lo
ad
ed
 X
M
L
 c
on
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
 fi
le
, u
p
d
at
e 
it
se
lf
. 
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id
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d
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K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.G
ol
d
D
re
am
 
T
h
is
 b
ac
kd
oo
r 
is
 a
 T
ro
ja
n
is
ed
 c
op
y 
of
 a
 le
gi
ti
m
at
e 
ga
m
in
g 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 f
or
 A
nd
ro
id
 O
S 
sm
ar
tp
h
on
es
. I
t s
te
al
s 
se
n
si
ti
ve
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
a
ff
ec
te
d
 p
h
o
n
e’
s 
S
M
S
 a
n
d
 c
al
ls
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s,
 c
o
m
p
ro
m
is
in
g
 t
h
e 
se
cu
ri
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 o
f 
th
e 
u
se
r.
 I
t 
m
o
n
it
o
rs
 t
h
e 
a
ff
ec
te
d
 p
h
o
n
e’
s 
SM
S 
an
d
 p
h
on
e 
ca
ll
s 
an
d
 s
en
d
s 
st
ol
en
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
o 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
U
R
L
. I
t 
al
so
 c
on
n
ec
ts
 t
o 
a 
m
al
ic
io
u
s 
U
R
L
 t
o 
re
ce
iv
e 
co
m
m
an
d
s 
fr
om
 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
m
al
ic
io
u
s 
u
se
r.
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D
ro
id
D
re
am
 L
ig
h
t 
V
ar
ia
n
t 
N
ew
 v
ar
ia
n
t 
of
 D
ro
id
D
re
am
 L
ig
h
t 
in
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 r
em
ov
ed
 b
y 
G
oo
gl
e.
 N
u
m
be
r 
of
 d
ow
n
lo
ad
s 
w
as
 l
im
it
ed
 t
o 
10
00
 –
 5
00
0.
 T
h
is
 is
 t
h
e 
th
ir
d
 it
er
at
io
n
 o
f 
m
al
w
ar
e 
li
ke
ly
 c
re
at
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
au
th
or
s 
of
 D
ro
id
D
re
am
. 
Ju
l 1
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A
n
d
ro
id
.S
m
ss
n
if
fe
r 
A
K
A
 
A
n
d
r/
SM
SR
ep
-B
/
C
 A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.T
ro
ja
n
.S
m
sS
p
y.
B
/
C
 A
K
A
 
T
ro
ja
n
-S
p
y.
A
n
d
ro
id
O
S.
Sm
se
r.
a 
Z
iT
M
O
 a
rr
iv
es
 o
n
 A
n
d
ro
id
! 
T
h
is
 t
h
re
at
 i
s 
fo
u
n
d
 b
u
n
d
le
d
 w
it
h
 r
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 v
er
si
on
s 
of
 l
eg
it
im
at
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 W
h
en
 t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 i
s 
ex
ec
u
te
d
, i
t 
gr
ab
s 
a 
co
p
y 
of
 a
ll
 S
M
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
h
an
d
h
el
d
 d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 s
en
d
s 
th
em
 t
o 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
. 
Ju
l 1
2,
 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.H
ip
p
oS
M
S 
A
K
A
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.H
ip
p
o 
A
n
ot
h
er
 t
h
re
at
 f
ou
n
d
 b
u
n
d
le
d
 w
it
h
 r
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 v
er
si
on
s 
of
 l
eg
it
im
at
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 W
h
en
 t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 i
s 
ex
ec
u
te
d
, i
t 
gr
ab
s 
a 
co
p
y 
of
 
al
l S
M
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
h
an
d
h
el
d
 d
ev
ic
e 
an
d
 s
en
d
s 
th
em
 t
o 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
. 
A
pp
en
di
ce
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Ju
l 1
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 2
01
1 
 
A
n
d
ro
id
.F
ok
on
ge
 
T
h
is
 t
h
re
at
 i
s 
of
te
n
 f
ou
n
d
 b
u
n
d
le
d
 w
it
h
 r
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 v
er
si
on
s 
of
 l
eg
it
im
at
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 T
h
e 
re
p
ac
ka
ge
d
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s 
ar
e 
ty
p
ic
al
ly
 
fo
u
n
d
 o
n
 u
n
of
fi
ci
al
 w
eb
si
te
s 
of
fe
ri
n
g 
A
n
d
ro
id
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 W
h
en
 th
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 is
 e
xe
cu
te
d
, i
t s
te
al
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 s
en
d
s 
it
 to
 a
 r
em
ot
e 
se
rv
er
. 
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id
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Fi
ve
 A
n
d
ro
id
 a
p
p
s 
fo
u
n
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
of
fi
ci
al
 A
nd
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
t 
sh
a
re
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 s
u
sp
ic
io
u
s 
p
a
y
lo
a
d
 w
h
ic
h
 u
p
lo
ad
 u
se
rs
’ 
p
er
so
n
al
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
em
a
il
 a
cc
o
u
n
ts
 a
s 
w
el
l 
a
s 
p
h
o
n
e 
n
u
m
b
er
s 
to
 a
 r
em
o
te
 s
er
v
er
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
u
se
r’
s 
aw
a
re
n
es
s.
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A
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ro
id
.N
ic
ki
sp
y 
T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
 w
h
ic
h
 s
te
al
s 
se
ve
ra
l i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 A
n
d
ro
id
 d
ev
ic
es
 (
fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
 G
P
S 
L
oc
at
io
n
 o
r 
W
i-
Fi
 p
os
it
io
n
).
 F
or
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
ti
m
e 
on
 t
h
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 P
la
tf
or
m
 a
 m
al
w
ar
e 
is
 b
el
ie
ve
d
 t
o 
sp
y 
co
n
ve
rs
at
io
n
s.
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A
n
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ro
id
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et
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p
 
T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
 t
h
at
 s
en
d
s 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
p
h
on
e 
n
u
m
be
r.
 W
h
en
 t
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 i
s 
ex
ec
u
te
d
, 
it
 r
et
ri
ev
es
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
co
n
ta
in
in
g 
p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
p
h
on
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
 f
ro
m
 a
 m
al
ic
io
u
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U
R
L
 th
en
 s
en
d
s 
p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
SM
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s.
 a
n
d
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 to
 b
lo
ck
 a
n
y 
co
n
fi
rm
at
io
n
 S
M
S 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
th
e 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 d
ev
ic
e 
m
ay
 r
ec
ei
ve
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
to
 m
as
k 
it
s 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
. T
h
e 
T
ro
ja
n
 
al
so
 a
tt
em
p
ts
 t
o 
ga
th
er
 I
M
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 a
n
d
 lo
ca
ti
on
 in
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rm
at
io
n
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n
d
 s
en
d
 th
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n
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ot
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at
ta
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A
u
g 
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A
n
d
ro
id
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re
m
iu
m
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T
h
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 is
 a
 d
et
ec
ti
on
 f
or
 T
ro
ja
n
 h
or
se
s 
th
at
 s
en
d
 S
M
S 
te
xt
s 
to
 p
re
m
iu
m
-r
at
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
. T
h
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T
ro
ja
n
 is
 a
 r
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 v
er
si
on
s 
of
 g
en
u
in
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 s
of
tw
ar
e 
p
ac
ka
ge
s,
 o
ft
en
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
A
n
d
ro
id
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
. T
h
e 
p
ac
ka
ge
 n
am
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 p
u
bl
is
h
er
, a
n
d
 o
th
er
 d
et
ai
ls
 w
il
l 
va
ry
 a
n
d
 m
ay
 b
e 
ta
ke
n
 d
ir
ec
tl
y 
fr
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h
e 
or
ig
in
al
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p
p
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ca
ti
on
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A
u
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n
d
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id
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ki
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It
 b
el
on
gs
 t
o 
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m
e 
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ic
ki
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m
il
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
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is
 s
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n
if
ic
an
tl
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d
if
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re
n
t 
fr
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s 
p
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d
ec
es
so
r 
si
n
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 is
 f
u
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y 
co
n
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ol
le
d
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y 
SM
S 
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ge
s 
in
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ea
d
 o
f 
re
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in
g 
on
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 h
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d
-c
od
ed
 C
&
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ve
r 
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r 
in
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ru
ct
io
n
s.
 I
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
, N
ic
ki
B
ot
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u
p
p
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 a
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
bo
t 
co
m
m
an
d
s,
 
su
ch
 a
s 
fo
r 
(G
P
S-
ba
se
d
) l
oc
at
io
n
 m
on
it
or
in
g,
 s
ou
n
d
 r
ec
or
d
in
g 
an
d
 (e
m
ai
l-
ba
se
d
) u
p
lo
ad
in
g,
 c
al
ll
og
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n
, e
tc
. I
t a
ls
o 
h
as
 a
 c
h
ec
k
-
in
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
 t
o 
a 
re
m
ot
e 
w
eb
si
te
. 
h
is
 t
h
re
at
 i
s 
of
te
n
 f
ou
n
d
 b
u
n
d
le
d
 w
it
h
 r
ep
ac
ka
ge
d
 v
er
si
on
s 
of
 l
eg
it
im
at
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 T
h
e 
re
p
ac
ka
ge
d
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s 
ar
e 
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p
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al
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 f
ou
n
d
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n
 u
n
of
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eb
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s 
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n
g 
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p
p
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ca
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s.
 W
h
en
 t
h
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T
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ja
n
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ex
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u
te
d
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at
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n
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n
d
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d
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re
m
ot
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